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Résumé de la thèse
L’estimation structurelle des modèles de demande sur des marchés de produits
diﬀérenciés joue un rôle important en économie. Elle permet de mieux com-
prendre les choix des consommateurs (e.g., en estimant les élasticités-prix de la
demande). De plus, elle est le point de départ de l’étude de plusieurs questions
économiques d’intérêt, incluant celles relatives au pouvoir de marché des en-
treprises (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001), à la fusion d’entreprises (Nevo, 2000),
à l’introduction de nouveaux produits sur le marché (Petrin, 2002; Gentzkow,
2007), à la politique commerciale (Goldberg, 1995; Verboven, 1996; Berry et al.,
1999), et aux taxes (Griﬃth et al., 2019).
La littérature théorique a mis en évidence que les réponses à ces questions
dépendent de la forme de la fonction de demande, laquelle est décrite par sa
pente et sa courbature. Ainsi, étant donné un modèle d’oﬀre (e.g., modèle sta-
tique de concurrence oligopolistique en prix), la qualité des réponses repose sur
la capacité du modèle de demande à être "flexible", i.e., sur sa capacité à capter
de manière flexible les substitutions qui existent entre les produits.
L’approche standard consiste à spécifier un modèle d’utilité aléatoire addi-
tif, à en calculer sa fonction de demande, et à estimer cette dernière en util-
isant la méthode développée par Berry (1994). Le modèle d’utilité aléatoire
additif est utilisé pour sa capacité à modéliser le comportement de consomma-
teurs hétérogènes choisissant parmi un grand nombre de produits diﬀérenciés
de manière parcimonieuse et flexible. La méthode de Berry (1994) est utilisée
pour estimer des modèles de demande pour des produits qui sont diﬀérenciés
de manières observée et inobservée par le modélisateur. Elle résout les prob-
lèmes d’endogénéité liés à la présence de termes d’erreurs structurels, lesquels
représentent les caractérististiques des produits qui sont inobservées par le mod-
élisateur mais observées et valorisées par les entreprises et les consommateurs.
Elle consiste à estimer les paramètres structurels de la fonction de demande à
partir du système d’équations qui égalise les demandes observées aux deman-
des prédites par le modèle. Or, les termes structurels d’erreurs entrent dans ce
système de manière non-linéaire, empêchant donc l’utilisation des techniques
standards des variables instrumentales. Berry (1994) propose ainsi d’inverser le
système afin d’obtenir des équations de demande inverse au sein desquelles les
termes d’erreurs structurels entrent de manière linéaire et de les utiliser comme
base pour l’estimation. Toutefois, en général, ces demandes inverses n’ont pas
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d’expression analytique. L’inversion doit donc être faite numériquement, ce qui
exige l’emploi de procédures d’estimation non-linéaire et la résolution de prob-
lèmes connexes d’optima locaux et de précision de l’inversion numérique (Knittel
& Metaxoglou, 2014).1
La méthode de Berry et al. (1995), connue sous le nom de méthode BLP, est
la méthode la plus populaire et la plus avancée de cette approche. Elle utilise
un modèle logit à coeﬃcients aléatoires qu’elle estime par un algorithme réal-
isant une inversion numérique de la demande, imbriquée dans une procédure
d’estimation non-lineaire. Elle permet de capter de manière flexible les substitu-
tions entre les produits tout en résolvant les problèmes d’endogénéité. Toutefois,
elle est sujette à des diﬃcultés pratiques : la flexibilité exige l’utilisation de nom-
breux coeﬃcients qui peuvent être diﬃciles à identifier empiriquement ; de plus,
estimer un modèle logit à coeﬃcients aléatoires peut être diﬃcile et chronophage
puisque cela exige l’emploi de procédures d’estimation non-linéaire ainsi que la
simulation et l’inversion numérique des fonctions de demande.
L’autre méthode très répandue utilise le modèle logit emboîté, lequel évite
les diﬃcultés associées à la méthode BLP en ayant uniquement recours à des
régressions linéaires. Toutefois, le modèle logit emboîté est critiqué aumotif qu’il
ne permet pas de capter de manière flexible les substitutions entre les produits et
qu’il demande aumodélisateur de définir la structure des nids avant l’estimation,
i.e., de déterminer les sources pertinentes de segmentation du marché.
Cette thèse poursuit l’objectif de proposer des modèles de choix des consom-
mateurs qui soient flexibles et qui aboutissent à des méthodes d’estimation sim-
ples et rapides. Pour cela, elle adopte une approche diﬀérente : elle développe
de nouveaux modèles de demande inverse qui sont cohérents avec un modèle
d’utilité de consommateurs hétérogènes. Cette approche permet de capter de
façon flexible les substitutions entre les produits, grâce à de simples régressions
linéaires basées sur des données incluant les parts de marché, les prix et les
caractéristiques des produits. Ces modèles peuvent être utilisés dans diﬀérents
domaines de l’économie, incluant l’économie industrielle, le commerce interna-
tional et l’économie publique pour, entre autres, mesurer les eﬀets d’une fusion
d’entreprise, de l’introduction d’un nouveau produit sur le marché ou d’une nou-
velle régulation. Du fait de leur simplicité d’estimation, ces modèles devraient
intéresser les chercheurs ainsi que les praticiens antitrust des cabinets de conseil
1À ma connaissance, les seuls modèles d’utilité aléatoire additifs ayant une fonction de de-
mande inverse analytique sont le modèles logit et logit emboîté.
iv
et des autorités de concurrence qui souhaitent éviter des procédures d’estimation
complexes et/ou qui sont pressés par le temps.
Plus spécifiquement, cette thèse développe et étudie des modèles de demande
inverse pour J +1 produits diﬀérenciés j = 0, . . . , J de la forme
σj(s)
−1 = lnGj(s) + c, j = 0, . . . , J,
où s est un vecteur de parts de marché, lnGj est une fonction dont les propriétés
restent à définir et c est une constante commune aux diﬀérents produits.
Le premier chapitre de cette thèse construit la classe des modèles general-
ized inverse logit (GIL), lesquels sont des modèles de demande inverse de la forme
décrite par l’Equation ci-dessus où lnG ≡ (lnG0, . . . , lnGJ ) présente des propriétés
spécifiques: lnG est telle que G est homogène de degré un et sa matrice jacobi-
enne est définie positive et symétrique.2 Ce chapitre montre que chaque mod-
èle de cette classe est cohérent avec un modèle de consommateur représentatif
et inclut une grande majorité de modèles d’utilité aléatoire additifs. Il four-
nit également des méthodes générales pour construire des modèles GIL. Une
des méthodes développe des modèles basés sur la construction de nids (i.e., de
groupes de produits), lesquels sont analogues à des modèles d’utilité aléatoire
additifs qui ont été utilisés à des fins d’estimation de la demande (e.g., le mod-
èle logit ordonné de Small (1987) ou le modèle modèle logit emboîté croisé de
Vovsha (1997)). En particulier, il développe le modèle inverse product diﬀeren-
tiation logit (IPDL), lequel, de manière analogue au modèle de Bresnahan et al.
(1997), généralise les modèles logit emboîtés, permettant ainsi de capter de façon
plus flexible les substitutions entre les produits, y compris de la complémentar-
ité. Cette construction présente toutefois deux limites, lesquelles feront l’objet
d’une extension dans le deuxième chapitre. D’abord, elle demande au modélisa-
teur de choisir la structure des nids avant l’estimation. Ensuite, elle implique que
la substitution entre produits ne dépend pas directement des caractéristiques des
produits – sauf éventuellement celles utilisées pour la construction des nids.
Le second chapitre développe le modèle flexible inverse logit (FIL), lequel est
un modèle GIL qui dépasse les deux limites associées aux modèles basés sur la
construction de nids. Le modèle FIL utilise une structure de nids flexible avec
un nid pour chaque pair de produits et un paramètre de nid associé (voir Chu,
2Une fonction f de E dans F est dite homogène de degré un si pour tout x ∈ E, pour tout λ > 0,
f (λx) = λf (x). La matrice jacobienne est la matrice des dérivées partielles du premier ordre d’une
fonction vectorielle.
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1989; Koppelman & Wen, 2000; Davis & Schiraldi, 2014) ; il est cohérent avec
un modèle appartenant à la classe de modèles de consommateurs hétérogènes
maximisateur d’utilité étudiée par Allen & Rehbeck (2019). Les paramètres de
nid du modèle FIL sont ensuite projetés dans l’espace des caractéristiques. Basé
sur Pinkse et al. (2002), ces paramètres sont remplacés par une fonction de la
distance entre les produits dans l’espace des caractéristiques. Cette projection
permet d’obtenir une substitution entre les produits qui dépend directement des
caractéristiques des produits, comme c’est le cas du modèle logit à coeﬃcients
aléatoires. La projection utilise également les polynômes de Bernstein afin que
la manière dont les substitutions dépendent des caractéristiques soit estimée à
partir des données et non postulée. Enfin, des simulations de Monte Carlo ont
été menés pour mesurer la capacité du modèle FIL à répliquer les élasticités-prix
de la demande de modèles logit à coeﬃcients aléatoires pour des spécifications
de l’utilité répandues (absence d’eﬀet revenu, utilité linéaire en le prix, un coef-
ficient aléatoire normalement distribué, etc.). Les résultats des simulations mon-
trent la capacité du modèle FIL à produire des substitutions flexibles.
Le troisième chapitre étudie la micro-fondation du modèle GIL développé
dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse. Il montre que les restrictions que le mod-
èle GIL impose sur la fonction de demande inverse sont des conditions néces-
saires et suﬃsantes de cohérence avec un modèle de consommateurs hétérogènes
maximisateur d’utilité, connu sous le nom de perturbed utility model (PUM) et
étudié, entre autres, par Allen & Rehbeck (2019). La preuve de ce résultat im-
plique deux résultats intermédiaires pouvant être considérés comme intéressants
en soi. Tout d’abord, tout PUM génère une fonction de demande qui satisfait
une légère variante des conditions de Daly-Zachary (voir Daly & Zachary, 1979),
laquelle permet de combiner substituabilité et complémentarité en demande.
Ensuite, toute fonction de demande satisfaisant ces conditions a une fonction de
demande inverse qui est un modèle GIL. Ainsi, par relation d’équivalence, il est
montré que les modèles GIL, les PUM et les modèles de demande satisfaisant la
variante des conditions de Daly-Zachary fournissent trois modélisations équiva-
lentes du comportement des consommateurs.
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Chapter 1
The Inverse Product Diﬀerentiation
Logit Model
1 Introduction
Estimating the demand for diﬀerentiated products is of great empirical relevance
in industrial organization and other fields of economics. It is important for un-
derstanding consumer behavior and for analyzing major economic issues such as
the eﬀects of mergers and changes in regulation. Ideally, one would like to em-
ploy a model that accommodates rich patterns of substitution, while requiring
just regression for estimation.
This paper proposes the Inverse Product Diﬀerentiation Logit (IPDL) model,
which generalizes the nested logit model by allowing richer patterns of substi-
tution and in particular complementarity (i.e., a negative cross-price elasticity of
demand), while being estimable by linear instrumental variables regression.
The IPDL model is relevant for estimating demands for diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts that are segmented along multiple dimensions. It generalizes the nested
logit models by allowing the segmentation to be non-hierarchical, which is often
desirable in applications. At the same time, it maintains the important advan-
tages of the nested logit model. First, its inverse demand has closed form such
that numerical inversion of demand is not required. Second, it can be estimated
by two-stage least squares regression of market shares on product characteristics
and shares related to product segmentation. Third, it is consistent with util-
ity maximization. The IDPL model may therefore be an attractive option in the
many empirical applications where the nested logit model would otherwise be
1
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used.
The current practice of the demand estimation literature with aggregate data
is to assume an additive random utility model (ARUM) (McFadden, 1974) and to
estimate it using Berry (1994)’s method to deal with endogeneity of prices and
market shares. The logit model is the simplest option, but exhibits the Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. This implies that an improvement
in one product draws demand proportionately from all the other products and
makes cross-price elasticities independent of how close products are in charac-
teristics space, which is unreasonable in most applications.
The nested logit model with two or more levels generalizes the logit model
(see Goldberg, 1995; Verboven, 1996a). This model is commonly used to esti-
mate aggregate demand for diﬀerentiated products; some recent examples are
Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) and Berry et al. (2016). The nested logit model
has closed-form inverse demand and is conveniently estimated by two-stage least
squares. It imposes, however, the restriction that the segmentation of products,
i.e., the nesting structure, must be hierarchical, meaning. that each nest on a
lower level must be contained within exactly one nest on a higher level. This
severely constrains the substitution patterns that the nested logit model can ac-
commodate, since the IIA property still holds within nests and at the nest level.
Furthermore, the sequence of segmentation dimensions in the hierarchy is not
unique and often not obvious.1
The logit and nested logit models belong to the wider class of Generalized
Extreme Value (GEV) models developed by McFadden (1978).2 A number of
recent papers have proposed members from this class in order to obtain mod-
els with richer substitution patterns. The product diﬀerentiation logit model of
Bresnahan et al. (1997) extends the nested logit model by allowing the grouping
of products to be non-hierarchical. The ordered logit model of Small (1987) and
the ordered nested logit model of Grigolon (2018) describe markets having a nat-
ural ordering of products.3 The seminal paper by Berry et al. (1995) overcomes
1Hellerstein (2008) writes, concerning the beers market, "[D]emand models such as the mul-
tistage budgeting model or the nested logit model do not fit this market particularly well. It is
diﬃcult to define clear nests or stages in beer consumption because of the high cross-price elastic-
ities between domestic light beers and foreign light and regular beers. When a consumer chooses
to drink a light beer that also is an import, it is not clear if he categorized beers primarily as
domestic or imported and secondarily as light or regular, or vice versa."
2GEV models are ARUM in which the random utilities have a multivariate extreme value
distribution (Fosgerau et al., 2013).
3Other papers provide generalizations of the logit model by using semiparametric or nonpara-
2
CHAPTER 1. THE INVERSE PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION LOGIT MODEL
the limitations of the nested logit model by specifying a random coeﬃcient logit
model, which breaks IIA at the population level. However, the inverse demands
of these more general models do not have closed form.
The richer substitution patterns of these models is obtained at the cost of
more complex and time-consuming nonlinear estimation procedures such as the
nested fixed point (NFP) approach of Berry et al. (1995) or the Mathematical
Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) approach of Dubé et al. (2012),
which are associated with issues of local optima and choice of starting values (see
e.g., Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2014).
In this paper, we depart from the standard practice by specifying a model
in terms of the inverse demand. Given linear-in-parameters utility indexes, the
model can then be directly estimated by linear regression using Berry (1994)’s
method. More specifically, we propose the IPDL model for products that are seg-
mented along multiple dimensions. The IPDL model extends the nested logit
model by allowing arbitrary, non-hierarchical grouping structures (i.e., any par-
titioning of the choice set in each dimension). It improves on the nested logit
model by allowing for richer patterns of substitution and, as we show, even com-
plementarity. This improvement is achieved by removing the constraint that the
segmentation should be hierarchical, and it is therefore costless. While the IPDL
model requires modelers to define the segmentation, the relative importance of
segmentation dimensions can be estimated.
Another important approach in demand estimation is the flexible functional
form approach (e.g., the AIDSmodel of Deaton andMuellbauer, 1980), where the
error term has no immediate structural interpretation. By contrast, in this paper,
the error term has the structural interpretation of Berry (1994) that it represents
product/market-level characteristics unobserved by the modeller but observed
by consumers and firms.
The IPDL model belongs to a wider class of inverse demand models, that
we label Generalized Inverse Logit (GIL) models. We show that any GIL model
is consistent with a representative consumer model (RCM) in which a utility-
maximizing representative consumer chooses a vector of nonzero demands, trad-
ing oﬀ variety against quality. We also show that any ARUM is equivalent to
some GIL model. However, the converse is not true, since some GIL models ex-
hibit complementarity, which cannot occur in an ARUM. We establish a new de-
mand inversion result, which extends Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (2013) by
metric methods, see Davis and Schiraldi (2014) for more details.
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allowing complementarity. It is often desirable to allow complementarity as im-
portant economic questions hinge on the extent to which products are substitutes
or complements. In particular, this directly aﬀects the incentives to introduce a
new product on the market, to bundle, to merge, etc.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the context, introducing the
role of demand inversion with the inverse demand of the logit and nested logit
models as examples. Section 3 introduces the IPDL model as a generalization
of the inverse demand of the nested logit model and shows how to estimate it
with aggregate data. Section 4 applies the IPDL model to estimate the demand
for ready-to-eat cereals in Chicago, finding that complementarity is pervasive
in this market. Section 5 introduces the wider class of GIL models. Section 6
studies its linkages with the ARUM and RCM. Section 7 concludes. A supplement
provides Monte Carlo evidence on the IPDL model as well as general methods
and examples for building GIL models that go beyond the IPDL model.
2 Motivation
2.1 General Setting: the Role of Demand Inversion
Consider a population of consumers choosing from a choice set of J + 1 diﬀer-
entiated products, denoted by J = {0,1, . . . , J}, where products j = 1, . . . , J are the
inside products and product j = 0 is the outside good. We consider aggregate
data on market shares sjt > 0, prices pjt ∈ R and K product/market characteris-
tics xjt ∈ RK for each inside product j = 1, . . . , J in each market t = 1, . . . ,T (Berry,
1994; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001). For each market t, the market shares sjt are
positive and sum to 1, i.e., st =
(
s0t, . . . , sJt
)
∈ int(∆), where int(∆) is the interior of
the unit simplex in RJ+1.
Based on Berry and Haile (2014), let δjt ∈ R be an index given by
δjt = δ
(
pjt,xjt,ξjt;θ1
)
, j ∈ J , t = 1, . . . ,T ,
where ξjt ∈ R is the jt-product/market unobserved characteristics term and θ1 is
a vector of parameters.
4See Gentzkow (2007), Ershov et al. (2018), and Iaria and Wang (2019) who investigate these
issues empirically.
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Consider the system of demand equations
st = σ (δt;θ2) , t = 1, . . . ,T , (1)
which relates the vector of observed market shares, st, to the vector of product
indexes in market t, δt = (δ0t, . . . ,δJt), through the model, σ =
(
σ0, . . . ,σJ
)
, where
θ2 is a vector of parameters and
σ (·;θ2) :D→ int(∆)
is an invertible function, with domain D ⊂ RJ+1.5
The market share of the outside good is determined by the identity
σ0 (δt;θ2) = 1−
J∑
k=1
σk (δt;θ2) , t = 1, . . . ,T .
We normalize the index of the outside good, setting δ0t = 0 in each market t =
1, . . . ,T .
Several remarks regarding the demand system (1) are in order. First, the un-
observed characteristics terms ξjt are scalars. Second, there is no income eﬀect,
since σ does not depend on income, and income is implicitly assumed to be suﬃ-
ciently high that y >maxj∈J pj . Last, prices pjt and characteristics xjt enter only
through the indexes (in particular, we rule out random coeﬃcients on prices and
product characteristics).
Since the function σ in Equation (1) is invertible in δt, then the inverse de-
mand, denoted by σ−1j , maps from market shares st to each index δjt with
δjt = σ
−1
j (st;θ2) , j ∈ J , t = 1, . . . ,T . (2)
For simplicity, we assume a linear index,
δjt = xjtβ −αpjt + ξjt, j ∈ J , t = 1, . . . ,T .
Then the unobserved product characteristics terms, ξjt, can be written as a
5Restricting the domain of σ to D enables the model to be normalized. E.g., D = {δt ∈ RJ+1 :
δ0t = 0} or D =
{
δt ∈ RJ+1 :∑j∈J δjt = 0}.
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function of the data and parameters θ1 = (α,β) and θ2 to be estimated,
ξjt = σ
−1
j (st;θ2) +αpjt − xjtβ, j ∈ J , t = 1, . . . ,T . (3)
The unobserved product characteristics terms ξjt represent the structural er-
ror terms of the model, since we assume that they are observed by consumers
and firms but not by the modeller. In addition, prices and market shares in the
right-hand side of Equation (3) are endogenous, i.e., they are correlated with the
structural error terms ξjt.6 Then, following Berry (1994), we can estimate de-
mands (1) based on the conditional moment restrictions
E
[
ξjt |zt
]
= 0, j ∈ J , t = 1, . . . ,T ,
provided that there exists appropriate instruments zt for the endogenous prices
and market shares.
2.2 Closed-Form and Linear-in-Parameters Inverse Demands
Since the seminal papers by Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995), the standard
practice of the demand estimation literature with aggregate data has been to
specify an ARUM and to compute the corresponding demands, which then must
be inverted numerically during estimation.7 In this paper, we instead directly
specify inverse demands of the form
σ−1j (st;θ2) = lnGj (st;θ2) + ct, j ∈ J , (4)
where the vector functionG = (G0, . . . ,GJ ) is invertible as a function of st ∈ int (∆),
and where ct ∈ R is a market-specific constant.8 Combining with Equation (2),
this amounts to
lnGj (st;θ2) = δjt − ct. (5)
6Prices are likely to be endogenous since firms may consider both observed and unobserved
product characteristics when setting prices. Market shares are endogenous by construction since
they are defined by the system of equations (1), where each demand depends on the entire vectors
of endogenous prices and unobserved product characteristics.
7To our knowledge, the logit and the nested logit models are the only ARUM that yield closed-
form inverse demands.
8Compiani (2019) adopts a similar approach, but proposing to nonparametrically estimate
inverse demands for diﬀerentiated products based on aggregate data.
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When lnGj is linear in parameters θ2, estimation amounts to linear regression,
which makes two-stage least squares (2SLS) easily applicable and (empirical)
identification clear.
The logit and the nested logit models have closed-form and linear-in-parameters
inverse demands that satisfy Equation (4). For the logit model,
lnGj (st) = ln
(
sjt
)
, j ∈ J ,
so that its inverse demand its given by the following well-known expression
(Berry, 1994)
σ−1j (st) = ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= δjt.
For the two-level nested logit model, which partitions the choice set into
groups,
lnGj (st;µ) = (1−µ) ln
(
sjt
)
+µ ln
 ∑
k∈G(j)
skt
 , j ∈ J ,
where G(j) is the set of products grouped with product j and µ ∈ (0,1) is the
nesting parameter (see Berry, 1994).
For the three-level nested logit model, which extends the two-level nested
logit model by further partitioning groups into subgroups,
lnGj (st;µ1,µ2) =
1− 2∑
d=1
µd
 ln(sjt)+µ1 ln
 ∑
k∈G1(j)
skt
+µ2 ln
 ∑
k∈G2(j)
skt
 ,
where the parameters satisfy
∑2
d=1µd < 1, µd ≥ 0, d = 1,2, and where G1(j) and
G2(j) are the sets of products belonging the same group and to the same subgroup
as product j, respectively.9
The logit and nested logit models have the important advantage that they boil
down to linear regression models (Berry, 1994). For example, for the logit model,
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= xjtβ −αpjt + ξjt, j = 1, . . . , J, t = 1, . . . ,T .
The logit model requires just one instrument for price and the two-level nested
9Indeed, setting γ1 = µ1 + µ2 and γ2 = µ1, we recover Equation (10) of Verboven (1996a) and
the model satisfies the constraint 0 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ1 < 1 that makes it consistent with random utility
maximization.
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logit model requires one instrument for price and one for the endogenous shares.
As a consequence, both models allow very large choice sets involving thousands
of products. However, the logit and nested logit models impose strong restric-
tions on the substitution patterns that can be accommodated.
In the next section, we introduce the inverse product diﬀerentiation logit
(IPDL) model, which extends the inverse demand of the nested logit model in the
same way that the product diﬀerentiation logit model of Bresnahan et al. (1997)
extends the nested logit model; we take the IPDL model to data on ready-to-eat
cereals in Section 4.
3 The Inverse Product Diﬀerentiation Logit (IPDL)
Specification of theModel Suppose that eachmarket exhibits product segmen-
tation along D dimensions, indexed by d. Each dimension d defines a finite num-
ber of groups of products, such that each product belongs to exactly one group
in each dimension. The grouping structure is exogenous and, for simplicity, as-
sumed to be common across markets.
Let θ2 = (µ1, . . . ,µD), where
∑D
d=1µd < 1 and µd ≥ 0, d = 1, . . . ,D , and let Gd (j)
be the set of products grouped with product j on dimension d. The IPDL model
has inverse demands that are given by Equation (4), where lnGj is defined as
lnGj (st;θ2) =
1− D∑
d=1
µd
 ln(sjt)+ D∑
d=1
µd ln
 ∑
k∈Gd(j)
skt
 . (6)
We show below that inverse demands (6) are invertible, such that it is possible
to compute the IPDL demands.10 We show in Section 6 that the IDPL demand is
consistent with utility maximization.
We say that two products are of the same type if they belong to the same
group on all dimensions. We assume that the outside good is the only product of
its type, which implies that
lnG0 (st;θ2) = ln(s0t) = δ0t − ct = −ct. (7)
10Invertibility of lnG =
(
lnG0, . . . , lnGJ
)
is shown using Proposition 1. The key assumption that
ensures invertibility is that
∑D
d=1µd < 1, which means that a positive weight is assigned to the
terms ln(sjt).
8
CHAPTER 1. THE INVERSE PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION LOGIT MODEL
The IPDL model extends the nested logit model by allowing arbitrary, non-
hierarchical grouping structures, i.e., any partitioning of the choice set in each
dimension. Figure 1 illustrates the competing hierarchical and non-hierarchical
grouping structures used for the empirical application in Section 4. The freedom
in defining grouping structures can be used to build inverse demand models that
are similar in spirit to GEV models based on nesting, which have proved useful
for demand estimation purposes (Train, 2009, Chap. 4). For example, like Small
(1987) and Grigolon (2018), it is possible to define grouping structures that de-
scribe markets where products are naturally ordered.
It is important to note that the parametrization of the IPDL model does not
depend on the number of products, but instead on the number of segmentation
dimensions. This is important because it implies that the IPDL model can handle
markets involving very many products.
Estimation of the IPDL Model Combining Equations (6) and (7), the IPDL
model boils down to a linear regression model of market shares on product char-
acteristics and share terms
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= xjtβ −αpjt +
D∑
d=1
µd ln
(
sjt∑
k∈Gd(j) skt
)
+ ξjt, (8)
for all inside products j = 1, . . . , J in each market t = 1, . . . ,T .
Equation (8) has the same form as the logit and nested logit equations (see
Berry, 1994; Verboven, 1996a), except for the share terms. Under the standard
assumption that product characteristics xjt are exogenous, wemust therefore find
at least D + 1 instruments: one instrument for price and for each of the D share
terms.
Following the prevailing literature (see e.g., Berry and Haile, 2014; Reynaert
and Verboven, 2014; Armstrong, 2016), both cost shifters and BLP instruments
are good candidates for instruments. Cost shifters are appropriate instruments
for prices but may not be appropriate for market shares because costs aﬀect the
market shares only through prices. BLP instruments, which are functions of
the characteristics of competing products and are commonly used to instrument
prices, are also useful to instrument market shares. In theory, BLP instruments
generally suﬃce for identification.11 However, in practice they may be weak and
11See Armstrong (2016) for a discussion on the validity of BLP instruments as the number of
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then cost shifters are required.
Following Verboven (1996a) and Bresnahan et al. (1997), the BLP instruments
of the IPDL model include, for each dimension, the sums of characteristics for
other products of the same group as well as the number of products within each
group. These instruments reflect the degree of substitution and the closeness
of products within a group and are therefore likely to aﬀect prices and within-
group market shares. The same instruments can also be computed for products
of the same type. Lastly, we can exploit the ownership structure of the market
and compute the same instruments while distinguishing products of the same
firms from products of competing firms. The idea is that prices, and thus market
shares, depend on the ownership structure since multi-product firms set prices
so as to maximize their total profits.
Links to Discrete Choice Models We show below that the IPDL model is con-
sistent with a representative consumer model (RCM) with taste for variety and
without income eﬀect. The RCM assumes the existence of a variety-seeking rep-
resentative consumer who aggregates a population of consumers and chooses
some quantity of every product, trading oﬀ variety against quality. It has been a
workhorse of the international trade literature since Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Krugman (1979), and has also been used for demand estimation purposes (e.g.,
Pinkse and Slade, 2004).
Specifically, as shown below, the IPDL model is consistent with a represen-
tative consumer, endowed with income y, who chooses a vector st ∈ int(∆) of
nonzero market shares in market t so as to maximize the utility
αy +
∑
j∈J
δjtsjt −
∑
j∈J
sjt lnGj (st) , (9)
where Gj is defined by Equations (6) and (7), and where δj is a linear-in-price
index. The second term in Equation (9) captures the net utility derived from the
consumption of st in the absence of interaction among products and the last term
expresses taste for variety.
As mentioned above, the IPDL model has the nested logit model, and thus
the logit model, as special cases: the logit is obtained when product segmenta-
tion does not matter, and the nested logit model is obtained when the grouping
products increases.
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structure is hierarchical. Thus some IDPL models are ARUM. On the other hand,
as shown below and in contrast to any ARUM, some IDPL models allow comple-
mentarity.12
Complementarity We use the standard definition of complementarity and sub-
stitutability in the absence of income eﬀect (Samuelson, 1974), defining com-
plementarity (resp., substitutability) as a negative (resp., positive) cross-price
derivative of demand.13 Proposition 4 in Appendix A.3 provides some properties
of the IPDL model regarding the patterns of substitution, including the matrix of
price derivatives of demand.
The IPDL model allows complementarity. To see this, suppose there are 3
inside products and one outside good. Inside products are grouped according to
two dimensions: for the first dimension, product 1 is in one group, and products
2 and 3 are in a second group; for the second dimension, products 1 and 2 are in
one group, and product 3 is in a second group. Products 1 and 3 are complements
if the derivative of the demand for product 3 with respect to the price of product
1 is negative, that is, if14
(1−µ1 −µ2) (s1 + s2) (s2 + s3)−µ1µ2s0s2 > 0,
which simplifies to 4/3 > µ1µ2/(1− µ1 − µ2) for s0 = 1/2 and s1 = s2 = s3 = 1/6. In
particular, products 1 and 3 are complements for µ1 = µ2 = 1/3, but are substi-
tutes for µ1 = µ2 = 0.45. With the representative consumer interpretation, the pa-
rameter µ0 = 1−∑Dd=1µd measures taste for variety over all products of the choice
set and each parameter µd , for d ≥ 1, measures taste for variety across groups of
products according to dimension d: higher µd means that variety at the level of
groups of products matters more, meaning that products in the same group in
dimension d are more similar (see Verboven, 1996b, for a similar interpretation
of the nesting parameter of the nested logit model). Then complementarity in
the IPDL model arises in a very intuitive way, due to taste for variety at the group
level.
In Section 1 of the supplement, we provide some simulation results investi-
12It would be of interest to establish conditions under which the IDPL model is equivalent to
an ARUM.
13This definition is diﬀerent from the one used by Gentzkow (2007) in the context of an ARUM
defined over bundles of products.
14See Proposition 4 in Appendix A.3.
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gating the patterns of substitution. We find that: (i) products of the same type
are always substitutes, while products of diﬀerent types may be substitutes or
complements; and (ii) closer products into the characteristics space used to form
product types (i.e., higher values of µd and/or whether products belong to the
same groups or not) have higher cross-price elasticities.
4 Empirical Illustration: Demand for Cereals
In this section, we illustrate the IPDLmodel by estimating the demand for ready-
to-eat (RTE) cereals in Chicago in 1991 – 1992. This market has been studied
extensively (see e.g., Nevo, 2001; Michel andWeiergraeber, 2019) and it is known
to exhibit product segmentation. We compare the results (in terms of elasticities
and goodness-of-fit) from the IPDL model to those from two alternative nested
logit models.
4.1 Data
Databases Weuse store-level scanner data from the Dominick’s Database, made
available by the James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of
Business. We supplement with data on the nutrient content of the RTE cere-
als (sugar, energy, fiber, lipid, sodium, and protein) from the USDA Nutrient
Database for Standard Reference and with monthly sugar prices from the web-
site www.indexmundi.com.
For our analysis, we use data from 83 Dominick’s stores and focus on the 50
largest products in terms of sales (e.g., Kellogg’s Special K), where a product is a
cereal (e.g., Special K) associated to its brand (e.g., Kellogg’s). We define a market
as a store-month pair. Prices of a serving (i.e., 35 grammes) and market shares
are computed following Nevo (2001). See Appendix B for more details on the
data.
Product Segmentation Based on the observations below, we consider two seg-
mentation dimensions. The first dimension is brand, where the brands are Gen-
eral Mills, Kellogg’s, Nabisco, Post, Quaker, and Ralston. The second dimension
is market segment, where the market segments are family, kids, health/nutrition,
and taste enhanced (see e.g., Nevo, 2001). These two dimensions are combined
to form 17 product types among the 50 products.
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Brands play an important role: Kellogg’s is the largest company and has large
market shares in all market segments; and General Mills, the second largest com-
pany, is especially popular in the family and kids segments. Taken together, Kel-
logg’s and General Mills account for around 80 percent of the market. As regards
market segments, the family and kids segments dominate and account for almost
70 percent of the market.
Table 1 shows the average nutrient content of the cereals grouped by brand
andmarket segment. As expected, cereals for health/nutrition contain less sugar,
more fiber, less lipid, and less sodium, and are less caloric. By contrast, cereals for
kids contain more sugar and more calories. Moreover, Nabisco oﬀers cereals with
less sugar and less calories, while Quaker and Ralston oﬀer cereals with more
calories. The two dimensions therefore proxy, at least partially, for the nutrient
content of the cereals.
Figure 1 illustrates the grouping structure of the IPDL model (left panel) and
of the three-level nested logit model where products are grouped first by brand
and then by market segment (right panel).
Figure 1: Product Segmentation on the Cereals Market
Each dot illustrates the location of a cereal in the grouping structure.
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Table 1: Average by Market Segment and by Brand
Dimensions Sugar Energy Fiber Lipid Sodium Protein N
g/serve kcal/serve g/serve g/serve mg/serve g/serve
Brand (dimension 1)
General Mills 9.92 132.09 1.99 1.51 230.69 2.65 17
(4.67) (7.69) (0.98) (0.82) (60.83) (0.83)
Kellogg’s 9.58 127.50 2.47 0.85 228.49 2.88 18
(5.52) (11.16) (2.81) (0.96) (103.93) (1.43)
Nabisco 0.25 125.48 3.43 0.58 2.10 3.83 2
(0.09) (0.74) (0) (0) (1.98) (0.02)
Post 12.02 130.76 2.09 1.03 212.03 2.49 5
(4.64) (14.83) (2.02) (0.78) (22.31) (1.15)
Quaker 8.50 139.44 2.26 2.43 159.88 3.59 5
(4.04) (9.20) (0.66) (1.86) (94.60) (1.15)
Ralston 7.09 138.48 0.58 0.51 305.43 2.04 3
(6.61) (1.41) (0.08) (0.65) (71.57) (0.39)
Market Segment (dimension 2)
Family 7.54 130.41 2.22 0.99 269.66 2.88 17
(5.27) (9.83) (2.61) (0.71) (88.64) (1.03)
Health/nutrition 5.03 122.54 3.16 0.54 168.54 3.84 9
(3.69) (5.78) (1.31) (0.21) (133.62) (1.35)
Kids 13.40 137.75 1.00 1.35 211.38 2.01 16
(4.17) (3.80) (0.69) (0.79) (44.77) (0.87)
Taste enhanced 9.70 129.28 3.32 2.22 166.43 3.16 8
(2.05) (15.50) (1.12) (1.93) (76.38) (0.34)
Total 9.31 131.16 2.17 1.22 216.29 2.82 50
(5.21) (10.21) (1.92) (1.08) (93.53) (1.15)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Column "N" gives the number of
products by market segment and by brand. Averages and standard deviations are com-
puted over products (without taking into account of their market shares).
4.2 Demand Estimation
Specification We estimate Equation (8), where xjt includes a constant, the nu-
trients mentioned above and a dummy for promotion. Following Bresnahan et al.
(1997), we include fixed eﬀects for brands (ξb) and market segments (ξs), which
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capture market-invariant observed and unobserved brand-specific and market
segment-specific characteristics, respectively. The advantages provided by the
two dimensions are therefore parametrized by the fixed eﬀects ξb and ξs, which
measure the extent to which belonging to a group shifts the demand for the prod-
uct, as well as the parameters for groups µ1 and µ2, which measure the extent to
which products within a group are protected from substitution from products
in other groups along each dimension. Lastly, we include fixed eﬀects for month
(ξm), and store (ξst), which capture monthly unobserved determinants of demand
and time-invariant store characteristics, respectively.
The unobserved product characteristics terms are therefore given by
ξjt = ξb + ξs + ξm + ξst + ξ˜jt,
where ξ˜jt, the structural error that remain in ξjt, capture the unobserved product
characteristics varying across products and markets that are not included into
the model (e.g., changes in shelf-space, positioning of the products among oth-
ers), which aﬀect consumers utility and that consumers and firms (but not the
modeller) observe so that they are likely to be correlated with prices and market
shares.
Instruments We use two sets of instruments. First, as cost-based instruments,
we form the price of the cereal’s sugar content of a serve (i.e., sugar content in a
serve times the sugar monthly price), which we interact with brand fixed eﬀects.
Multiplying the price of sugar by the sugar content allows the instrument to vary
by product; and interacting this with fixed eﬀects allows the price of sugar to
enter the production function of each firm diﬀerently.
Second, we form BLP instruments by using other products’ promotional ac-
tivity in a given market, which varies both across stores for a given month and
across months for a given store: for a given product, other products’ promo-
tional activity should aﬀect consumers’ choices, and should thus be correlated
with the price and market share of that product, but not with the error term.15
15We do not use functions of the nutrient content of the cereals as instruments since by con-
struction of the data they are invariant across markets. We treat promotion as an exogenous
variable since, at Dominick’s Finer Foods, the promotional calendar is known several weeks in
advance of the weekly price decisions. One concern about the use of promotions to form instru-
ments is that promotions could be advertised. If it was the case, this would mean that promotions
are not exogenous and cannot be used as instruments. However, we do not observe advertising
in the data, which is therefore part of the error term, and, in turn, we assume that promotions
15
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Specifically, we use the number of other promoted products of rival firms and
the number of other promoted products of the same firm, which we interact with
brand name fixed eﬀects. We also use these numbers over products belonging to
the same market segment, which we interact with market segment fixed eﬀects.
A potential problem is weak identification, which occurs when instruments
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. With multiple en-
dogenous variables, the standard first-stage F-statistic is no longer appropriate to
test for weak instruments. We therefore use Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)’s
F-statistic to test whether each endogenous variable is weakly identified. In each
estimated model, the F-statistics are far larger than 10, implying that we can be
confident that instruments are not weak.
Parameter Estimates Table 2 presents the 2SLS demand estimates from the
IPDL and the three-level nested logit models with groups for market segment
on top (3NL1) and with groups for brand on top (3NL2), in columns (1), (2), and
(3), respectively.
Consider first the results from the IPDL model. As expected, the estimated
parameters on the negative of price (α) and on promotion (β) are significantly
positive. The estimated parameters for groups have magnitude and sign that
conform to the assumptions of the IPDL model, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0 and 1−µ1 −µ2 > 0;
no constraints were imposed on the parameters during the estimation. These
estimates imply that there is product segmentation along both dimensions: for
cereals of the same market segment, cereals of the same brand are closer substi-
tutes than cereals of diﬀerent brands; and for cereals of the same brand, cereals
within the samemarket segment are closer substitutes than cereals from diﬀerent
market segments. Overall, cereals of the same type are closer substitutes.
We find that the brand reputation of the cereals confers a significant advan-
tage to products from General Mills and Kellogg’s and that cereals for family
have a significant advantage. In addition, we find that µ1 > µ2, which means that
the market segments confer more protection from substitution than brand repu-
tation does (cereals of the same market segment are more protected from cereals
from diﬀerent market segments than cereals of the same brand are from cereals
of diﬀerent brands).
are not followed by advertising. See Michel and Weiergraeber (2019) who also use promotion to
form instruments.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates of Demand
(1) (2) (3)
IPDL 3NL1 3NL2
Price (−α) -1.83 (0.12) -2.91 (0.12) -4.10 (0.16)
Promotion (β) 0.088 (0.003) 0.102 (0.003) 0.144 (0.004)
Constant (β0) -0.697 (0.059) -0.379 (0.065) -0.195 (0.076)
Nesting Parameters (µ)
Market Segment/Group (µ1) 0.626 (0.009) 0.771 (0.008) 0.668 (0.011)
Brand/Subgroup (µ2) 0.232 (0.009) 0.792 (0.007) 0.709 (0.010)
FE Brands (ξb)
Kellogg’s 0.024 (0.005) -0.056 (0.003) 0.104 (0.006)
Nabisco -0.754 (0.024) -0.218 (0.011) -2.11 (0.02)
Post -0.485 (0.014) -0.187 (0.008) -1.36 (0.01)
Quaker -0.553 (0.015) -0.329 (0.014) -1.51 (0.01)
Ralston -0.732 (0.025) -0.200 (0.011) -2.13 (0.02)
FE Market Segments (ξs)
Health/nutrition -0.672 (0.010) -0.855 (0.008) -0.069 (0.005)
Kids -0.433 (0.009) -0.529 (0.009) 0.071 (0.005)
Taste enhanced -0.710 (0.010) -0.903 (0.007) -0.088 (0.006)
Observations 99281 99281 99281
RMSE 0.210 0.242 0.270
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(sjt/s0t). Regressions include fixed eﬀects (FE) for brands,
market segments, months, and stores, as well as a constant, the nutrients (fiber, sugar, lipid,
protein, energy, sodium) and a dummy for promotion. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. The values of the F-statistics in the first stages suggest that weak instruments
are not a problem.
Model Selection andRobustness The estimates from the two nested logit mod-
els satisfy µ2 > µ1, which means that they are both consistent with random utility
maximization. Neither nested logit model can then be rejected on this criterion.
The three estimated models are non-nested and have the same number of
estimated parameters. Then the non-nested test of Rivers and Vuong (2002) can
be used to determine which best fits the data. We find that the test strongly rejects
both nested logit models in favor of the IPDL model.16
In many situations, consumers face choices involving a very large number
16The test statistic is given by
√
J × T
(
Qˆ1 − Qˆ2
)
/σˆ , where Qˆi is the value of the 2SLS objective
function of model i evaluated at the demand estimates, and σˆ2 is the estimated value of the
variance of the diﬀerence between Qˆi ’s. The null hypothesis is that the two non-nested models are
asymptotically equivalent; the first (resp., second) alternative hypothesis is that model 1 (resp.,
model 2) is asymptotically better than model 2 (resp., model 1). This statistic must be evaluated
against the standard normal distribution and we estimate σˆ2 using 500 bootstrap replications.
The test statistics of the two nested logit models (model 1) against the IDPL model (model 2) are
1509.77 and 3644.43, respectively.
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of products (e.g., choice of a car or of a RTE cereal). We have estimated an al-
ternative specification in which we define products as cereal-brand-store combi-
nations, as it is commonly done in the vertical relationships literature (see e.g.,
Villas-Boas, 2007), and markets as months. The resulting specification, which
has more than 4,000 products, leads to very similar parameter estimates, thereby
indicating that the results are fairly robust to the definitions of products and
markets.
Substitution Patterns. Figure 2 presents the estimated density of the own- and
cross-price elasticities of demands of the IPDL and the two nested logit models
(see Section 3 of the supplement for the estimated own- and cross-price elastici-
ties of demands, averaged across markets and product types).
The estimated own-price elasticities are in line with the literature (see e.g.,
Nevo, 2001). On average, the estimated own-price elasticity of demands is −2.815
for the IPDL model, −3.187 for the 3NL1 model and −3.124 for the 3NL2 model.
However, there is an important variation in price responsiveness across product
types: for the IPDL model, own-price elasticities range from −3.560 for cereals
for kids produced by General Mills to −1.388 for cereals for health/nutrition pro-
duced by Post; for the 3NL1 model, they range from −3.923 for cereals for kids
produced by Ralston to −1.868 for cereals for health/nutrition produced by Post;
and for the 3NL2 model, they range from −3.975 for cereals for kids produced by
General Mills to −1.488 for cereals for health/nutrition produced by Post.
Consider now the cross-price elasticities. Among the 50 × 50 diﬀerent cross-
price elasticities that the IPDLmodel yields, 49.5 percent (resp., 50.5 percent) are
negative (resp., positive), meaning about one half of all pairs of cereals are com-
plements. Note that the presence of complementarity is likely to reduce compe-
tition in the cereals market compared to a case with no complementarity. Iaria
and Wang (2019) also find that complementarity is pervasive in the RTE cereals
market. Complementarity can arise for many reasons, including taste for variety
and shopping costs.
Products of the same brand are always substitutes, which means that there is
cannibalization eﬀect; likewise, products from the same market segment are all
substitutes. Products of diﬀerent brands and of diﬀerent market segments may
or may not be complements.
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Figure 2: Estimated Price Elasticities of Demands
5 The Generalized Inverse Logit Model
In this section, we introduce the Generalized Inverse Logit (GIL) class of models,
which includes the IPDL model as a special case and hence also the logit and
nested logit models. Proofs for this section are provided in Appendix A.4 along
with formal statements of the results. To ease exposition, we omit notation for
parameters θ2 and market t.
Definition 1. GIL models are inverse demands of the form (5), i.e.,
lnGj (s) = δj − c, j ∈ J , (10)
where c ∈ R is a market-specific constant and lnG =
(
lnG0, . . . , lnGJ
)
is an inverse
GIL demand.
An inverse GIL demand is a function lnG, where G : (0,∞)J+1 → (0,∞)J+1 is
homogeneous of degree one and where the Jacobian JlnG (s) is positive definite
and symmetric.
This definition immediately implies that the IDPL model is also a GIL model.
Section 2 of the supplement provides a range of general methods for building
inverse GIL demands along with illustrative examples that go beyond the IPDL
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model, which is the focus of the paper. As stated in the following proposition, an
inverse GIL demand is injective and hence invertible on its range.
Proposition 1. Let lnG be an inverse GIL demand. Then lnG is injective on
int(∆).
We denote the inverse function as H = G−1. Inverting Equation (10) and us-
ing that demands sum to one together with the homogeneity of G leads to the
demand functions
sj = σj (δ) =
Hj
(
eδ
)∑
k∈J Hk (eδ)
, j ∈ J . (11)
This expression generalizes the logit demands in a nontrivial way through the
presence of the function H.
In addition, consider any vector of market shares s ∈ int(∆). Then, hold-
ing δ0 = 0, the injectivity of the inverse GIL demand ensures that there exists a
unique vector of indexes δ =
(
0,δ1, . . . ,δJ
)
that rationalizes demand, i.e., s = σ (δ).
Using that demands satisfy Roy’s identity ∂CS
(
eδ
)
/∂δj = σj (δ), it can easily
be shown that the consumer surplus is
CS (δ) = ln
∑
k∈J
Hk
(
eδ
) ,
up to an additive constant. Note that the consumer surplus is simply the loga-
rithm of the denominator of the demands in Equation (11), just as in the case of
the logit model.
Using that demands sum to one, we obtain that the market-specific constant
is equal to the consumer surplus c = CS (δ), which combined with Equation (10),
shows that GIL models satisfy
δj = lnGj (s) +CS (δ) , j ∈ J . (12)
Diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to δ, we find that the matrix of demand
derivatives ∂σj /∂δi is given by
Jσ (δ) = [JlnG (s)]
−1 − ssᵀ, (13)
where s = σ (δ). Given the absence of income eﬀects, the matrix (13) is the Slutsky
matrix. This is symmetric and positive semi-definite, which implies that GIL
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demands are non-decreasing in their own index δj , ∂σj /∂δj ≥ 0.
The class of GIL models accommodates patterns that go beyond those of stan-
dard ARUM. In particular, it allows for complementarity: this is for example the
case of the IPDL model, which is a member of the class of GIL models. Our in-
vertibility result in Proposition 1 therefore extends Berry (1994)’s invertibility
result, which restricts the products to be strict substitutes. Proposition 1 also
extends Berry et al. (2013), who show invertibility for demands that satisfy their
“connected substitutes” conditions, which rule out complementarity.17
6 Relationships between Models
This section puts the GIL and the IPDL models into perspective by showing how
they relate to the representative consumer model (RCM) and to the additive ran-
dom utility model (ARUM).
6.1 Representative Consumer Model
Consider a representative consumer facing the choice set of diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, J , and a homogeneous numéraire good, with demands for the diﬀerentiated
products summing to one. Let pj and vj be the price and the quality of product
j ∈ J , respectively.
The price of the numéraire good is normalized to 1 and the representative
consumer’s income y is suﬃciently high (y > maxj∈J pj) to guarantee that con-
sumption of the numéraire good is positive.
In this subsection, we show that the inverse GIL demand lnG is consistent
with a representative consumer who chooses a consumption vector s ∈ ∆ of mar-
ket shares of the diﬀerentiated product and a quantity z ≥ 0 of the numéraire
17The connected substitutes structure requires two conditions: (i) products are weak gross
substitutes, i.e., everything else equal, an increase in δi weakly decreases demand σj for all other
products; and (ii) the “connected strict substitution” condition holds, i.e., there is suﬃcient strict
substitution between products to treat them in one demand system. In contrast to ours, Berry
et al. (2013)’s result does not require that demand σ is diﬀerentiable. Demand systems with
complementarity may be covered by Berry et al. (2013)’s result in cases where a suitable trans-
formation of demand can be found such that the transformed demand satisfies their conditions.
They provide no general result on how such a transformation could be found. Our result allows
complementarity without requiring such a transformation to be found.
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good, so as to maximize her direct utility
αz+
∑
j∈J
vjsj −
∑
j∈J
sj lnGj (s) (14)
subject to the budget constraint and the constraint that demands sum to one,∑
j∈J
pjsj + z ≤ y and
∑
j∈J
sj = 1, (15)
where α > 0 is the marginal utility of income. The first two terms of the direct
utility (14) describe the utility that the representative consumer derives from
the consumption (s, z) of the diﬀerentiated products and the numéraire in the
absence of interaction among them. The third term is a strictly concave function
of s that expresses the representative consumer’s taste for variety (see Lemma 4
in Appendix A.5).
Let δj = vj −αpj be the net utility that the consumer derives from consuming
one unit of product j ∈ J . The utility maximization program (14)-(15) leads to
first-order conditions for interior solution
lnGj (s) + c = δj , (16)
which are of the form of Equation (10) defining the inverse GIL demand.
We state this observation as a proposition and give a detailed proof in Ap-
pendix A.5.
Proposition 2. The GIL model (16) is consistent with a representative consumer
who maximizes utility (14) subject to constraints (15).
This proposition thus extends Anderson et al. (1988) and Verboven (1996b)’s
results that the logit and the nested logit models are consistent with a utility
maximizing representative consumer.
6.2 Additive Random Utility Model
We now turn to the Additive Random Utility Model. A population of consumers
face the choice set of diﬀerentiated products, J , and associate a deterministic
utility component δj = vj −αpj to each product j ∈ J . Each individual consumer
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chooses the product that maximizes her indirect utility given by18
uj = δj + εj , j ∈ J , (17)
where the vector of random utility components ε =
(
ε0, . . . , εj , . . . , εJ
)
follows a
joint distribution with finite means that is absolutely continuous, fully supported
on RJ+1 and independent of δ. These assumptions are standard in the discrete
choice literature. They imply that utility ties occur with probability 0, that the
choice probabilities are all everywhere positive, and that random coeﬃcients are
ruled out. Specific distributional assumptions for ε lead to specific models such
as the logit model, the nested logit model, the probit model, etc.
The probability that a consumer chooses product j is
Pj (δ) = Pr
(
uj ≥ ui , ∀i , j
)
, j ∈ J .
Let CS : RJ+1 → R be the consumer surplus, i.e. the expected maximum utility
given by
CS (δ) = E
(
max
j∈J uj
)
.
By theWilliams-Daly-Zachary theorem (McFadden, 1981), the conditional choice
probabilities are equal to the derivatives of the consumer surplus, i.e. Pj (δ) =
∂CS (δ) /∂δj . Define a function H =
(
H0, . . . ,H J
)
, with H j : (0,∞)J+1 → (0,∞) as
the derivative of the exponentiated surplus with respect to its jth component, i.e.,
H j
(
eδ
)
=
∂eCS(δ)
∂δj
= Pj (δ)e
CS(δ), j ∈ J .
Summing over k ∈ J and using that probabilities sum to one, we can write the
ARUM choice probabilities and the consumer surplus in terms of H as
Pj (δ) =
H j
(
eδ
)
∑
k∈J Hk (eδ)
, j ∈ J , (18)
18Note that income does not enter utility (17), which means that there is no income eﬀect.
This is equivalent to the case in which income enters linearly. The deterministic utilities, δj ,
are common across all consumers, which rules out heterogeneity in preferences apart from the
random utilities ϵj .
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and
CS (δ) = ln
∑
k∈J
Hk
(
eδ
) .
Lemma 6 in Appendix B shows thatH is invertible, with inverseG =H
−1
, and
that lnG is an inverse GIL demand. Then we can invert Equations (18) to obtain
the inverse ARUM demands, which coincide with the inverse GIL demands (10)
when G =G,
lnGj (s) + c = δj , j ∈ J ,
with c = CS (δ).
Products are always substitutes in an ARUM. In contrast, some GIL models
allow for complementarity and cannot therefore be rationalized by any ARUM.
This is in particular the case of the IPDL model introduced in Section 3 and used
in the empirical illustration in Section 4. We summarize the results as follows.
Proposition 3. The ARUM choice probabilities in Equation (18) coincide with
the GIL demands defined by Equation (11) when G =G =H−1 =H−1.
Then any ARUM is consistent with some GIL model. The converse does not
hold, since some GIL models are not consistent with any ARUM.
Lastly, any GILmodel is consistent with some perturbed utilitymodel (PUM).19
In a PUM, the consumer chooses a vector of choice probabilities s ∈ int(∆) to max-
imize her utility function defined as the sum of an expected utility component
and a concave and deterministic function of s, labeled as perturbation. Specifi-
cally, the GIL model (16) can be rationalized by a PUM with utility given by∑
j∈J
δjsj −
∑
j∈J
sj lnGj (s) ,
without the explicit structure of income and prices. However, the converse does
not hold. For example, for the concave perturbation function
∑
j∈J ln(sj), the
corresponding candidate inverse GIL demand is lnGj (s) = 1sj ln
(
sj
)
, which is not
homogeneous of degree one and thus is not an inverse GIL demand.
19See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), McFadden and Fosgerau (2012) and Fudenberg et al.
(2015) for more details on PUM. PUMhave been used tomodel optimization with eﬀort (Mattsson
and Weibull, 2002), stochastic choices (Swait and Marley, 2013; Fudenberg et al., 2015), and
rational inattention (Matejka and McKay, 2015; Fosgerau et al., 2018). Allen and Rehbeck (2019)
show that some PUM allow for complementarity
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Proposition 3 shows that the choice probabilities generated by any ARUM
can be derived from some GIL model. As the class of GIL models is a strict
subset of the class of PUMmodels, we have therefore strengthened Hofbauer and
Sandholm (2002)’s result that the choice probabilities generated by any ARUM
can be derived from some PUM by showing that the GIL structure is suﬃcient to
recover any ARUM.
6.3 Overview of Relationships
The relationships between the GIL, IDPL, ARUM and RCM classes of models are
illustrated in Figure 3.
We have established that any GIL model is an RCM. An example suﬃces to
show that there are RCM that are not consistent with any GIL model. In partic-
ular, when lnGj (s) = 1sj ln
(
sj
)
, the direct utility (14) is consistent with a RCM but
not with a GIL model.
As mentioned above, the IPDL model is a GIL model and admits the logit
and nested logit models as special cases. We have also shown that any ARUM is
observationally equivalent to some GILmodel. However, the special case of IPDL
model shows that the converse does not hold, since it allows for complementarity
which is ruled out by any ARUM.
Figure 3: Relationships between RCM, ARUM and GIL models
Altogether, as Figure 3 shows, the class of GIL model is strictly larger than
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the class of ARUM, but strictly smaller than the class of RCM.
7 Conclusion
This paper has introduced the IPDL model, which is an inverse demand model
for diﬀerentiated products that are segmented according to multiple dimensions.
The IDPLmodel allows formore complex patterns of substitution than the nested
logit model, it even allows for complementarity, while being easily estimated by
linear regression using Berry (1994)’s method. The IDPL model provides an at-
tractive modelling framework in applications where the priority is to maintain
the computational simplicity of logit and nested logit models, while allowing
more realistic patterns of substitution that do not constrain products to be sub-
stitutes.
The IDPL model belongs to the wider class of GIL models, which is a class
of representative consumer models, large enough to comprise equivalents of all
ARUM as well as models in which products may be complements. Finding that
GIL demands are invertible even in the presence of complementarity extends the
previous literature on invertibility of demand.
There is ample room for future research on the IDPL model and the more
general GIL class of models. Generally, it is of interest to develop GIL mod-
els for various applications, exploiting the possibilities for constructing models
with structures that are tailored to specific circumstances. On the methodolog-
ical level, it is of interest to develop methods for estimating GIL models with
individual-level data. Another issue is to determine conditions on the inverse
GIL demand under which products are substitutes. Finally, the link to rational
inattention, pointed out in Fosgerau et al. (2018), remains to be explored theoret-
ically and empirically.
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Appendices
A Proofs and Additional Results
A.1 Mathematical Notation
We use italics for scalar variables and real-valued functions, boldface for vec-
tors, matrices and vector-valued functions, and calligraphic for sets. By default,
vectors are column vectors: s =
(
s0, . . . , sJ
)ᵀ ∈ RJ+1.
∆ ⊂ RJ+1 is the J-dimensional unit simplex: ∆ =
{
s ∈ [0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1},
and int(∆) =
{
s ∈ (0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1} is its interior.
Let CS : RJ+1 → R be a function. Then, ∇δCS (δ), with elements j given by
∂CS(δ)
∂δj
, denotes its gradient with respect to the vector δ.
Let G =
(
G0, . . . ,GJ
)
: RJ+1 → RJ+1 be a vector function composed of functions
Gj : RJ+1 → R. Its Jacobian matrix JG (s) at s has elements ij given by ∂Gi(s)∂sj .
A univariate function R→ R applied to a vector is a coordinate-wise applica-
tion of the function, e.g., ln(s) =
(
ln(s0) , . . . , ln
(
sJ
))
. 1J = (1, . . . ,1)
ᵀ ∈ RJ is a vector
consisting of ones and IJ ∈ RJ×J denotes the J × J identity matrix.
A.2 Preliminary Results
This section states some preliminary mathematical results that are used in the
proofs below.
Lemma 1 (Euler equation for homogeneous functions). Suppose thatφ : (0,∞)J+1 →
R is homogeneous of degree one. Then
φ (s) =
J∑
i=0
∂φ (s)
∂si
si , for all s ∈ (0,∞)J+1 .
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Definition 2. A matrix A ∈ R(J+1)×(J+1) is positive quasi-definite if its symmetric
part, defined by 12 (A+A
ᵀ), is positive definite.
It follows that a symmetric and positive definite matrix is positive quasi-
definite.
Lemma 2 (Gale and Nikaido 1965, Theorem 6). If a diﬀerentiable mapping F :
Θ→ RJ+1, where Θ is a convex region (either closed or non-closed) of RJ+1, has a
Jacobian matrix that is everywhere quasi-definite in Θ, then F is injective on Θ.
Lemma 3 (Simon and Blume, 1994, Theorem 14.4). Let F : RJ+1 → RJ+1 and G :
RJ+1 → RJ+1 be continuously diﬀerentiable functions. Let y ∈ RJ+1 and x =G (y) ∈
RJ+1. Consider the composite function
C = F ◦G : RJ+1 → RJ+1.
The Jacobian matrix JC (y) is given by
JC (y) = JF◦G (y) = JF (x)JG (y) .
A.3 Properties of the IPDL Model
Let Θd be the matrix encoding the grouping structure for dimension d with ele-
ments ij given by
(Θd)ij =
1, if i ∈ Gd (j) ,0, otherwise,
where Gd(j) is the set of products that are grouped with product j in dimension
d. Let sGd(j) =
∑
k∈J (Θd)jk sk denote the market share of the group Gd (j).
Proposition 4. The IPDL model has the following properties.
1. The IIA property holds for products of the same type; but does not hold in
general for products of diﬀerent types.
2. The matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives is given by
Jσ (δ) = −α (Ψ diag(s)− ssᵀ) , (19)
where
Ψ =

1− D∑
d=1
µd
IJ+1 + D∑
d=1
µdΘdSGd

−1
, (20)
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where SGd is the diagonal matrix with elements jj given by
sj
sGd (j)
with sj =
σj (δ).
3. Products can be substitutes or complements.
Proof of Proposition 4
1. Using the relation (6) between indexes δ and market shares s, we obtain for
any pair of products j and k that
σj (δ)
σk (δ)
= exp
 δj − δk1−∑Dd=1µd +
D∑
d=1
µd
1−∑Dd=1µd ln
(
σGd(k) (δ)
σGd(j) (δ)
) . (21)
For products j and k of the same type (i.e., with Gd (k) = Gd (j) for all d),
Equation (21) reduces to
σj (δ)
σk(δ)
= exp
(
δj−δk
1−∑Dd=1µd
)
, which is independent of the
characteristics or existence of all other products, i.e., IIA holds for products
of the same type. When products are of diﬀerent types, the ratio can depend
on the characteristics of other products, which means that IIA does not hold
in general.
2. Use Equation (25) in Proposition 5 below to show that the matrix of own-
and cross-price derivatives is given by Equations (19) and (20).
3. Suppose there are 3 inside products and one outside good. Inside products
are grouped according two dimensions. For the first dimension, product 1
is in one group, and products 2 and 3 are in a second group. For the second
dimension, products 1 and 2 are in one group, and product 3 is in a second
group.
Using Equation (19), we show that
∂σ1 (δ)
∂p3
= −α ((1−µ1 −µ2) (s1 + s2) (s2 + s3)−µ1µ2s0s2) ,
meaning that if
(1−µ1 −µ2) (s1 + s2) (s2 + s3)−µ1µ2s0s2 > 0,
then products 1 and 3 are complements.
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A.4 Results for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 1 The function lnG is diﬀerentiable on the convex region
int(∆) of RJ+1. In addition, JlnG is positive quasi-definite on int(∆), since by
assumption it is symmetric and positive definite on int(∆). Then lnG is injective
by Lemma 2.
Proposition 5. The GIL models defined by Equation (10) satisfy the following
properties.
1. The market-specific constant c is equal to
c = ln
∑
k∈J
Hk
(
eδ
) , (22)
where H(eδ) = (H0(eδ), . . . ,HJ (eδ)) =G−1(eδ).
2. The market shares functions are given by
σj (δ) =
Hj
(
eδ
)∑
k∈J Hk (eδ)
, j ∈ J . (23)
3. The Euler-type equation
∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
= 1, k ∈ J , s ∈ int (∆)
holds and can be written in matrix form as
JlnG (s)s = 1J+1, s ∈ int (∆) . (24)
4. Roy’s identity implies that the consumer surplus is given by the convex
function
CS (δ) = ln
∑
k∈J
Hk
(
eδ
) .
5. With s = σ (δ), the matrix of demand derivatives is given by
Jσ (δ) = [JlnG (s)]
−1 − ssᵀ, (25)
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which is symmetric and positive semi-definite, implying that GIL demands
have symmetric cross eﬀects and are non-decreasing in their own index.
Proof of Proposition 5
1. Exponentiating and applying H on both sides of Equation (10) leads to
s =H(eδe−c) =H(eδ)e−c, (26)
where the last equality uses the homogeneity of H. Using that demands
sum to 1 leads to Equation (22).
2. Combine Equations (22) and (26) and use σj (δ) = sj to obtain Equation (23).
3. Note that
∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
=
∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGk (s)
∂sj
=
∑
j∈J sj
∂Gk(s)
∂sj
Gk (s)
=
Gk (s)
Gk (s)
= 1,
where the first equality relies on the symmetry of the Jacobian of lnG and
the third equality uses the Euler equation for the homogeneous functionG.
4. We verify that Roy’s identity holds. Set δ = lnG (s). Then (lnG)−1 (δ) =
H ◦ exp(δ) = s, and by Lemma 3,
JlnG (s) =
[
J(lnG)−1 (lnG (s))
]−1
=
[
JH◦exp (δ)
]−1
.
By assumption, the Jacobian JlnG(s) is positive definite and symmetric. Then
its inverse JH◦exp (δ) exists and is symmetric, i.e.,
∂Hi
(
eδ
)
∂δj
=
∂Hj
(
eδ
)
∂δi
.
Then Roy’s identity can be verified via
∂CS
(
eδ
)
∂δi
=
∑
k∈J
∂Hk(eδ)
∂δi∑
j∈J Hj (eδ)
=
∑
k∈J
∂Hi(eδ)
∂δk∑
j∈J Hj (eδ)
,
=
∑
k∈J
∂Hi(eδ)
∂eδk
eδk∑
j∈J Hj (eδ)
=
Hi
(
eδ
)∑
j∈J Hj (eδ)
= σi (δ) ,
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where the second equality uses symmetry of JH◦exp (δ) and the fourth equal-
ity uses the Euler equation for the homogeneous function H.
Convexity of the consumer surplus follows by property 5 since the Hessian,
Jσ (δ), is positive semidefinite.
5. Diﬀerentiate δj = lnGj (s) +CS (δ) with respect to δ to find that
IJ+1 = JlnG (s)Jσ (δ) + 1J+1s
ᵀ,
where s = σ (δ). Solving for Jσ (δ), we obtain that
Jσ (δ) = [JlnG (s)]
−1 [I− 1J+1sᵀ] = [JlnG (s)]−1 − [JlnG (s)]−11J+1sᵀ,
since JlnG (s) is invertible.
Finally, use Equation (24) to show that [JlnG (s)]
−11J+1sᵀ = ssᵀ. Then Jσ (δ)
is symmetric.
As JlnG (s) is positive definite, the square-root matrix [JlnG (s)]1/2 exists and
is also positive definite. Then
[JlnG (s)]
1/2Jσ (δ) [JlnG (s)]
1/2 = [JlnG (s)]
−1/2(IJ+1 − 1J+1sᵀ)[JlnG (s)]1/2,
is symmetric and idempotent and hence positive semidefinite. Then also
Jσ (δ) is positive semidefinite.
A.5 Results for Section 6
Representative Consumer Model
Lemma 4. Let lnG be an inverse GIL demand. Then the function s→−sᵀ lnG(s) =
−∑j∈J sj lnGj (s) is strictly concave on int(∆).
Proof of Lemma 4 Consider s ∈ int(∆). By property 3 of Proposition 5, the
Hessian of −sᵀ lnG(s) is −JlnG (s), which is negative definite by assumption.
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider the representative consumer maximizing util-
ity (14) subject to constraints (15). The budget constraint is always binding since
α > 0 and y >maxj∈J pj . Substituting the budget constraint into the direct utility
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(14), the representative consumer then chooses s ∈ ∆ to maximize
u (s) = αy +
∑
j∈J
δjsj −
∑
j∈J
sj lnGj (s) ,
where δj = vj −αpj .
The Lagrangian of the utility maximization program given by
L (s,λ) = u (s) +λ
1−∑
j∈J
sj
 ,
yields
∑
j∈J sj = 1 and the first-order conditions
δj − lnGj (s)−
∑
k∈J
sk
∂ lnGk (s)
∂sj
−λ = 0, j ∈ J .
By property 3 of Proposition 5, the first-order conditions can be simplified to
δj − lnGj (s)− 1−λ = 0, j ∈ J .
The first-order condition for an interior solution has a unique solution, since the
objective is strictly concave by Lemma 4, hence the utility maximizing demands
exist uniquely.
Setting c = 1+λ, one obtains
lnGj (s) + c = δj ,
which then shows that the representative consumer model leads to the inverse
GIL demand.
Additive Random Utility Model
Since shifting all the δj ’s by a constant amount c ∈ R shifts the maximum ex-
pected utility CS by the same amount and does not aﬀect choice probabilities
P, we may use the normalization
∑
j∈J δj = 0, i.e., we consider at no loss of gen-
erality the restrictions of G and P to Λ =
{
δ ∈ RJ+1 :∑j∈J δj = 0}. The following
lemma collects some properties of the expected maximum utility CS.
Lemma 5. The expected maximum utility CS has the following properties.
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1. It is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, convex and finite everywhere.
2. It satisfies the homogeneity property
CS
(
δ+ c1J+1
)
= CS (δ) + c, c ∈ R. (27)
3. Its Hessian is positive definite on Λ.
4. It is given in terms of the expected residual of the maximum utility product
by
CS (δ) =
∑
j∈J
Pj (δ)δj +E
(
εj∗ |δ
)
, (28)
where j∗ is the index of the chosen product.
Proof of Lemma 5 McFadden (1981) establishes convexity, finiteness, and the
homogeneity property (27). He also shows the existence of all mixed partial
derivatives up to order J ≥ 2, meaning that all second order mixed partial deriva-
tives are continuous. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) show that the Hessian of
CS is positive definite on Λ.
Let j∗ be the index of the chosen product. Property (28) follows from
CS (δ) =
∑
j∈J
E
(
max
j∈J
{
δj + εj
}
|j∗ = j,δ
)
Pj (δ) ,
=
∑
j∈J
(
δj +E
(
εj∗ |j∗ = j,δ
)
Pj (δ)
)
,
=
∑
j∈J
Pj (δ)δj +E
(
εj∗ |δ
)
,
where the first equality uses the law of iterated expectations.
It is well-known in the convex analysis literature that, for the logit model, the
convex conjugate of the negative Shannon entropy −CS∗ (s) =∑j∈J sj ln(sj) is the
log-sum CS (δ) = ln
(∑
j∈J eδj
)
(see e.g., Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004). Fosgerau
et al. (2018) extend this result to a class of "generalized entropies" which has
the Shannon entropy as special case. See also Matejka and McKay (2015), Chiong
et al. (2016) and Galichon and Salanié (2015) who use convex analysis in diﬀerent
contexts.
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Lemma 6. The function H is invertible, and its inverse G =H
−1
is an inverse GIL
demand.
Lemma 6 is proved in Fosgerau et al. (2018) in a very similar setting. The
proof provided here applies to the exact setting of the current paper and has
independent value by being simpler.
Proof of Lemma 6 We first show that H is injective. Note that H is diﬀeren-
tiable. Consider the function δ → H
(
eδ
)
. Its Jacobian is positive definite on Λ
since it has elements ij given by{
eCS(δ)
∂CS (δ)
∂δi
∂CS (δ)
∂δj
}
+
{
eCS(δ)
∂2CS (δ)
∂δi∂δj
}
,
where the first term is a positive semi-definite matrix and where, by property 3
of Lemma 5, the second term is a positive definite matrix on Λ. As it is also sym-
metric, it follows that the Jacobian is positive quasi-definite. ThenH is invertible
by Lemma 2. By Norets and Takahashi (2013), the range of H is int(∆), which
then is the domain of the inverse function H
−1
.
We now show that lnG is an inverse GIL demand. Note that G is linearly ho-
mogeneous and that, as shown above, the Jacobian ofH is symmetric and positive
definite. Then, by Lemma 3, the same is true for the Jacobian of lnG.
B Data
Databases We use data from the Dominick’s Database made available by the
James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This
is weekly store-level scanner data, comprising information on 30 categories of
packaged products at the UPC level for all Dominick’s Finer Foods chain stores
in the Chicago metropolitan area over the period 1989-1997. For the application,
we consider the RTE cereals category during the period 1991–1992.
We supplement the data with the nutrient content of the RTE cereals using the
USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference. This dataset is made available
by the United States Department of Agriculture and provides the nutrient con-
tent of more than 8,500 diﬀerent foods including RTE cereals (in particular, we
use releases SR11 (year 1996) and SR16 (year 2004) for sugar). We have collected
six characteristics: fiber, sugar, lipid and protein in g/serve, energy in kcal/serve,
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and sodium inmg/serve. We also supplement the data with monthly sugar prices
from the website www.indexmundi.com to form cost-based instruments.
Markets, Products, Market shares and Prices We aggregate UPCs into prod-
ucts (e.g., Kellogg’s Special K), so that diﬀerent size boxes are considered one
product, where a product is a cereal (e.g., Special K) associated to its brand (e.g.,
Kellogg’s). We focus attention on the top 50 products in terms of sales, which
account for 73 percent of sales of the category in the sample we use.
We define a market as a store-month pair. Following Nevo (2001), we define
market shares of the inside products by converting volume sales into number of
servings sold, and then by dividing it by the total potential number of servings
at a store in a given month.
To compute the total potential number of servings at a store in a given month,
we assume that (i) an individual in a household consumes around 15 servings per
month, and (ii) consumers visit stores twice a week. Indeed, according to USDA’s
Economic Research Service, per capita consumption of RTE cereals was equal to
around 14 pounds (that is, about 6350 grammes) in 1992, which is equivalent
to 15 servings per month (without loss of generality, we assume that a serving
weight is equal to 35 grammes). Then, the potential (month-store) market size (in
servings) is computed as the weekly average number of households which visited
that store in that given month, times the average household size for that store,
times the number of servings an individual consumes in a month. The market
share of the outside good is then the diﬀerence between one and the sum of the
inside products market shares. As a robustness check, we have also estimated the
models with the alternative assumption that consumers visit stores once a week;
results do not change significantly.
Lastly, following Nevo (2001), we compute the price of a serving by dividing
the dollar sales by the number of servings sold, where the dollar sales reflect
the price consumers paid; we also convert the six nutrients into nutrients for a
serving.
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Supplements
Notation We use italics for scalar variables and real-valued functions, boldface
for vectors, matrices and vector-valued functions, and calligraphic for sets. By
default, vectors are column vectors: s =
(
s0, . . . , sJ
)ᵀ ∈ RJ+1.
∆J ⊂ RJ+1 is the J-dimensional unit simplex: ∆J =
{
s ∈ [0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1},
and int
(
∆J
)
=
{
s ∈ (0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1} is its interior, where J = {0,1, . . . , J}.
Let CS : RJ+1 → R be a function. Then, ∇δCS (δ), with elements j given by
∂CS(δ)
∂δj
, denotes its gradient with respect to the vector δ.
Let G =
(
G0, . . . ,GJ
)
: RJ+1 → RJ+1 be a vector function composed of functions
Gj : RJ+1 → R. Its Jacobian matrix JG (s) at s has elements ij given by ∂Gi(s)∂sj .
A univariate function R→ R applied to a vector is a coordinate-wise applica-
tion of the function, e.g., ln(s) =
(
ln(s0) , . . . , ln
(
sJ
))
. 1J = (1, . . . ,1)
ᵀ ∈ RJ is a vector
consisting of ones and IJ ∈ RJ×J denotes the J × J identity matrix. Let |s˜| =∑j∈J |s˜j |
denotes the 1-norm of vector s˜.
1 Simulation Results for the IPDL Model
Let Θd be the matrix encoding the grouping structure for dimension d, with ele-
ments ij given by
(Θd)ij =
1, if i ∈ Gd (j) ,0, otherwise,
where Gd (j) is the set of products that are grouped with product j in dimension
d. Let sGd(j) =
∑
k∈J (Θd)jk sk be the market share of Gd (j).
Recall that the matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives for the IPDL model
is
Jσ (δ) = −α (Ψ diag(s)− ssᵀ) ,
37
CHAPTER 1. THE INVERSE PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION LOGIT MODEL
where
Ψ =

1− D∑
d=1
µd
IJ+1 + D∑
d=1
µdΘdSGd

−1
,
and where SGd is the diagonal matrix with elements jj given by
sj
sGd (j)
with sj =
σj (δ). We cannot obtain closed-form formulae for the entries of the matrix of
own- and cross-price derivatives. We therefore perform simulations to better
understand the substitution patterns of the IPDL model.
Simulated Data We simulate
• A market with 20 inside products and an outside good;
• 20 diﬀerent grouping structures (i.e. allocations of products in groups)
along 3 dimensions, and with 3 groups per dimension. We obtain a group-
ing structure by simulating a 20×3 matrix of random numbers following a
generalized Bernoulli distribution;
• 20 diﬀerent vectors of grouping parameters µ = (µ0, . . . ,µ3). We obtain a
vector of µ by simulating a 4-vector of uniformly distributed random num-
bers, where the first element is µ0, then normalizing so that µ ∈ int(∆3);
• 20 diﬀerent vectors of market shares s = (s0, . . . , s20). We obtain a vector of
market shares by simulating a 21-vector of uniformly distributed random
numbers, where the first element is s0, then by normalizing the vector of
market shares of inside products so that s ∈ int (∆20).
This way of normalizing ensures that we simulate markets with very low and
very high values for µ0 and s0. Combining the grouping structures, the grouping
parameters, and the market shares, we form 8,000 markets. The following table
gives summary statistics on the simulated data.
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Table S1: Summary Statistics on the Simulated Data
Variable Mean Min Max
s0 0.5253 0.0064 0.9906
sj 0.0158 3e-06 0.0697
µ0 0.4662 0.0697 0.9532
µ1 0.2014 0.0135 0.8480
µ2 0.1420 0.0175 0.4036
µ3 0.1904 0.0059 0.5212
Grouping Structure Table S2 shows the distribution of the own- and cross-
price derivatives according to the number of common groups.
Own-price elasticities are always negative, while cross-price elasticities can
be either negative (complementarity) or positive (substitutability). Products of
the same type are always substitutes. Products that are very similar (i.e., that are
grouped together according to all dimensions, but one) are also always substi-
tutes. Products that are very diﬀerent can be either substitutes or complements.
Products are less likely to be substitutes as they become more diﬀerent.
Table S2: Distribution of Price Derivatives by Number of Common Groups
Common groups Jσ > 0 Median Min Max Freq.
Own-price derivatives
– 0.00% -0.0222 -0.7781 -3e-06 100.00%
Cross-price derivatives
0 (None) 45.33% -7e-07 -0.1539 0.0251 25.09%
1 90.38% 0.0002 -0.1114 0.2082 43.59%
2 100.00% 0.0006 -1e-09 0.2641 26.47%
3 (All) 100.00% 0.0009 -1e-09 0.3100 4.85%
Total 82.09% 0.0002 -0.1539 0.3100 100.00%
Notes: Column "Jσ > 0" gives the percentage of positive cross-price elasticities
according to the number of common groups (e.g., the row "2" concerns products
that are grouped together into 2 groups). Column "Freq." gives the frequencies
(in percentage) of the cross-price elasticities (e.g., 4.85 percent of the cross-price
elasticities involve products of the same type).
Grouping Parameters Table S3 shows the distribution of cross-price deriva-
tive according to the proximity of products into the characteristics space used
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to form product types, as measured by the sum of grouping parameters µjk =∑3
d=1µd1 {j ∈ Gd (k)} for two products j and k.
As the parameter µjk becomes larger, we observe that (i) the derivatives in-
crease in values, and that (ii) the share of substitutes increases. This is because
higher µd means that products of the same group in dimension d become more
similar.
Table S3: Percentage of Substitutes according to the Value of µjk
µjk Jσ > 0 Median Min Max
[0,0.1[ 65.60% 0.0000 -0.1539 0.0286
[0.1,0.2[ 96.37% 0.0002 -0.0538 0.1462
[0.2,0.3[ 93.52% 0.0003 -0.1114 0.1670
[0.3,0.4[ 94.16% 0.0007 -0.0673 0.2082
[0.4,0.5[ 93.89% 0.0009 -0.0432 0.2049
[0.5,1[ 100.00% 0.0020 1e-08 0.3100
Summary In the IPDL model,
1. (Grouping structure) Products of the same type are always substitutes. Prod-
ucts of diﬀerent types may be substitutes or complements, depending on
the degree of closeness between products as measured by the value of the
parameters µd and by the closeness of the products into the characteristics
space used to form product types. The closer two products are, the more
likely they are to be substitutes.
2. (Grouping parameters) The size of the cross-derivatives depends on the de-
gree of closeness. The closer two products are, the higher is their cross-
derivative.
2 Construction of GIL Models
In this section, we provide a range of general methods for building members of
the class of GIL models, along with illustrative examples. They allow us to obtain
alternative models to the logit and nested logit models that have interesting fea-
tures: some of them can accommodate complementarity, others have closed form
for both the demands and their inverse.
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Definition 1. An inverse GIL demand is a function lnG, where G : (0,∞)J+1 →
(0,∞)J+1 is homogeneous of degree one and where the Jacobian JlnG (s) is positive
definite and symmetric.
Definition 2. An almost inverse GIL demand is a function that satisfies the re-
quirements for being an inverse GIL demand, except the Jacobian JlnG (s) is only
required to be positive semi-definite rather than positive definite.
2.1 General Methods and Illustrative Examples
The first result in this section shows that averaging an almost inverse GIL de-
mand with an inverse GIL demand yields a new inverse GIL demand.
Proposition S1 (Averaging). LetGk , k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, be almost inverse GIL demands
with at least one being an inverse GIL demand. Let (α1, . . . ,αK ) ∈ int(∆K−1). Then
lnG (s) =
K∑
k=1
αk lnGk (s)
is an inverse GIL demand.
Proof of Proposition S1 The functionG is homogeneous of degree one since for
λ > 0,
G (λs) =
K∏
k=1
Gk (λs)
αk =
K∏
k=1
λαkGk (s)
αk ,
=
 K∏
k=1
λαk

 K∏
k=1
Gk (s)
αk
 ,
=
(
λ
∑K
k=1αk
) K∏
k=1
Gk (s)
αk
 = λG (s) ,
where the second equality uses the homogeneity of the functions Gk and the
fourth equality uses the restrictions on parameters
∑K
k=1αk = 1.
The Jacobian of lnG, given by JlnG =
∑K
k=1αkJlnGk , is symmetric as the linear
combination of symmetric matrices, and positive definite as the linear combi-
nation of at most K − 1 positive semi-definite matrices and at least one positive
definite matrix.
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Proposition S1 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary S1 (General grouping). Let G ⊆ 2J be a finite set of groups with asso-
ciated parameters µg , where µ0j +
∑
{g∈G|j∈g}µg = 1 for all j ∈ J with µg ≥ 0 for all
g ∈ G and µ0j > 0 for all j ∈ J . Let lnG = (lnG0, . . . , lnGJ ) be given by
lnGj (s) = µ0j ln
(
sj
)
+
∑
{g∈G|j∈g}
µg ln
∑
i∈g
si
 .
Then lnG is an inverse GIL demand.
Proof of Corollary S1 Let T 0j (s) = sj and for each g ∈ G, Tg =
(
T
g
1 , . . . ,T
g
J
)
with
T
g
j (s) =
(∑
i∈g si
)1{j∈g}
. The Jacobian of lnTg has elements jk given by 1{j∈g}1{k∈g}∑
i∈g si
,
and thus JlnTg =
1g1
ᵀ
g∑
i∈g si
where 1g = (1 {1 ∈ g} , . . . ,1 {J ∈ g})ᵀ. Each Tg is an almost
inverse GIL demand while T0 is the logit inverse demand. Lastly,
∑
{g∈G|j∈g}µg +
µ0j = 1. Then the conditions for application of Proposition S1 are fulfilled.
The grouping structure in Corollary S1 is arbitrary and therefore allows the
grouping structure that defines the IPDLmodel. The presence of the logit inverse
demand, due to µ0 > 0, ensures that the Jacobian JlnG(s) is always positive definite
and hence that the inverse demand is indeed invertible.
If the outside good 0 belongs only to one group and is the only member of
that group, then lnG0 (s) = ln(s0) = δ0 + c. Setting δ0 = 0 and assuming a linear
index, the model of Corollary S1 boils down to the linear regression model
ln
(
sj
s0
)
= xjβ −αpj +
∑
g∈G(j)
µg ln
∑
k∈g
sk
+ ξj , j = 1, . . . , J.
The following proposition shows how an inverse GIL demand can be trans-
formed into another inverse GIL demand by application of a location shift and a
matrix with non-negative elements that sum to one across rows and columns. Let
unnormalized demands s˜ be demands obtained before normalizing their sum to
one, i.e., s = s˜/ |s˜|.
Proposition S2 (Transformation). Let T be an inverse GIL demand andm ∈ RJ+1
be a location shift vector. Let A ∈ R(J+1)×(J+1) be an invertible matrix such that
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aij ≥ 0 and∑i∈J aij =∑j∈J aij = 1. Then the function lnG given by
lnG(s) =Aᵀ [ln(T (As))] +m (1)
is an inverse GIL demand, and the corresponding unnormalized demands are
given by
s˜ =A−1T−1
(
exp
[
(Aᵀ)−1 (δ −m)
])
. (2)
Proof of Proposition S2 The function G defined by Equation (1) is homoge-
neous of degree one since for λ > 0,
G (λs) = exp(Aᵀ lnT (A (λs)) +m) ,
= exp(Aᵀ lnλ+Aᵀ lnT (As) +m) ,
= exp(lnλ+Aᵀ lnT (As) +m) = λG (s) ,
where the second equality uses the homogeneity of T, and the third equality uses
the feature that columns of A sum to 1.
The Jacobian of lnG is JlnG(s) = AᵀJlnT(s)A, which is symmetric and positive
definite. Unnormalized demands (2) follow from solving lnG (s˜) = δ.
Proposition S2 provides models where both demand and inverse demand
have closed form, as it is the case of the logit and nested logit models. We il-
lustrate this proposition with an inverse GIL demand that allows for comple-
mentarity. Let J +1 = 3,m = 0, T (s) = s, and
A =

p 1− p 0
1− p p 0
0 0 1
 ,
with p < 0.5. Then we obtain that
s˜ =A−1
(
exp
[
(Aᵀ)−1δ
])
=

p
2p−1e
p
2p−1δ1− 1−p2p−1δ2 − 1−p2p−1e
p
2p−1δ2− 1−p2p−1δ1
p
2p−1e
p
2p−1δ2− 1−p2p−1δ1 − 1−p2p−1e
p
2p−1δ1− 1−p2p−1δ2
eδ3
 ,
so that
s3 = σ3 (δ) =
eδ3
e
p
2p−1δ1− 1−p2p−1δ2 + e
p
2p−1δ2− 1−p2p−1δ1 + eδ3
,
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and ∂σ3(δ)∂δ1 > 0 if and only if δ2 − δ1 > (2p − 1)ln
(1−p
p
)
.
2.2 Zero Demands
The constructions above rule out zero demands (this is also the case of the mod-
els discussed in the main text). The following proposition shows how we can
build models that allow zero demands by slightly modifying Proposition S1 and
applying it to functions G defined on [0,∞)J+1 instead of just (0,∞)J+1.
Proposition S3 (Invertible grouping). Let G =
{
g0, . . . , gJ
}
be a finite set of J + 1
groups (i.e., the number of groups is equal to the number of products). Let µg > 0,
for all g ∈ G, be the associated parameters, where ∑{g∈G|j∈g}µg = 1 for all j ∈ J .
Let G = (G0, . . . ,GJ ) : [0,∞)J+1 → (0,∞)J+1 be given by
lnGj (s) =
∑
{g∈G|j∈g}
µg ln
∑
i∈g
si
 . (3)
Let W = diag
(
µg0 , . . . ,µgJ
)
and let M ∈ R(J+1)×(J+1) with entries Mjk = 1{j∈gk}
(where rows correspond to products and columns to groups). If M is invertible,
then lnG has all the properties of an inverse GIL demand, except that it is defined
on ∆J , and the unnormalized demands satisfy
δ = lnG (s˜)⇔ s˜ = (Mᵀ)−1 exp
(
W−1M−1δ
)
.
Proof of Proposition S3 Following the proof of Proposition S1, the function
G given by Equation (3) clearly has all the properties of an almost inverse GIL
demand. Thus, it remains to show that the Jacobian of lnG is positive definite if
M is invertible. Observe that
lnGj (s) =
∑
k∈J
µgk1 {j ∈ gk} ln
∑
i∈gk
si

=
∑
k∈J
µgk1 {j ∈ gk} ln
∑
i∈J
1 {i ∈ gk}si
 ,
and, in turn, that
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sl
=
∑
k∈J
µgk
1 {j ∈ gk}1 {l ∈ gk}∑
i∈gk si
,
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which can be expressed in matrix form as
JlnG (s) =MVM
ᵀ,
with V = diag
(
µg0∑
i∈g0 si
, . . . ,
µgJ∑
i∈gJ si
)
. This is positive definite since all µg are strictly
positive andM is invertible.
Lastly, unnormalized demands solve lnG (s˜) =MW ln(Mᵀs˜) = δ and, with M
invertible, are given by s˜ = (Mᵀ)−1 exp
(
W−1M−1δ
)
.
As it is illustrated in the following example and as it is the case in ARUM
where error terms have bounded support, Proposition S3 allows for zero de-
mands when there is no degenerate group (i.e, a group containing only one prod-
uct). Note that this proposition also allows to build models with closed form for
both the demands and their inverses.
Define groups from the symmetric matrixM with entries Mij = 1{i,j}, so that
each product belongs to J + 1 groups. Its inverse, M−1, has entries ij equal to
1
J+1 − 1{i=j}.
Let µg = 1/(J +1) for each group g = 0, . . . , J . Then the unnormalized demands
are given by s˜ = (M)−1 exp
[
(J +1)M−1δ
]
and lead to the following demands
σi (δ) =
s˜i∑
j∈J s˜j
=
∑
j∈J e−(J+1)δj − (J +1)e−(J+1)δi∑
j∈J e−(J+1)δj
. (4)
Demands (4) are non-negative only for values of δ within some set. To ensure
positive demands, it is suﬃcient to average with the simple inverse logit demand.
Demands (4) are not consistent with any ARUM since they do not exhibit the
feature of the ARUM that the mixed partial derivatives of σi (δ) alternate in sign.
Indeed, products are substitutes
∂σ1 (δ)
∂δ2
= −J2e−J(δ1+δ2)/
∑
j∈J
e−Jδj

2
< 0,
but
∂2σ1 (δ)
∂δ2∂δ3
= −2J3e−J(δ1+δ2+δ3)/
∑
j∈J
e−Jδj

3
< 0.
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3 Supplement for the Empirical Illustration
Table S4: Top 50 Brands
Nb. Brand Product Type Brand name Market segment Shares (%)
Dollars Volume
1 Apple Cinnamon Cheerios 1 General Mills Family 2.23 2.02
2 Cheerios 1 General Mills Family 7.67 6.76
3 Clusters 1 General Mills Family 1.03 0.89
4 Golden Grahams 1 General Mills Family 2.28 2.12
5 Honey Nut Cheerios 1 General Mills Family 4.82 4.47
6 Total Corn Flakes 1 General Mills Family 0.87 0.59
7 Wheaties 1 General Mills Family 2.59 2.75
8 Total 2 General Mills Health/nutrition 1.29 1.00
9 Total Raisin Bran 2 General Mills Health/nutrition 1.61 1.49
10 Cinnamon Toast Crunch 3 General Mills Kids 2.16 1.94
11 Cocoa Puﬀs 3 General Mills Kids 1.22 0.98
12 Kix 3 General Mills Kids 1.68 1.29
13 Lucky Charms 3 General Mills Kids 2.35 1.94
14 Trix 3 General Mills Kids 2.43 1.75
15 Oatmeal (Raisin) Crisp 4 General Mills Taste enhanced 2.05 2.09
16 Raisin Nut 4 General Mills Taste enhanced 1.60 1.60
17 Whole Grain Total 4 General Mills Taste enhanced 1.77 1.29
18 All Bran 5 Kellogg’s Family 0.97 1.11
19 Common Sense Oat Bran 5 Kellogg’s Family 0.49 0.46
20 Corn Flakes 5 Kellogg’s Family 4.12 6.96
21 Crispix 5 Kellogg’s Family 1.88 1.70
22 Frosted Flakes 5 Kellogg’s Family 6.01 6.77
23 Honey Smacks 5 Kellogg’s Family 0.85 0.84
24 Rice Krispies 5 Kellogg’s Family 5.58 6.06
25 Bran Flakes 6 Kellogg’s Health/nutrition 0.90 1.16
26 Frosted Mini-Wheats 6 Kellogg’s Health/nutrition 3.35 3.69
27 Product 19 6 Kellogg’s Health/nutrition 1.06 0.86
28 Special K 6 Kellogg’s Health/nutrition 3.07 2.53
29 Apple Jacks 7 Kellogg’s Kids 1.67 1.32
30 Cocoa Krispies 7 Kellogg’s Kids 0.99 0.85
31 Corn Pops 7 Kellogg’s Kids 1.80 1.52
32 Froot Loops 7 Kellogg’s Kids 2.66 2.22
33 Cracklin’ Oat Bran 8 Kellogg’s Taste enhanced 1.91 1.66
34 Just Right 8 Kellogg’s Taste enhanced 1.07 1.12
35 Raisin Bran 8 Kellogg’s Taste enhanced 3.96 4.83
36 Shredded Wheat 9 Nabisco Health/nutrition 0.77 0.88
37 Spoon Size Shredded Wheat 9 Nabisco Health/nutrition 1.59 1.63
38 Grape Nuts 10 Post Health/nutrition 2.27 3.06
39 Cocoa Pebbles 11 Post Kids 1.11 0.92
40 Fruity Pebbles 11 Post Kids 1.14 0.94
41 Honey-Comb 11 Post Kids 1.05 0.90
42 Raisin Bran 12 Post Taste enhanced 0.93 1.10
43 Oat Squares 13 Quaker Family 0.91 1.02
44 CapNCrunch 14 Quaker Kids 1.00 1.10
45 Jumbo Crunch (Cap’n Crunch) 14 Quaker Kids 1.27 1.35
46 Life 14 Quaker Kids 1.73 2.24
47 100% Cereal-H 15 Quaker Taste enhanced 1.42 1.84
48 Corn Chex 16 Ralston Family 0.81 0.72
49 Rice Chex 16 Ralston Family 1.15 1.03
50 Cookie-Crisp 17 Ralston Kids 0.89 0.68
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Elasticities for the Main Specifications. Tables S5 and S6 give the estimated
average (over product types and markets) price elasticities of demands for the
main specifications.
Table S5: Average Price Elasticities for the Three-Level NL Models
Type 3NL1 3NL2
Own Cross Own Cross
Same Same Diﬀerent Same Same Diﬀerent
subgroup group group subgroup group group
1 -3.442 0.152 0.118 0.005 -3.440 0.177 0.131 0.007
2 -3.462 0.378 0.207 0.003 -3.547 0.316 0.085 0.004
3 -3.907 0.314 0.234 0.004 -3.975 0.234 0.125 0.006
4 -2.900 0.372 0.269 0.004 -3.034 0.244 0.103 0.005
5 -2.758 0.119 0.095 0.004 -2.776 0.116 0.084 0.006
6 -2.865 0.370 0.296 0.004 -3.156 0.194 0.094 0.006
7 -3.632 0.270 0.182 0.003 -3.714 0.196 0.077 0.005
8 -2.898 0.346 0.272 0.004 -3.008 0.185 0.086 0.006
9 -2.807 0.307 0.167 – -2.026 1.106 – 0.003
10 -1.868 – 0.307 0.005 -1.488 – 0.624 0.007
11 -3.718 0.231 0.116 0.002 -3.503 0.468 0.313 0.003
12 -2.334 – 0.163 0.002 -2.139 – 0.286 0.003
13 -2.595 – 0.048 0.002 -2.333 – 0.234 0.003
14 -2.888 0.211 0.132 0.002 -2.709 0.440 0.333 0.004
15 -2.060 – 0.207 0.003 -1.842 – 0.360 0.004
16 -3.501 0.219 0.051 0.002 -2.723 1.019 0.790 0.003
17 -3.922 – 0.096 0.002 -3.186 – 0.717 0.003
Notes: Elasticities are averaged over product types and over markets.
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Table S6: Average Price Elasticities for the IPDL Model
O
w
n
C
ross
Typ
e
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1
-3.107
0.195
0.091
0.071
0.078
0.077
-0.026
-0.047
-0.039
0.004
0.010
-0.011
-0.003
0.108
-0.016
-0.008
0.064
-0.060
2
-3.203
0.059
0.323
0.064
0.068
-0.036
0.227
-0.032
-0.028
0.095
0.186
-0.073
-0.066
-0.008
-0.004
0.000
-0.006
-0.001
3
-3.560
0.068
0.093
0.334
0.084
-0.031
-0.006
0.235
-0.015
0.003
-0.055
0.186
-0.063
-0.110
0.157
-0.094
-0.051
0.216
4
-2.651
0.062
0.082
0.070
0.355
-0.037
-0.017
-0.028
0.256
0.003
-0.020
-0.032
0.249
-0.051
-0.042
0.242
-0.006
0.002
5
-2.513
0.062
-0.047
-0.027
-0.039
0.142
0.034
0.053
0.042
-0.006
-0.011
0.009
-0.003
0.085
-0.004
-0.016
0.050
-0.038
6
-2.581
-0.025
0.324
-0.006
-0.020
0.038
0.386
0.056
0.042
0.127
0.244
-0.086
-0.095
-0.013
0.005
-0.009
-0.009
0.009
7
-3.319
-0.035
-0.037
0.183
-0.028
0.047
0.046
0.266
0.055
-0.005
-0.063
0.158
-0.052
-0.090
0.129
-0.083
-0.043
0.176
8
-2.651
-0.032
-0.036
-0.013
0.259
0.043
0.038
0.061
0.334
-0.005
-0.036
-0.013
0.251
-0.055
-0.037
0.236
-0.006
0.012
9
-1.945
0.002
0.077
0.002
0.002
-0.004
0.072
-0.004
-0.003
0.912
0.060
-0.016
-0.014
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.005
0.005
10
-1.388
0.009
0.266
-0.051
-0.021
-0.013
0.244
-0.073
-0.043
0.107
–
0.489
0.501
0.036
-0.024
0.006
0.019
-0.040
11
-3.238
-0.005
-0.051
0.089
-0.020
0.004
-0.042
0.098
-0.011
-0.013
0.247
0.386
0.270
-0.029
0.065
-0.045
-0.012
0.082
12
-2.097
-0.002
-0.044
-0.029
0.146
-0.001
-0.044
-0.029
0.146
-0.011
0.233
0.248
–
-0.005
-0.032
0.143
0.011
-0.017
13
-2.379
0.043
-0.005
-0.047
-0.027
0.043
-0.006
-0.047
-0.027
0.004
0.015
-0.026
-0.006
–
0.199
0.219
0.036
-0.053
14
-2.492
-0.008
-0.003
0.086
-0.029
-0.003
0.002
0.092
-0.024
0.005
-0.015
0.075
-0.040
0.287
0.381
0.266
-0.013
0.081
15
-1.760
-0.006
0.001
-0.061
0.185
-0.012
-0.006
-0.067
0.179
0.007
0.004
-0.057
0.184
0.338
0.282
–
0.013
-0.041
16
-2.631
0.027
-0.004
-0.022
-0.003
0.027
-0.004
-0.022
-0.003
0.004
0.009
-0.009
0.010
0.040
-0.009
0.010
0.784
0.734
17
-3.287
-0.022
-0.001
0.084
0.001
-0.017
0.004
0.089
0.006
0.004
-0.018
0.067
-0.016
-0.049
0.057
-0.026
0.663
–
N
otes:E
lasticities
are
averaged
over
p
rodu
ct
typ
es
and
over
m
arkets.
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Chapter 2
The Flexible Inverse Logit Model
1 Introduction
Estimation of structural demand models for diﬀerentiated products plays an im-
portant role in economics. It allows to recover key parameters characterizing
consumers’ preferences so as to better understand their choices (e.g., by comput-
ing willingnesses to pay for product characteristics, price elasticities of demand,
etc.). On top of that, it is the starting point of many economic questions of in-
terest, including market power (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001), mergers (Nevo,
2000), products’ entry (Petrin, 2002; Gentzkow, 2007), trade policy (Goldberg,
1995; Verboven, 1996; Berry et al., 1999), taxes (Griﬃth et al., 2019), cost pass-
through (Miller et al., 2016), etc. As highlighted by the theoretical literature, the
shape of the demand function, described by its slope and its curvature, drives the
answers to these questions.1 Then, assuming a supply model (e.g., price compe-
tition), the accuracy of the answers hinges on the ability of the demand model to
yield general or unrestricted demand shape, i.e., on its ability to yield rich sub-
stitution patterns (roughly speaking, on its "flexibility"). Overall, this calls for
a demand model which yields substitution patterns that are data-driven, rather
than model-driven, and which ideally is easy and fast to estimate.
This paper pursues this goal by developing the flexible inverse logit (FIL)
model. The FIL model is an inverse demand model for products that are diﬀeren-
1In monopolistically competitive and in oligopolistic models, the profit maximizing level of
cost pass-through depends on both the slope (i.e., its first derivatives) and the curvature (i.e., its
second derivatives) of the demand function (see Bulow and Pfleiderer, 1983; Weyl and Fabinger,
2013; Mrázová and Neary, 2017). For example, in monopolistically competitive markets, absolute
pass-through is less than one if and only if log-demand is convex (Bulow and Pfleiderer, 1983;
Weyl and Fabinger, 2013).
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tiated in prices and in characteristics that may be observed or unobserved by the
modeller. It accommodates rich substitution patterns, including complementar-
ity, and is consistent with an underlying structural model of heterogeneous and
utility-maximizing consumers. With aggregate data at hand (i.e., data on mar-
ket shares, prices and product characteristics), the FIL model can be estimated
by a linear instrumental variable (IV) regression, which allows to deal with the
endogeneity of prices and market shares, due to the presence of structural error
terms that represent unobserved (by the modeller, but observed by consumers
and firms) product characteristics. The FIL model can be applied to various top-
ics in industrial organization, international trade, and public economics; and it
can be used to answer relevant policy questions, such as the eﬀects of mergers,
products’ entry, and changes in regulation.2
The standard practice to structurally estimate demands for diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts based on aggregate data assumes an additive random utility model (ARUM).
It then computes the associated demands that are estimated using the method
developed by Berry (1994), which targets the inverse demands and thus involves
an inversion from demands to their inverse that must be performed numerically
when inverse demands are not closed form. Since Berry et al. (1995), the state-of-
the-art approach is the BLP method, which assumes an RCL model and estimates
it using a nested-fixed point algorithm.3 The popularity of the BLP method is
due to its ability to accommodate very rich substitution patterns while dealing
with the endogeneity of prices and market shares.4 However, the BLP approach
faces some practical diﬃculties. Flexibility of the RCL model can be diﬃcult to
obtain in practice because it requires many random coeﬃcients, which are not
easily identified in applications; besides estimating an RCL model can be painful
and time-consuming since it requires nonlinear optimization, numerical inver-
2In particular, it possesses the main features that make it appealing for merger evaluation
purposes, as highlighted by Pinkse and Slade (2004). It imposes no specific restriction on the
price elasticities; it is easily and fastly estimated by linear IV regression using standard computer
softwares; and it can handle very large choice sets. To demonstrate its use for merger simulation,
I provide, in Appendix E, a preliminary analysis of the Post-Nabisco merger in the ready-to-eat
cereals industry that occurred in January 1993. Assuming that the merger had no eﬀect on non-
merging firm’s prices, I find that the structural model of demand (FIL model) and supply (static
oligopolistic price competition model) predicts pretty well the merging firms’ price increase, as
directly estimated using pre- and postmerger data.
3Since the RCL model yields inverse demands that are not closed form, Berry et al. (1995)
propose to estimate demands by inverting them using a contraction mapping nested into a gen-
eralized method-of-moments (GMM) minimization procedure.
4McFadden and Train (2000) shows that any random utility model can be approximated by an
RCL model.
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sion and simulation of market shares.5 Another widely used approach uses the
nested logit models.6 Because they have linear-in-parameters inverse demands,
the nested logit models avoid the diﬃculties of the BLP approach by just re-
quiring linear instrumental variable (IV) regressions (see Berry, 1994; Verboven,
1996). However, they have been criticized on the ground that they yield substi-
tution patterns that are too restrictive and that they require the modeller to take
a stand on the relevant dimensions along which nests can be defined.
The approach of this paper contrasts with the standard practice by specifying
a linear-in-parameters inverse demand model, which just requires linear IV re-
gression for estimation, and then by showing that it is consistent with a (utility)
model of heterogeneous consumers.7 Fosgerau et al. (2019) propose a general
method to construct linear-in-parameters inverse demand models based on nest-
ing, which yield richer substitution patterns than the nested logit model by al-
lowing any nesting structure with overlapping and non-overlapping nests. How-
ever, this construction has two drawbacks with respect to the BLP approach: it
requires the modeller to choose the nesting structure before estimation; and it
yields substitutions patterns that do not depend on product characteristics di-
rectly – except those used to construct the nesting structure.8
5This implies dealing with their associated issues of local optima and choice of starting values,
accuracy of the contraction mapping and of numerical integration (see e.g., Skrainka and Judd,
2011; Dubé et al., 2012; Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2014). See Conlon and Gortmaker (2018) for the
current best practices in the estimation of structural demand models using BLP approach. Other
approaches have been proposed. Dubé et al. (2012) transform the BLP’s GMMminimization into
a mathematical programwith equilibrium constraints (MPEC), which minimizes the GMM objec-
tive function subject to the constraint that observed market shares be equal to predicted market
shares. Lee and Seo (2015) approximate by linearization the nonlinear system of market shares
for the RCL model and thus invert it analytically. Salanié and Wolak (2019) propose another
approximation which leads to a linear IV regression.
6The nested logit models are commonly used by antitrust practitioners and competition au-
thorities (e.g., the European Commission estimated nested logit models to simulate mergers for
the Lagardère/Natexis/VUP (2004), TomTom/Tele Atlas (2008), Unilever/Sara Lee (2010) cases;
see CCR - Competition Competence Report Autumn 2013/1) and by academics (see e.g., Björner-
stedt and Verboven, 2016; Berry et al., 2016, for recent papers that estimate nested logit models
with aggregate data).
7This paper adopts a fully parametric approach. By contrast, Compiani (2019) develops a
non-parametric approach to estimate inverse demands in diﬀerentiated products markets based
on aggregate data. His approach does not make any distributional assumptions on unobserv-
ables and imposes minimal functional form restrictions based on economic theory. However,
he rules out complementarity, as defined by a negative cross-price derivative of demand. Using
restrictions on inverse demands allows him to reduce the very large number of parameters to
be estimated required in non-parametric settings. However, it still requires a large number of
parameters and thus needs large enough datasets for estimation.
8In particular, Fosgerau et al. (2019) propose the inverse product diﬀerentiation logit (IPDL)
model based on a predetermined segmentation of the market in which the multiple dimensions
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The FIL model developed in the present paper overcomes these two draw-
backs. Based on the construction proposed by Fosgerau et al. (2019), the FIL
model uses a flexible nesting structure with a nest for each pair of products
and an associated nesting parameter (see Chu, 1989; Koppelman and Wen, 2000;
Davis and Schiraldi, 2014), which is consistent with a member of the class of
model of heterogeneous and utility-maximizing consumers studied by Allen and
Rehbeck (2019). Nesting in the FIL model is thus just a way to fully parametrize
the matrix of price elasticities of demand and does not require the modeller to
choose the nesting structure before estimation.9 Then, the nesting parameters
are projected into product characteristics space: in spirit to Pinkse et al. (2002),
each parameter is defined as a function of the distance between products into
the product characteristics space, known up to some parameters to be estimated.
This projection imposes the same restrictions on the (inverse) demand function
as the linear-in-characteristics ARUM – namely that only diﬀerences in charac-
teristics determine the (inverse) demand, not the identity of products ; otherwise,
it makes use of Bernstein polynomials for its shape to be data-driven.10
The FIL model is flexible in the sense of Diewert (1974) in a large class of in-
verse demand models imposing minimal restrictions on consumers’ behavior,11
except that it does not allow for income eﬀect.12 It is easily estimated by lin-
ear IV regression, which clarifies its empirical identification (in terms of instru-
ments needed), and eases and accelerates its estimation (e.g., by application of
the two-stage least squares estimator). The FIL model allows for complementar-
ity in demand (i.e., negative cross-price derivatives of demand) and in utility (i.e.,
positive cross second-order partial derivatives of the utility function with respect
to quantity). This is an important feature of the FIL model since many important
economic questions hinge on the extent to which products are independent, sub-
stitutes or complements: in particular, it directly aﬀects the incentive for firms to
of segmentation are allowed to cross in any way. The IPDL model extends the nested logit models
to allow richer substitution patterns, including complementarity, but requires the modeller to
choose the relevant dimensions of segmentation.
9This implies that its cross-price elasticities are not constrained by a predetermined segmen-
tation of the market; however, it can still exploit product segmentation by adding segment fixed
eﬀects as product characteristics.
10Note that McFadden and Train (2000) use Bernstein polynomials to show the flexibility of the
RCL model.
11This means that, observing a vector of market shares, it can match that vector of market
shares as well as own- and cross-price elasticities.
12This is its main drawback. This is the case of any model derived from the construction based
on nesting proposed by Fosgerau et al. (2019). Extending it to allow for income eﬀect is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
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introduce a new product on themarket (Gentzkow, 2007), to merge (Ershov et al.,
2018), to bundle their products (Iaria and Wang, 2019), etc.13 In this respect,
the nesting parameters are interaction parameters, similar to those of Gentzkow
(2007), determining the way products interact in utility and the type of relation-
ship between them: products are substitutes (resp., complements) in utility, if
their interaction parameter is positive (resp., negative).
Lastly, this paper studies the ability of the FIL model to provide rich substitu-
tion patterns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, it assesses its capacity to replicate
the substitution patterns of the RCL model, which is used on the ground that it
yields rich substitution patterns. They show that the FIL model provides a good
approximation of the RCL model for specifications that are commonly used in
the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
general setting used in this paper. Section 3 introduces and studies the FIL
model. Section 4 develops the methods to estimate it with data on market shares,
prices and product characteristics. Section 5 shows, using Monte-Carlo simula-
tions, the ability of the FIL model to replicate the substitution patterns of the
RCL model for specifications that are commonly used in the literature. Section 6
concludes.
Notation I use italics for scalar variables and real-valued functions, boldface
for vectors, matrices and vector-valued functions, and calligraphic for sets. By
default, vectors are column vectors.
Let J = {0, . . . , J}. A vector s ∈ RJ+1 refers to s ≡
(
s0, . . . , sJ
)ᵀ ∈ RJ+1, and s−0 ≡
(s1, . . . , sJ )ᵀ. |s| denotes the 1-norm of the vector s, |s| =∑j∈J |sj |.
∆J denotes the J-dimensional unit simplex: ∆J ≡
{
s ∈ [0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1},
int
(
∆J
)
≡
{
s ∈ (0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1} is its interior, and bd(∆J ) ≡ ∆J\int(∆J) is its
boundary.
Let G =
(
G0, . . . ,GJ
)
: RJ+1 → RJ+1 be a vector function composed of functions
Gj : RJ+1 → R. The Jacobian matrix JsG (s) of G with respect to s at s has entries ij
given by ∂Gi(s)∂sj . The matrix
[
JsG (s)
]
0
corresponds to the matrix JsG (s) after remov-
ing its first row and its first column.
A univariate function R → R applied to a vector is a coordinate-wise ap-
plication of the function, e.g., ln(s) =
(
ln(s0) , . . . , ln
(
sJ
))
. 0J = (0, . . . ,0)
ᵀ ∈ RJ
and 1J = (1, . . . ,1)
ᵀ ∈ RJ are vectors consisting of zeroes and ones, respectively.
13For example, a merger between firms selling complements reduces prices (Cournot, 1838).
58
CHAPTER 2. THE FLEXIBLE INVERSE LOGIT MODEL
IJ,J ∈ RJ×J is the J × J identity matrix and 1J,J ∈ RJ×J is the J × J matrix consisting
of ones.
2 Setting
This section first presents the general setting used in this paper. It gives the main
ingredients required to identify and estimate demand models for diﬀerentiated
products using aggregate data. In particular, it highlights that it is the inverse de-
mand that is targeted during estimation. Then, it introduces the general method
developed by Fosgerau et al. (2019) to construct inverse demand models based
on nesting, which is used in Section 3 to build the flexible inverse logit model.
2.1 General Setting
Consider a population of consumers choosing from a choice set J ≡ {0, . . . , J} of
J+1 diﬀerentiated products, where products j ∈ J0 ≡ {1, . . . , J} are the inside prod-
ucts and product j = 0 is the outside good. Let pj ∈ R be the price of prod-
uct j and xj ∈ RK be the vector of K observed characteristics of product j, with
p ≡
(
p0, . . . ,pJ
)
and x ≡
(
x0, . . . ,xJ
)
.
Following the prevailing literature (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995), let ξj ∈ R
be the j-product unobserved characteristics term, with ξ ≡
(
ξ0, . . . ,ξJ
)
. The vector
ξ contains the structural error terms of the demand model, which are considered
to be observed by consumers and firms but not by the modeller.
Consider the demand system
σ =
(
σ0, . . . ,σJ
)
: X → int
(
∆J
)
,
where X is the support of (p,x,ξ) and where the function σ gives the vector
s =
(
s0, . . . , sJ
)
∈ int
(
∆J
)
of nonzero observed market shares, that is, it yields the
system of market shares which equates the vector s of observed market shares to
the vector σ of predicted (by the model) market shares,
s = σ (p,x,ξ;θ) , (1)
where θ denotes the vector of structural parameters to be estimated. The struc-
tural parameters are the key parameters describing consumers’ preferences, which
are invariant to changes in economic policy, such as taxes, or in firms’ strategy,
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such as pricing strategies, product characteristics, new products (see Hurwicz,
1966).
The demand system (1) assumes that the terms ξj , j ∈ J , are scalars, that
there is no income eﬀect (since σ is independent of income), and that demands
are positive (i.e., σj > 0 for all j ∈ J ).
Index restriction Following Berry and Haile (2014), I further assume an index
restriction. Specifically, I partition the set of K product characteristics as x =(
x(1),x(2)
)
, where x(1) and x(2) are K1 linear product characteristics and K2 = K−K1
nonlinear product characteristics, respectively. Then, I define linear indexes as
δj ≡ x(1)j β −αpj + ξj , j ∈ J , (2)
where α > 0 is the consumers’ price sensitivity (i.e., their marginal utility of in-
come) and where β captures the consumers’ taste for characteristics x(1). The
vector (α,β) is often referred to as the vector of linear parameters. I normalize
the indexes of each inside product relative to that of the outside good by setting
δ0 = 0, so that δ belongs to R
J+1
0 ≡ {δ : δ0 = 0}. This normalization is required for
identification (see Proposition 1 for details).
This means that the system of market shares (1) can be rewritten as
s = σ
(
δ,x(2);µ
)
, (3)
where δ ≡
(
δ0, . . . ,δJ
)
and µ is often referred to as the vector of nonlinear param-
eters.
The index restriction implies that x(1), p and ξ enter demands only through
the product indexes δ. By constrast, x(2) can enter demands in an unrestrictive
way. In the logit model, there is no x(2). By contrast, in the RCL model, x(2) are
the characteristics that have a random coeﬃcient. Demands (3) depending on x(2)
make the own- and cross-price elasticities depending on product characteristics
directly; otherwise, they do not depend on product characteristics directly, except
when parameters depend on product characteristics - as it is, for example, the
case of the nested logit model.
Inverse Demand Invertibility in δ of the system of market shares (3) is crucial
for identification and estimation. Berry et al. (2013) show that their "connected
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substitutes" structure is suﬃcient for invertibility.14 In Monardo (2019), I pro-
vide a new result of invertibility for demands that accommodate some substitu-
tion patterns that are not allowed by Berry et al. (2013), including complementar-
ity as defined by a negative cross-price derivative of demand; this result applies
to the FIL model developed in Section 3.
If σ is invertible in δ, there exists an inverse demand function σ−1 given by
δj = σ
−1
j
(
s,x(2);µ
)
, j ∈ J ,
so that the structural error terms ξj can be written as
ξj(θ) = σ
−1
j
(
s,x(2);µ
)
− x(1)j β +αpj , j ∈ J . (4)
where θ = (α,β,µ).
Equation (4), which gives each structural error term as a function of the data
(i.e., market shares, prices and product characteristics) and parameters θ to be
estimated, shows that the inverse demand function, not the demand function
itself, is the target of estimation.
Instruments Following the prevailing literature (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995;
Nevo, 2001), I assume that product characteristics x are exogenous, i.e., they are
uncorrelated with the structural error terms. However, prices and market shares
in the right-hand side of Equation (4) are likely to be endogenous. Prices are en-
dogenous because, as it is typically assumed in price competition models with
diﬀerentiated products, firms consider both observed and unobserved product
characteristics when they set their prices. Market shares are endogenous since
they are determined by the system of equations (1), where each market share
depends on the entire vectors of endogenous prices and of unobserved product
characteristics, and because consumers choose products while considering unob-
served product characteristics.
Then, provided that there exists appropriate instruments z for prices andmar-
ket shares, following Berry (1994), one can estimate demands (3) based on the
14The connected substitutes structure requires that (i) products be weak substitutes, i.e., every-
thing else equal, an increase in δj weakly decreases demand σi for all other products; and (ii) the
“connected strict substitution” condition hold, i.e., there is suﬃcient strict substitution between
products to treat them in one demand system.
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following conditional moment restrictions
E
[
ξj(θ)|z
]
= 0, j ∈ J , (5)
where ξj(θ) is given by Equation (4).
Both cost-based instruments and BLP instruments can be used (see e.g., Berry
and Haile, 2014; Reynaert and Verboven, 2014; Armstrong, 2016; Gandhi and
Houde, 2017, etc.). Cost-based instruments separate exogenous variation in prices
due to exogenous changes in costs from endogenous variation in prices due to
changes in unobserved product characteristics. They are valid under the assump-
tion that variation in cost shifters is correlated with variation in prices, but not
with changes in unobservable product characteristics. However, they may not be
good instruments for market shares, since costs do not directly shift the endoge-
nous market shares but instead only aﬀect them through prices.15
BLP instruments are functions of the characteristics of competing products
and are valid under the assumption that product characteristics x are exogenous.
They separate exogenous variation in prices due to changes in x from endoge-
nous variation in prices due to changes in unobserved product characteristics.
They are commonly used to instrument prices with the idea that characteristics
of competing products are correlated with prices since the (equilibrium) markup
of each product depends on how close products are into product characteristics
space (products with close substitutes tend to have low markups and thus low
prices relative to costs). They are also appropriate to instrument market shares.
BLP instruments can suﬃce for (theoretical) identification, but may be weak in
practice, thereby making cost-based instruments useful (see e.g., Reynaert and
Verboven, 2014).16
2.2 Linear-in-Parameters Inverse Demand Models
Equations (4) and (5), when combined with parametric functional form restric-
tions, serve as a basis for demand estimation. When inverse demands σ−1j have
a closed form, one can resort to IV regression techniques for estimation. If, in
addition, they are linear in parameters µ, then estimation just requires linear IV
15The weak instruments problem occurs when instruments are only weakly correlated with
the endogenous variables. See Andrews et al. (2018) on how to test for weak instruments in
applications.
16Note that Armstrong (2016) discusses the strength of the BLP instruments as the number of
products increases.
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regressions.
Fosgerau et al. (2019) show how to construct linear-in-parameter inverse de-
mand models based on nesting, thereby generalizing the nested logit models by
allowing any nesting structure, with overlapping or non-overlapping nests, while
just requiring linear IV regressions for estimation.17 Inverse demands of such
models are of the form of
σ−1j (s;µ) ≡ lnGj (s;µ) + c = δj , j ∈ J , (6)
where δj is given by Equation (2) and c ∈ R is a market-specific constant, and
where lnGj is defined by
lnGj (s;µ) ≡ µj ln
(
sj
)
+
∑
g∈G(j)
µg ln
∑
k∈g
sk
 , j ∈ J , (7)
where G (j) is the set of nests containing product j, andwhere µ ≡
(
(µj)j∈J , (µg)g∈G
)
,
with G the finite set of all nests, is such that µj +∑g∈G(j)µg = 1, for all j ∈ J , with
µj > 0 for all j ∈ J and µg ≥ 0 for all g ∈ G.
The logit and the nested logit models are the simplest special cases (see e.g.,
Berry, 1994; Verboven, 1996). For the logit model,
lnGj (s) ≡ ln(sj). (8)
Partition the choice set J into nests, and further partition each nest into sub-
nests. Then, one obtains the three-level nested logit model with
lnGj (s;µ1,µ2) ≡
1− 2∑
d=1
µd
 ln(sj)+µ1 ln
∑
k∈g
sk
+µ2 ln
∑
k∈g |h
sk
 , (9)
for product j ∈ J0 in nest g and subnest h|g, where µ1,µ2 ≥ 0 with µ1 + µ2 < 1.
Indeed, setting γ1 = µ1 + µ2 and γ2 = µ1, one obtains Equation (10) of Verboven
(1996), with the constraints 0 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ1 < 1 that make it consistent with random
utility maximization. Note that, for the nested logit models, the inverse demand
of the outside good is given by
lnG0 (s) ≡ ln(s0) ,
17See Corollary A in the supplement of Fosgerau et al. (2019).
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since the outside good is assumed to be the only member of its nest.
The construction proposed in Equations (6) and (7) leads to models that have
several attractive features. They generalize the nested logit models by allowing
for richer substitution patterns, and in particular complementarity. They require
linear IV regressions for estimation, which clarifies their empirical identification
in terms of instruments needed, and eases and accelerates their estimation by
application of the two-stage least squares estimator. They can be suﬃciently par-
simonious (i.e., their number of parameters does not grow with the number of
products), that they can fastly handle large choice sets.
However, this construction has two drawbacks with respect to the BLP ap-
proach. First, it requires the modeller to choose a nesting structure before es-
timation. For example, Fosgerau et al. (2019) build the inverse product diﬀer-
entiation logit (IPDL) model which, similarly to the PDL model of Bresnahan
et al. (1997), generalizes the nested logit models by allowing an arbitrary, non-
hierarchical nesting structure in which dimensions of segmentation are allowed
to cross in any way. The IPDL model allows for richer substitution patterns than
the nested logit models, including complementarity; however, it still requires the
modeller to choose the relevant dimensions of segmentation.
The choice of the nesting structure can be problematic in applications. Con-
sider for example the market for cars, where cars are assumed to belong to five
segments: subcompact, compact, standard, intermediate, and luxury. Grigolon
(2018) suggests a natural ordering of cars from subcompact to luxury, while
Brenkers and Verboven (2006) consider a nested structure without prior order-
ing. Determining which of the two nesting structures best describes the market
is not obvious.
Second, it leads to models with substitution patterns that depend on product
characteristics only indirectly through the market shares, except for those used
to construct the nesting structure.
3 The Flexible Inverse Logit Model
This section develops the flexible inverse logit (FIL) model, which overcomes the
two drawbacks mentioned above. It is a flexible model that uses the construction
of Equations (6) and (7) to build a flexible nesting structure with a nest for each
pair of products and with an associated nesting parameter that drives the sub-
stitutions between these two products. Thus, in the FIL model, nesting does not
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require the modeller to identify relevant dimensions of segmentation.
Then, to make the substitution patterns depend on product characteristics
directly, I project the nesting parameters into product characteristics space. In
particular, in spirit to Pinkse et al. (2002), I replace each nesting parameter with
a function of a measure of distance between products i and j into the product
characteristics space formed by x(2).
3.1 Specification
The FIL model uses a flexible nesting structure with a nest for each pair of prod-
ucts (i, j) ∈ J0, i , j, and with an associated parameter µij for each nest. Its inverse
demands are given by
σ−1j (s;µ) ≡ lnGj (s;µ) + c = δj , j ∈ J0, (10)
where δj is given by Equation (2), and where lnGj is defined by
lnGj (s;µ) ≡ µj ln
(
sj
)
+
∑
i,j
µij ln
(
si + sj
)
, j ∈ J0, (11)
where µ ≡
(
µ1, . . . ,µJ ,µ11, . . . ,µJ−1,J
)
satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The vector µ satisfies the following constraints.
(i) µj +
∑
i,j µij = 1 for all j ∈ J0
(ii) µj > 0 for all j ∈ J0
(iii) µij = µji for all (i, j) ∈ J 20 , i , j.
In addition, the outside good is the only member of its nest, then
lnG0 (s;µ) = ln(s0) , (12)
and
σ−10 (s;µ) ≡ ln(s0) + c = 0, (13)
where I recall that normalization δ0 = 0 is used.
Assumption 1 has an economic content and can be expressed in terms of de-
mand shape restrictions. The FIL model yields positive demands that sum to
one, that are invariant to translation in δ (i.e, only diﬀerences in δ determine
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demands, not their absolute value), that satisfy Slutsky symmetry and positive
definiteness (i.e., the matrix of demand derivatives with respect to δ is symmetric
and positive definite) and the boundary condition that all the consumers choose a
product j ∈ J when that product becomes infinitely attractive (i.e., when δj goes
to infinity), while the others remain finitely attractive.
Several remarks are in order. First, Assumption 1 allows the nesting parame-
ters µij to be positive and negative. Then, the FIL model nests the logit model. It
boils down to the logit model when µij = 0 for all i, j ∈ J0, i , j. As a consequence,
the independence from irrelevance alternatives (IIA) property could be tested us-
ing standardWald tests.18 Lastly, one could also test (rather than impose) Slutsky
symmetry by testing whether or not Assumption (iii) holds. Note, however, that
Slutsky symmetry is key for rationalizability of the demand function, i.e., for it
to be consistent with utility maximization. Then, if Slutsky symmetry is rejected
by the data, any study based on the demand estimates (e.g., merger simulation)
would not rely on an underlying utility model.
Demand Invertibility The following proposition establishes invertibility of the
demand.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider any vector s ∈ int
(
∆J
)
of nonzero
market shares. Then, there exists a unique δ ∈ RJ+10 such that
δ = σ−1 (s;µ) ⇔ s = σ (δ;µ) ,
where σ−1 is given by Equations (10) to (13).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Equations (10) to (13) describe the inverse demand of the FIL model, i.e., its
mapping from market shares s to product indexes δ. Proposition 1 establishes
existence and uniqueness of the inverse mapping from product indexes to market
shares (i.e., the demand), up to normalization. It states that product indexes δ
are identified up to an additive constant c from the vector of observed nonzero
market shares s by the relations (10) to (13), where c is fixed by normalizing δ0 to
zero. The need for normalization is due to the feature of the FIL model whereby
its demand function satisfies translation invariance in product indexes δ.
18However, the FIL model and the nested logit model are non-nested.
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Microfoundation The FIL model is consistent with a consumer choosing a vec-
tor s ∈ ∆J of market shares of the diﬀerentiated products so as to maximize her
quasi-linear utility given by19
u (s) =
∑
j∈J
δjsj −
∑
j∈J
sj ln
(
sj
)
+
∑
j∈J0
∑
i,j
µijsj ln
(
sj
si + sj
)
,
if s ∈ ∆J and u (s) = −∞ if s < ∆J , where δj is given by Equation (2).
The FILmodel can thus be seen as a representative consumermodel (Fosgerau
et al., 2019) or a standard continuous-choice model. It is worthwhile to mention
that this form of utility can be derived, after an aggregation across consumers,
from the utility model of heterogeneous and utility-maximizing consumers, stud-
ied by Allen and Rehbeck (2019). Parameters µij thus parametrize the distribu-
tion of taste in the population of consumers.
Complements and Substitutes The parameters µij of the FIL model relate to
two diﬀerent (but related) definitions of complementarity used in the empirical
literature (see Appendix A.4). In the FIL model, the sign of the parameter µij
determines whether products i and j are complements or substitutes in utility.
Indeed,
∂2u (s)
∂si∂sj
= − µij
si + sj
,
so that products i and j are substitutes in utility if µij > 0, complements in utility
if µij < 0, and independent in utility if µij = 0.
The nesting parameters are thus parameters, similar to those of Gentzkow
(2007), determining the way products interact in utility and thus the type of
relationship between them. Gentzkow (2007) uses a discrete analogue of this
definition in an ARUM based on bundles ij with utilities
uij = ui +uj + Γij ,
so that products i and j are complements in utility if Γij > 0, substitutes in utility
if Γij < 0 and independent in utility if Γij = 0.
Each parameter µij drives the cross-price elasticities between products i and
19Note that Assumption (i) has been used.
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j. To see this, let J = 3 with sj = 1/4 and pj = p. Then,
∂s1
∂p3
p3
s1
>
∂s1
∂p2
p2
s1
⇔ µ13 > µ12.
However, as suggested by preliminary simulations, there is no relationship
between the sign of µij and the sign of the cross-price derivative (or elasticity)
of demand between products i and j. Rather, whether or not products i and j
are complements or substitutes depends on the relation of these two products to
the other products, as already highlighted by the theoretical literature (see e.g.,
Samuelson, 1974; Ogaki, 1990). In particular, these simulations show that the
FIL model rules out complementarity when µij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ J0 and µj > 0.5 for
all j ∈ J0.20
Flexibility The FIL model can be shown to be flexible in the sense of Diewert
(1974) in the class of inverse demand models of the form of Equation (10), where
G is homogeneous of degree one, with G0(s) = s0, and where the Jacobian JslnG is
positive definite and symmetric on int(∆J ).21
A demand system is said to be flexible in the sense of Diewert (1974) if it
is able to provide a first-order approximation to any theoretically grounded de-
mand system at a point in price space.22 Equivalently, flexibility can also be
viewed as the ability of the (direct or indirect) utility function to provide second-
order approximations to any utility function. This is because the partial deriva-
tives of the demand function can be uniquely derived from the second partial
derivatives of the utility function.
Flexibility of the FIL model means that, observing market shares s∗, the FIL
can match that vector of market shares s∗ as well as the true matrix of price
derivatives of demand for inside products
[
Jpσ ∗
]
0
. That is, if the FIL model is
flexible, then one can choose δ∗, α∗ and µ∗ such that s∗ = σ (δ∗;µ∗) and
[
Jpσ ∗
]
0
=[
Jpσ (δ∗;µ∗)
]
0
.
Flexibility of the FIL model is best understood by focusing on its inverse de-
mand function and its corresponding matrix of derivatives. Indeed, flexibility
20Further simulations will be performed later.
21This is the class of generalized inverse logit (GIL) models developed by Fosgerau et al. (2019)
where it is further assumed that lnG0 = ln(s0), as it is the case of the logit, nested logit, and IPDL
models.
22See Appendix A.2 for more details.
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can be obtained by matching
σ−1j (s
∗;µ∗) = lnGj (s∗;µ∗) + c = δ∗j , j ∈ J ,
and23 [
Jpσ (δ∗;µ∗)
]−1
0
= − 1
α∗
[
1J,J
s∗0
+ [JlnG (s
∗;µ∗)]0
]
=
[
Jpσ ∗
]−1
0
, (14)
where lnGj is given by Equations (11) and (12) so that
[
JslnG (s;µ)
]
0
is given by
[
JslnG (s;µ)
]
0
=

µ1
s1
+
∑
i,1
µi1
si+s1
µ12
s1+s2
· · · µ1Js1+sJ
µ12
s1+s2
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . .
...
µ1J
s1+sJ
· · · · · · µJsJ +
∑
i,J
µiJ
si+sJ

.
The FIL model yields flexible substitution patterns in the sense that it has a
suﬃcient number of parameters to fully parametrize
[
JslnG (s;µ)
]
0
. At the oppo-
site, the logit model fully sparsifies
[
JslnG (s)
]
0
,
[
JslnG (s)
]
0
=

1
s1
· · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1sJ
 ,
which does not depend on parameters µ.
Flexibility of the FIL model is obtained as follows. One can match the oﬀ-
diagonal entries ij of
[
Jpσ ∗
]−1
0
, by appropriately choosing µij = µ∗ij . Its diagonal
entries are then automatically matched since the FIL model satisfies the Euler-
type equation
∑
k∈J
∂ lnGj (s∗;µ∗)
∂sk
s∗k = 1 for all j ∈ J (see Fosgerau et al., 2019). One
can match the vector of market shares s∗ by choosing the unique vector δ∗ ∈ RJ+10
that is able to do so. The parameter α∗ can be chosen so that µj > 0 for all j ∈ J0.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 2. The FILmodel is flexible in the sense of Diewert (1974) in the class
of inverse demand models of the form of Equation (10), whereG is homogeneous
of degree one, with G0 = s0, and where the Jacobian JslnG is positive definite and
symmetric on int(∆J ).
23See Appendix B.2 for details of computations.
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Proof. See Appendix B.3.
3.2 Projection into Product Characteristics Space
The FIL model yields substitution patterns that are flexible (in the sense of Diew-
ert (1974)), but that depend on product characteristics only indirectly (through
the market shares). I address this drawback by projecting the nesting parameters
µij into the product characteristics space formed by x(2), based on the idea that
the distance between products into this space drives substitution (closer products
into this space should be more substitutable).
In spirit to Pinkse et al. (2002), I replace µij with a function of a measure of
distance d(2)ij ≡ (d(2)ij1, . . . ,d(2)ijK2) between products i and j into the product charac-
teristics space formed by x(2),24
µij = µ
(
d(2)ij ;γ
)
,
known up to some parameters γ to be estimated.
This projection makes the substitution patterns depending on characteristics
x(2). It maps the FILmodel from product space into product characteristics space;
therebymaking it appealing to perform counterfactual exercises, such as the sim-
ulation or evaluation of mergers, products’ entry, or changes in regulation. It also
makes the price elasticities functions of a small number of parameters γ to be es-
timated.
With this transformation, the parameters µij are no longer structural, since
they are not invariant to changes in product characteristics by firms. However,
the vector of parameters contained in the vector γ parametrizing the function µ
are structural; they are similar in spirit to the standard deviations of the random
coeﬃcients in a RCL model, as they control for the distribution of valuation for
product characteristics x(2) in the population of consumers.
The relationship to other approaches, and in particular, with the ideal point
(or address) approach (Anderson et al., 1992), where in this case the ideal points
just consists of the locations of products into the product characteristics space
24This strategy has been successfully applied by Pinkse and Slade (2004) Slade (2004), Rojas
(2008) for demand estimation purposes. See also Pinkse and Slade (1998). Note that I do not im-
plement the semi-parametric estimator of Pinkse et al. (2002). In my model, their method would
use a series expansion to approximate µ, and in turn, this would introduce an additional source
of endogeneity. Indeed, in addition to the structural error ξ, their method adds an approximation
error, due neglected expansion errors, that is a function of characteristics x(2).
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formed by x(2), or with discrete-continuous models (e.g., Hanemann, 1984) will
be studied later.
Economic Restrictions The FIL model projected into product characteristics
space satisfies the same shape restrictions on the inverse demands as those that
are imposed in the linear-in-characteristics ARUM, including the RCL model
(Gandhi and Houde, 2017).
Observe first that the FIL model projected into product characteristics space
has inverse demands given by
σ−1j
(
s,x(2);γ
)
= lnG
(
sj , {sk ,d(2)kj }k,j ;γ
)
+C, (15)
where
lnG
(
sj , {sk ,d(2)kj }k,j ;γ
)
≡ ln
(
sj
)
−
∑
i,j
µ
(
d(2)ij ;γ
)
ln
(
sj
si + sj
)
, (16)
with C ∈ R a market-specific constant (see Appendix C for more details).
Now, let yj ≡ (sj ,x(2)j ) and y−j ≡ (y1, . . . , yj−1, yj+1, . . . , yJ ). Then, the inverse de-
mands (15) can be rewritten in terms of yj as σ
−1
j
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
. One can easily show
that the FIL model projected into product characteristics space yields inverse de-
mands which are symmetric, that is,
σ−1j
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
= σ−1k
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
, j , k,
so that one can set σ−1j
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
= σ−1
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
; which are anonymous, that is,
σ−1
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
= σ−1
(
yj ,yρ(−j);γ
)
,
where ρ(−j) is any permutation of the product indexes −j; and which are invari-
ant to translation in x(2), that is,
σ−1
(
yj + (0, c),y−j + (0, c1);γ
)
= σ−1
(
yj ,y−j ;γ
)
.
Overall, these shape restrictions mean that that the identity of products does
not matter, only the diﬀerences in characteristics do.25 The following proposition
25This approach builds on Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) who use symmetry and anonymity
to reduce the dimensionality of value functions in the context of dynamic games, on Compiani
(2019) who uses anonymity to reduce the number of parameters of the inverse demand to be
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gives the properties of the FILmodel projected into product characteristics space.
Proposition 3. The FILmodel projected into product characteristics space has in-
verse demands given by Equations (15) and (16), which is symmetric, anonymous
and invariant to translation in product characteristics.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Measures of distance The measures of distance d(2)ij can be continuous or dis-
crete. The paper focuses on continuous measures and uses the absolute value
d(2)ij = |x(2)i − x(2)j | as measure.26 Other measures, such as the euclidian distance,
can also be used.
The projection can also exploit product segmentation, as the nested logit or
the IPDL models do, by using categorical variables that group products into dif-
ferent segments. In this case, the measure of distance is discrete: for a categorical
variable k, one can set d(2)ijk = 1 if products i and j belong to the same nest accord-
ing to dimension k and d(2)ijk = 0.
The FIL model can also be projected into other spaces. One can consider
market-level variablesm, such as demographics, with, e.g., µij = µ
(
d(2)ij ,m;γ ,γm
)
or interact them with products characteristics. The projection into price space
with µij = µ
(
d(2)ij ,d
p
ij ;γ ,γp
)
, where dpij is a measure of price distance between
products i and j, is left for future research, since it non-trivially changes the
shape of the Slutsky matrix, which is not ensured to be symmetric anymore.
4 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the methods to estimate the FILmodel with data onmarket
shares sjt, prices pjt and product characteristics xjt for T markets, indexed by t,
and J products per market (see e.g., Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001).
estimated in a nonparametric setting, and on Gandhi and Houde (2017) who use anonymity and
symmetry of the ARUM choice probabilities to construct new approximations of the optimal
instruments.
26This measure is used in the Monte-Carlo simulations of Section 5 and in the empirical appli-
cation of Section E.
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4.1 Estimation by Linear Regression
Nested Logit-Type Linear Regression Using Equations (10) to (13) yields, for
each market t = 1, . . . ,T ,
µj ln
(
sjt
)
+
∑
i,j
µij ln
(
sit + sjt
)
= δjt − ct, j ∈ J0, (17)
and
ln(s0t) = −ct, (18)
where δj is given by Equation (2), and where it is assumed that δ0t = 0 for all
markets t = 1, . . . ,T .
Combining Equations (17) and (18) with Assumption (i), the FIL model yields
the log-odd ratio formula,
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= x(1)jt β −αpjt +
∑
i,j
µij ln
(
sjt
sit + sjt
)
+ ξjt
By comparison, for the logit model (8), the log-odd ratio formula is given by
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= x(1)jt β −αpjt + ξjt,
and, for the three-level nested logit model (9), it is given by
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= x(1)jt β −αpjt +µ1 ln
(
sjt∑
k∈g skt
)
+µ2 ln
(
sjt∑
k∈g |h skt
)
+ ξjt,
for product j in nest g and subnest g |h (Verboven, 1996).
Then, the FIL model boils down to the nested logit-like linear regression of
market shares on product characteristics, prices and shares terms related to the
flexible nesting structure.
Price and market shares are endogenous, implying that one needs at least
1 + J(J − 1)/2 instruments, one instrument for price and for each share term. The
number of parameters µij , equal to J (J − 1) /2, and thus the number of instru-
ments needed, quickly grows with the number of products.27 However, the pro-
jection of the nesting parameters µij into product characteristics space reduces
27For J = 3,4,5,10,25,50,100, there are J(J − 1)/2 = 3,6,10,45,300,1225,4950 parameters to be
estimated.
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the number of parameters, and thus the number of instruments needed.
Projection into Product Characteristics Space The FIL model, projected into
product characteristics space, boils down to the following linear IV regression
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= x(1)jt β −αpjt +
∑
i,j
µ
(
d(2)ijt ;γ
)
ln
(
sjt
sit + sjt
)
+ ξjt
where the function µmust be specified up to some parameters γ to be estimated.
Specifically, I specify µ as a Bernstein polynomial of orderM, which, with K2
product characteristics x(2), is defined by
µ
(
d(2)ijt ;γ
)
=
M∑
k1=0
. . .
M∑
kK2=0
γkBk,M
(
d(2)ijt
)
,
where k ≡ (k1, . . . , kK2) and
Bk,M
(
d(2)ijt
)
≡ bk1,M
(
d
(2)
ijt1
)
× . . .× bkK2 ,M
(
d
(2)
ijtK2
)
where bk,M is a Bernstein basis function, as defined in Appendix A.3 and where γ
is the vector of (M+1)K2 parameters. Bernstein polynomials are useful to approx-
imate a continuous function; besides, shape restrictions on µ, such as positivity,
monotonicity and concavity, can be easily enforced through linear constraints on
parameters γ (see e.g. Chak et al., 2005).
Overall, the FIL model projected into product characteristics space is esti-
mated by the following linear IV regression
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
= x(1)jt β −αpjt +
∑
k
γk
∑
i,j
Bk,M
(
d(2)ijt
)
ln
(
sjt
sit + sjt
)+ ξjt. (19)
4.2 Optimal Instruments
Assume the existence of exogenous variables zt such that the following condi-
tional moment restrictions hold
E
[
ξjt (θ) |zt
]
= 0, j ∈ J0, t = 1, . . . ,T ,
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where θ = (α,β,γ) and where ξjt = ξjt (θ) is the jt-product/market unobserved
characteristics term defined by Equation (19).
They lead to the following unconditional moment restrictions
E
[
hjt (zt)ξjt (θ)
]
= 0, j ∈ J0, t = 1, . . . ,T ,
where hjt (zt) are instruments.
In principle, any function hjt of the exogenous variables zt is a candidate as
instruments. However, an important practical issue is to choose the ("right") form
of hjt, especially to avoid the weak instrument problem.28
One solution is to use the optimal instruments of Chamberlain (1987), who
shows that the optimal instruments matrix for a single-equation GMM estimator
exploit the functional forms of the model and are given by
hjt (zt) = E
[
∂ξjt
∂θ
|zt
]ᵀ
Ω−1jt ,
whereΩjt = E
[
ξ2jt |zt
]
. Following Newey (1990), I consider the homoscedastic case
where Ωjt =Ω, which, in the single-equation GMM estimator case, is a constant
that can be set equal to 1 at no loss of generality.
For the FIL model, optimal instruments are given by
E
[
∂ξjt
∂θ
|zt
]ᵀ
=
(
E
[
∂ξjt
∂βᵀ
|zt
]
E
[
∂ξjt
∂α
|zt
]
E
[
∂ξjt
∂γᵀ
|zt
])ᵀ
, (20)
where
E
[
∂ξjt
∂βᵀ
|zt
]
= −E
[
x(1)t |zt
]
= −x(1)t , (21)
E
[
∂ξjt
∂α
|zt
]
= E
[
pjt |zt
]
, (22)
and
E
[
∂ξjt
∂γk
|zt
]
= −E
∑
i,j
Bk,M
(
d(2)ijt
)
ln
(
sjt
sit + sjt
)
|zt
 , k ∈ {0, . . . ,M}K2 . (23)
28Gandhi and Houde (2017) shows in the context of ARUM, that the form of hj may aﬀect
their strength and that choosing the wrong form can lead to the weak instrument problem. Reiss
(2016) shows, for the linear regression case, that estimates may be very sensitive to the form of
the instruments.
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The optimal instruments given by Equations (20) to (23) can be computed in
two steps. The first step uses the instruments suggested by Gandhi and Houde
(2017) and Pinkse et al. (2002). The second step updates to the optimal instru-
ments of Chamberlain (1987). See Subsection 5.3 for an algorithm that approx-
imates the optimal instruments of the FIL model, based on existing algorithms
(Berry et al., 1999; Reynaert and Verboven, 2014; Conlon and Gortmaker, 2018).
5 Performances of the FIL Model
This section studies the ability of the FIL model to provide rich substitution pat-
terns. The RCLmodel is used for its ability to yield rich substitution patterns (see
McFadden and Train, 2000). The RCL and the FIL models are nonnested. Monte
Carlo simulations are therefore used to assess its capacity to replicate the substi-
tution patterns of the RCL model (i.e., its own- and cross-price elasticities) for
specifications widely used in the literature. To do so, I simulate data from a RCL
model and estimate a FIL model to compare the estimated FIL price elasticities
of demand to the true RCL price elasticities.29 30 Simulations are largely based
on Armstrong (2016) and allow to obtain wide ranges of RCL price elasticities.
5.1 Models
Two models are considered. The first model is a structural model of demand
with exogenous prices; abstracting from the issue of price endogeneity allows
to focus on the performances of the FIL model. The second model is a fully
structural model of demand and supply with endogenous prices, i.e., it solves for
equilibrium prices and market shares.
The demand side is a standard static RCL model with a single normally dis-
tributed random coeﬃcient on an exogenous characteristic.31 32 The supply side
29This exercise contrasts with Wojcik (2000), who compares the performances of the nested
logit and RCL models for out-of-sample prediction of market shares. Instead, I follow Berry and
Pakes (2001)’s suggestions by comparing price elasticities.
30Another approach would be to compare the estimated FIL price elasticities to the estimated
RCL price elasticities. This would recognize that, even in case of no misspecification, the model
would be estimated with error (e.g., due to simulation error, strength/validity of the instruments,
etc.).
31In particular, this specification does not allow for a random coeﬃcient on price.
32A future version of this paper will consider the case of several independent and correlated
random coeﬃcients. In particular, it could be interesting to investigate how the FIL model per-
forms with respect to the RCL with independent random coeﬃcients when the random coeﬃ-
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is a static oligopolistic price competition model with multiproduct firms.
Demand The conditional indirect utility of consumer n in market t from choos-
ing an inside product j is given by
unjt = β0 + βnxxjt −αpjt + ξjt + εnjt, (24)
where xjt is the exogenous characteristic, pjt is the price, and ξjt is the unobserved
product characteristic of product j in market t. The utility from choosing the
outside good j = 0 is normalized to un0t = εn0t, for all markets t = 1, . . . ,T .
The two parameters β0 and α are assumed to be equal for all consumers n:
β0 captures the value of choosing an inside product instead of the outside good,
and α is the marginal utility of income. The parameter βnx is the only random
coeﬃcient, which captures consumer-specific valuation for characteristic xjt. The
term εnjt is a remaining consumer-specific valuation for product j. In the RCL
model, the εnjt’s are assumed to be distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value.
The random coeﬃcient can then be decomposed as βnx = βx+σxvnx, where vnx
is a standardized random variable (i.e., with mean 0 and variance 1), so that βx
captures the mean valuation for product characteristic xjt and σx is its standard
deviation across consumers. Then, the indirect utility (24) can be rewritten as
unjt = β0 + βxxjt −αpjt + ξjt + σxxjtvnx + εnjt.
Each consumer n with random preferences βnx chooses one unit of the prod-
uct that provides her the highest utility. Then, the market share of product j
in market t is computed as the probability that product j provides the highest
utility across all products in market t. In the RCL model, it is given by
sjt = σj(xt,pt,ξt;θ) =
∫ exp(β0 + βxxjt −αpjt + ξjt + σxxjtv)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(β0 + βxxkt −αpkt + ξkt + σxxktv)
f (v)dv,
(25)
and
s0t = σ0(xt,pt,ξt;θ) ≡ 1−
J∑
k=1
σk(xt,pt,ξt;θ),
where θ ≡ (β0,α,βx,σx) and where f (v) denotes the distribution of vnx.
cients are actually correlated.
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Supply Consider F firms, indexed by f . The profit that firm f producing the
set of products Jf , with ∪Ff =1Jf = J0 and ∩Ff =1Jf = ∅, makes in market t is given
by
Πf t =
∑
j∈Jf
(
pjt − cjt
)
σj(xt,pt,ξt;θ), (26)
where cjt, the marginal cost, is parametrized as follows
cjt = γ0 +γxxjt +γwwjt +ωjt,
where xjt is the product characteristic, which aﬀects utility and cost, wjt is a
variable which only aﬀects cost, and ωjt is an unobserved cost component.
In the static oligopolistic price competition model, each firm f in market t
chooses the prices pjt of its products j ∈ Jf to maximize its profits (26), given
the characteristics and costs of its products and the prices, characteristics and
costs of its competing products in that market. Assuming that a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists, prices pt ≡ (p1t, . . . ,pJt) solve the following first-order
conditions
σ (xt,pt,ξt;θ) +∇pt (pt − ct) = 0J , t = 1, . . . ,T , (27)
where ∇pt has entries ij given by
− ∂σi
∂pjt
(xt,pt,ξt;θ)Θij , (28)
with Θij = 1 if products i and j are produced by the same firm, and Θij = 0
otherwise. Note that this model rules out price coordination among firms (see
e.g., Michel andWeiergraeber, 2019, for a model allowing for price coordination).
5.2 Simulation Configurations
The simulations are largely based on those of Armstrong (2016). For each config-
uration, I construct 500 Monte Carlo datasets, and for each of them, I simulate T
markets, where each one consists of J products, N consumers (indexed by n), and
J/10 firms (indexed by f ) producing each one 10 products.
Each product j inmarket t is characterized by the vector (sjt,pjt,xjt,ξjt,wjt,ωjt),
where xjt and wjt are drawn from two independent standard uniform distribu-
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tions, and where the structural error terms, ξjt and ωjt, are computed as
ξjt = u
1
jt +u
3
jt − 1,
ωjt = u
1
jt +u
2
jt − 1,
where u1jt, u
2
jt and u
3
jt are drawn from three independent standard uniform dis-
tributions.
Exogenous Prices In the model with exogenous prices, prices are computed as
pjt = 0.5ηjt +4,
where ηjt is drawn from a standard normal distribution, so that the distribution
of prices thus obtained is very similar to that obtained in the model with en-
dogenous prices. Market shares (25) are computed as follows. I first generate
N = 2,000 draws vnx from a standard normal distribution. Then, I compute the
observed market share of product j in market t as
sjt (xt,pt,ξt |θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
exp(β0 + βxxjt −αpjt + ξjt + σxxjtvnx)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(β0 + βxxkt −αpkt + ξkt + σxxktvnx)
.
I consider 16 configurations by varying σx ∈ {0.5,1,2,3}, J ∈ {25,50} and T ∈
{25,50}, with (α,β0,βx,γ0,γx,γw) fixed at (1,3,6,2,1,1).
Endogenous Prices In the model with endogenous prices, for each market t,
prices pt and market shares st ≡
(
s1t, . . . , sJt
)
solve the structural model of demand
and supply, i.e., solve Equations (25) and (27). I consider 4 configurations by
varying σx ∈ {0.5,1,2,3}, with (α,β0,βx,γ0,γx,γw) fixed at (1,3,6,2,1,1).
5.3 Optimal Instruments
This subsection describes the algorithms used to compute the optimal instru-
ments of the FIL model given by Equations (20) to (23).
Exogenous Prices The first step uses instruments suggested by Pinkse et al.
(2002) and Gandhi and Houde (2017). The included instruments are the con-
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stant, xj and pj . The excluded instruments are of the form of∑
i,j
bk,M
(
dijt
)
zijt, k = 0, . . . ,M, (29)
where dijt ≡ |xjt − xit | and zijt ∈ {xjt,pjt,xjt − xit,pjt − pit} explain much of the
variation in ln
(
sjt/(sit + sjt)
)
, i.e., the relative popularity of product j with respect
to product i.
The second step updates to (an approximation of) the optimal instruments of
Chamberlain (1987), which are given by
∑
i,j
bk,M
(
dijt
)
ln
(
ŝjt
ŝit + ŝjt
)
, k = 0, . . . ,M, (30)
where ŝjt is the predicted market shares of product j in market t. The prediction
uses the estimated parameters of the first step and is evaluated at the expected
value of the unobservables, E[ξjt] = 0.
Endogenous Prices For the model with endogeneous prices, the algorithm is
a little bit diﬀerent and exploits the supply side (in particular, the ownership
structure of the market).
The first step estimates the demand model and the marginal cost function.
For demand estimation, the included instruments are the constant and xjt, and
the excluded instruments are of the form of Equation (29), where zijt ∈ {xjt,xjt −
xit}, and p̂jt computed as the predicted value of the linear regression of pjt on xj ,
wj , x
2
j , w
2
j , xjwj ,
∑
k∈Jf (j)\{j}xjt,
∑
k∈J \Jf (j)xjt,
∑
k∈Jf (j)\{j}wjt,
∑
k∈J \Jf (j)wjt. Esti-
mation leads to demand estimates θ̂ ≡ (α̂, β̂0, β̂x, γ̂), from which one can compute
v̂jt = β̂0 + β̂xxjt.
The implied marginal cost cjt are obtained from the first-order conditions (27)
and (28) where σ defined by its inverse given by Equations (10) and (11). The pre-
dicted marginal costs are obtained as the predicted value of the linear regression
of cjt on a constant, xjt and wjt: ĉjt = γ̂0 + γ̂xxjt + γ̂wwjt.
The second step uses p̂jt and instruments given by Equation (30) as optimal
instruments, where p̂jt and ŝjt solve the first-order conditions as a function of x,
v̂, ĉ, and θ̂. The prediction uses the estimated parameters of the first step and is
evaluated at the expected value of the unobservables, E[ξjt] = E[ωjt] = 0.
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5.4 Results
This subsection studies the ability of the FIL model to replicate the substitution
patterns the RCLmodel for the configurations described in the previous sections.
For each configuration, µ is specified as a Bernstein polynomial of order 5. Re-
sults are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 for the 16 configurations with exogenous
prices and in Table 3 for the 4 configurations with endogenous prices. Elasticities
are computed based on the parameters estimates as given by the mean estimated
value of parameters across Monte-Carlo datasets, keeping all market-level vari-
ables at the values of the first Monte-Carlo dataset and using the first twenty
markets (for the sake of comparability between the configurations).
Consider first the results for the configurations with exogenous prices. They
confirm the ability of the FIL model to match the own- and cross-price from the
RCL models. The lower σx is, the better the fit is. Models with a higher number
of products (J = 50 versus J = 25) are better fitted, while the number of market T
does not significantly aﬀect the results. The average value of the true own-price
elasticities ranges from −3.9021 to −3.8015 and the FIL model estimated these
elasticities with a bias ranging from −0.0132 to −0.2219. The average value of the
true cross-price elasticities ranges 0.0736 to 0.1520 and the FIL model estimated
these elasticities with a bias ranging from 0.0007 to 0.0139.
Turn now to the configurations with endogeneity. The FIL model provides
a good approximation – except maybe for the configuration with σx = 3 where
the MSE is high. The average value of the true own-price elasticities ranges from
−4.1208 to −4.0894 and the FIL model estimated these elasticities with a bias
ranging from 0.0207 to −0.1065. The average value of the true cross-price elas-
ticities ranges 0.1721 to 0.1855 and the FIL model estimated these elasticities
with a bias ranging from 0.0019 to 0.0109.
Several remarks are in order. First, the FIL model does not generate comple-
ments as defined by a negative cross-price derivative of demand, when, as it is
the case of the RCL model, there is only substitutes. then, Appendix D provides
further results about the simulations. Figures 1 to 5 represent the accuracy of
the estimation of the FIL model when the true model is the RCL model (after
removing outliers). They show the ability of the FIL model to mimic the substi-
tution patterns of the simulated RCLmodels. Tables 4 to 6 summarize the results
obtained using cruder instruments. They show the usefulness of the optimal in-
struments for fitting, since these latter allow to obtain better fits.
81
CHAPTER 2. THE FLEXIBLE INVERSE LOGIT MODEL
Table 1: Simulation Results: Own-Price Elasticities with Exogenous Prices
T J σ Mean Percentiles Bias MSE
2.5th 97.5th 2.5th 97.5th
RCL FIL RCL FIL
20 25 0.5 -3.8338 -3.8769 -4.8205 -2.5582 -5.0968 -2.3005 -0.0430 0.0323
50 25 0.5 -3.8333 -3.8695 -4.8196 -2.5142 -5.0571 -2.3286 -0.0362 0.0341
20 50 0.5 -3.9021 -3.9154 -4.9011 -2.8028 -5.0224 -2.6916 -0.0132 0.0169
50 50 0.5 -3.9021 -3.9185 -4.8997 -2.7943 -5.0409 -2.6710 -0.0163 0.0190
20 25 1 -3.8314 -3.8863 -4.8191 -2.5578 -5.1908 -2.2778 -0.0549 0.0445
50 25 1 -3.8309 -3.8795 -4.8179 -2.5121 -5.1498 -2.3064 -0.0485 0.0477
20 50 1 -3.9009 -3.9183 -4.9014 -2.7982 -5.1053 -2.6696 -0.0174 0.0225
50 50 1 -3.9009 -3.9217 -4.9000 -2.7932 -5.0999 -2.6460 -0.0208 0.0254
20 25 2 -3.8201 -3.9228 -4.8144 -2.5156 -5.5502 -2.2665 -0.1027 0.1201
50 25 2 -3.8196 -3.9194 -4.8122 -2.5135 -5.5527 -2.2320 -0.0998 0.1362
20 50 2 -3.8948 -3.9310 -4.9015 -2.7790 -5.3540 -2.6058 -0.0362 0.0660
50 50 2 -3.8947 -3.9367 -4.8997 -2.7719 -5.3891 -2.5588 -0.0420 0.0768
20 25 3 -3.8018 -4.0176 -4.7905 -2.4682 -6.6121 -2.1862 -0.2158 0.4683
50 25 3 -3.8015 -4.0234 -4.8003 -2.5089 -6.6773 -2.1090 -0.2219 0.5479
20 50 3 -3.8839 -3.9761 -4.8957 -2.7562 -6.0543 -2.4848 -0.0922 0.2694
50 50 3 -3.8837 -3.9852 -4.8922 -2.7618 -6.1047 -2.4542 -0.1015 0.3069
Notes: Summary statistics across 500 Monte Carlo replications. The bias is measured by
the mean error. The mean square error (MSE) measures the accuracy.
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Table 2: Simulation Results: Cross-Price Elasticities with Exogenous Prices
T J σ Mean Percentiles Bias MSE
2.5th 97.5th 2.5th 97.5th
RCL FIL RCL FIL
20 25 0.5 0.1515 0.1542 0.0011 0.9628 0.0006 0.9399 0.0027 0.0004
50 25 0.5 0.1520 0.1544 0.0011 0.9060 0.0007 0.9208 0.0025 0.0004
20 50 0.5 0.0752 0.0759 0.0004 0.4714 0.0003 0.4866 0.0007 0.0001
50 50 0.5 0.0752 0.0760 0.0005 0.5038 0.0003 0.5023 0.0007 0.0001
20 25 1 0.1512 0.1546 0.0016 0.9224 0.0008 0.9153 0.0034 0.0005
50 25 1 0.1517 0.1549 0.0016 0.8845 0.0008 0.8875 0.0032 0.0005
20 50 1 0.0752 0.0760 0.0007 0.4548 0.0003 0.4710 0.0008 0.0001
50 50 1 0.0752 0.0761 0.0007 0.4820 0.0003 0.4902 0.0009 0.0001
20 25 2 0.1496 0.1560 0.0037 0.8192 0.0014 0.8135 0.0063 0.0012
50 25 2 0.1501 0.1564 0.0038 0.7880 0.0015 0.7668 0.0063 0.0013
20 50 2 0.0748 0.0763 0.0017 0.4083 0.0006 0.4235 0.0015 0.0004
50 50 2 0.0748 0.0764 0.0017 0.4216 0.0007 0.4468 0.0016 0.0004
20 25 3 0.1459 0.1594 0.0062 0.7109 0.0026 0.6754 0.0135 0.0034
50 25 3 0.1463 0.1601 0.0062 0.6927 0.0026 0.6327 0.0139 0.0038
20 50 3 0.0736 0.0771 0.0029 0.3514 0.0011 0.3684 0.0035 0.0009
50 50 3 0.0736 0.0773 0.0030 0.3696 0.0012 0.3886 0.0037 0.0010
Notes: Summary statistics across 500 Monte Carlo replications. The bias is measured
by the mean error. The mean square error (MSE) measures the accuracy.
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Table 3: Simulation Results with Endogenous Prices
T J σ Mean Percentiles Bias MSE
2.5th 97.5th 2.5th 97.5th
RCL FIL RCL FIL
Own-Price Elasticities
50 25 0.5 -4.1208 -4.1001 -5.4317 -2.6397 -5.4778 -2.6550 0.0207 0.0513
50 25 1 -4.1178 -4.0973 -5.4325 -2.6380 -5.6391 -2.6395 0.0205 0.0938
50 25 2 -4.1060 -4.0612 -5.4303 -2.6084 -6.4735 -2.4461 0.0448 0.3925
50 25 3 -4.0887 -4.1952 -5.4167 -2.5384 -9.2503 -2.2480 -0.1065 1.7778
Cross-Price Elasticities
50 25 0.5 0.1855 0.1874 0.0038 0.8959 0.0022 0.9031 0.0019 0.0007
50 25 1 0.1843 0.1862 0.0050 0.8627 0.0026 0.8472 0.0020 0.0008
50 25 2 0.1792 0.1812 0.0087 0.7678 0.0037 0.6914 0.0020 0.0027
50 25 3 0.1720 0.1829 0.0110 0.7035 0.0042 0.5806 0.0109 0.0087
Notes: Summary statistics across 500 Monte Carlo replications. The bias is measured by
the mean error. The mean square error (MSE) measures the accuracy.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has developed the FIL model, which is an inverse demand models
for diﬀerentiated products that accommodates rich substitution patterns, includ-
ing complementarity, thanks to a simple linear regression with data on market
shares, prices and product characteristics.
The FIL model uses a flexible nesting structure with a nest for each pair of
products. By contrast with the nested logit model, nesting in the FIL model is
just a way to fully parametrize the matrix of price elasticities of demand and does
not require the modeller to choose the nesting structure before estimation. This
means that the resulting cross-price elasticities of demand are not constrained by
the model, but instead are driven by the data.
The FIL model, projected into product characteristics space, makes the price
elasticities depending on product characteristics directly, as it is the case of the
"flexible" RCL model. On top of that, as shown using Monte Carlo simulations, it
is able to mimic the substitution patterns from the RCL model.
The FIL model can be applied to various topics in industrial organization, in-
ternational trade, public economics, etc. It can be used to answer relevant policy
questions, such as the eﬀect of mergers, products’ entry, and changes in regula-
tion. Due to its simplicity of estimation, the likely audience of the FIL model
involves researchers as well as antitrust practitioners in consultancies and com-
petition authorities who wish to avoid complex procedures of estimation and/or
who are under time pressure.
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A Preliminaries
This section summarizes useful results and definitions.
A.1 Demand Invertibility
Proposition 4. Assume that (i) G =
(
G0, . . . ,GJ
)
: [0,∞)J+1 → [0,∞)J+1 is contin-
uously diﬀerentiable and homogeneous of degree one on int
(
∆J
)
; (ii) JslnG (s) is
positive definite and symmetric on int
(
∆J
)
; and (iii) | lnG (s) | approaches infinity
as s approaches bd(∆J ).
(i) It follows that lnG is invertible on int(∆J ).
(ii) Consider any vector of market shares s ∈ int
(
∆J
)
. Then, there exists a unique
δ ∈ RJ+10 such that
δ = σ−1 (s) ⇔ s = σ (δ) .
Proof. See Proposition 2 in Monardo (2019).
A.2 Flexibility of Demands
Consider a demand system of (J +1) diﬀerentiated products σ (p). Absent income
eﬀect, this demand system is said to be flexible in the sense of Diewert (1974)
if it is able to provide a first-order approximation to any theoretically grounded
demand system at a point in price space, i.e., if it can match the (J + 1) true (i.e.,
observed) market shares s∗, and the (J + 1)2 true own- and cross-price elastici-
ties.33
33See Barnett (1983, 1985) for the diﬀerent definitions of flexibility and their relationship to
second-order approximations.
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However, only J + J(J + 1)/2 independent market shares and elasticities need
to be matched. Indeed, since the market shares sum to one, only J market shares
are independent. Once the market shares of J products are matched, the market
shares of the (J +1)th product is matched automatically using that market shares
sum to one. Then, given the market shares, by Slutsky symmetry, only J(J + 1)/2
cross-price elasticities are independent. Lastly, given the market shares and the
cross-price elasticities, one can infer all the own-price elasticities from
∂σi (p)
∂pi
= −
∑
j,i
∂σj (p)
∂pi
, i ∈ J ,
which is obtained by diﬀerentiating
∑
j∈J σj (p) = 1 with respect to price pi .
A.3 Bernstein Polynomials
For a positive integerM, the Bernstein basis functions defined over interval [a,b]
are defined by
bk,M (x) ≡
Mk
 (x − a)k (b − x)M−k(b − a)M ,
where k = 0, . . . ,M.34 In applications, Bernstein basis functions are often ex-
pressed over interval [0,1] as
bk,M (x) =
Mk
xk (1− x)M−k .
A univariate function defined over interval [a,b] can be approximated by a
linear combination of the Bernstein basis functions
M∑
k=0
θkbk,M (x) ,
for x ∈ [a,b] and for some coeﬃcients θk, k = 0, . . . ,M.
The generalization to a multivariate function defined over [a1,b1]× . . .×[aL,bL]
34See Chapter 6 in Davis (1975) for more on Bernstein polynomials.
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is straightforward. A multivariate function can be approximated by
M∑
k1=0
. . .
M∑
kL=0
θk1,...,kLbk1,M (x1)× . . .× bkL,M (xL) ,
for (x1, . . . ,xL) ∈ [a1,b1]×. . .×[aL,bL] and for some coeﬃcients θk1,...,kL , k1 = 0, . . . ,M,
. . . , kL = 0, . . . ,M.
The derivative of bk,M (x) is given by
∂bk,M (x)
∂x
=M
[
bk−1,M−1 (x)− bk,M−1 (x)] ,
that is,
∂bk,M (x)
∂x
=
[
k
x − a −
M − k
b − x
]
bk,M (x) ,
which implies that approximation also works for the derivatives (see Chak et al.,
2005).
A.4 Defining Complementarity and Substitutability
There are diﬀerent ways of defining complementarity (Samuelson, 1974; New-
man, 2008). The empirical literature has focused on two diﬀerent but related
definitions, both relying on the idea of a positive interaction between the prod-
ucts.
The first definition asserts that products i and j are complements (resp., sub-
stitutes) in utility if the cross second-order partial derivative of the utility func-
tion with respect to quantities si and sj
∂2u (s)
∂si∂sj
=
∂2u (s)
∂sj∂si
is positive (resp., negative).
Absent income eﬀect, the second definition, which is the textbook definition,
asserts that products i and j are complements (resp., substitutes) in demand if
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the cross-price derivative of demand35
∂σi (δ)
∂pj
=
∂σj (δ)
∂pi
is negative (resp., positive).36
This appendix does not discuss the advantages/disadvantages of both defini-
tions. However, just note that the utility-based definition has been criticized on
the ground that it is not invariant with respect to monotone increasing transfor-
mations of utility u. Regarding the demand-based definition, whether two prod-
ucts are complements or substitutes depends on the relation of the two products
to the other products, which may lead to a wrong classification (Samuelson, 1974;
Ogaki, 1990).
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The FIL model is defined by lnG ≡ (lnG0, . . . , lnGJ ) with
Gj (s;µ) ≡ sµjj
∏
i,j
(
si + sj
)µij
, j ∈ J0, (31)
and
G0 (s) = s0, (32)
where µ =
(
µ1, . . . ,µJ ,µ11, . . . ,µJ−1,J
)
satisfies Assumptions (i) – (iii).
For the proof, it is convenient to use the conventions µ0 = 1 and µj0 = µ0j = 0
for all j ∈ J0.
35In the standard definition of complementarity, two products are complements (resp., substi-
tutes) in demand if the compensative cross-price derivative of demand is negative (resp., posi-
tive). Absent income eﬀect, the Slutsky matrix is just the matrix of own- and cross-price deriva-
tives of demand, and in turn, complementarity (resp., substitutability) is the only source of the
negative (resp., positive) cross-price derivative.
36The utility-based definition is known as the Edgeworth-Pareto (EP) or Auspitz-Lieben-
Edgeworth-Pareto (ALEP) definition of complementarity; the demand-based definition is known
as the Slutsky-Hicks-Allen-Schultz (SHAS) definition of complementarity.
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The Jacobian JlnG has diagonal entries j +1, j +1 given by
µj
sj
+
∑
i,j
µij
si + sj
,
and oﬀ-diagonal entries i +1, j +1 given by
µij
si + sj
.
The proof uses Proposition 4 as applied to the function G(.,µ) given by Equa-
tions (31) and (32). It thus consists in showing that the functionG(.,µ) is homoge-
neous of degree one and that the Jacobian JlnG is positive definite and symmetric.
It is homogeneous of degree one, since for λ > 0 and j ∈ J0,
Gj (λs) =
(
λsj
)µj ∏
i,j
[
λ(si + sj)
]µij
,
=
λµj ∏
i,j
λµij

(sj)µj ∏
i,j
(
si + sj
)µij  ,
=
[
λµj+
∑
i,j µij
]
Gj (s) ,
= λGj (s) ,
where the last equality uses Assumption (i). Likewise, for λ > 0,
G0 (λs) = λs0 = λG0 (s) .
The Jacobian JlnG is symmetric since, by Assumption (iii), its entry i +1, j +1
given by
µij
si + sj
is equal to its entry j +1, i +1 given by
µji
sj + si
.
The Jacobian JlnG is positive definite. To show this, let
〈
i, j
〉
be a vector with
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entry k given by
〈
i, j
〉
k =

1 k = i,
1 k = j,
0 otherwise,〈
i,−j〉 be a vector with entry k given by
〈
i,−j〉k =

1 k = i
−1 k = j
0 otherwise,
and 〈i〉 be a vector with entry k given by
〈i〉k =
1 k = i,0 otherwise.
Then, using Assumption (iii), one can write the Jacobian JlnG as∑
i∈J
µi 〈i〉〈i〉ᵀ
si
+
∑
0<i<j,µij>0
|µij |〈i, j〉〈i, j〉ᵀ
si + sj
+
∑
0<i<j,µij<0
|µij |〈i,−j〉〈i,−j〉ᵀ
si + sj
,
which is positive definite since its first term is a positive definite matrix by As-
sumption (ii), and its second and third terms are two sums of positive semi-
definite matrices.
B.2 Proof of Inverse Slutsky Matrix
Consider the class of inverse demands given by
σ−1j (s) ≡ lnGj (s) + c = δj , j ∈ J0,
and
σ−10 (s) ≡ ln(s0) + c = δ0,
where c ∈ R is a market-specific constant, where G is homogeneous of degree one
and where the Jacobian JslnG is positive definite and symmetric. This is a subclass
of the class of GIL models, developed by Fosgerau et al. (2019).
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For this class of inverse models,[
Jδσ (δ)
]
0
= [JlnG (s)]
−1
0
[
IJ − 1Jsᵀ−0
]
;
The inverse demand being the target of estimation, it is worthwhile to derive
the expression of the matrix of inverse demand derivatives, which, by the implicit
function theorem, satisfies [
Jsσ−1 (s)
]
0
=
[
Jδσ (δ)
]−1
0
,
where s = σ (δ). Then, [
Jsσ−1 (s)
]
0
=
[
IJ − 1Jsᵀ−0
]−1
[JlnG (s)]0 ,
where
[
IJ − 1Jsᵀ−0
]−1
=
1
s0

s0 + s1 s2 · · · sJ
s1 s0 + s2 · · · sJ
...
...
. . .
...
s1 s2 · · · s0 + sJ

.
Noting that ∂ lnG0(s)∂sj =
∂ lnGj (s)
∂s0
= 0 for all j ∈ J0, one obtains the requested ex-
pression (14) using
∑
j∈J sj
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
= 1 for all k ∈ J0, and that
[
Jpσ (δ)
]
0
= −α
[
Jδσ (δ)
]
0
.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof consists in showing that, observing the vector of market shares s∗, the
FIL model can match that vector of market shares s∗ as well as the true (sym-
metric) matrix of own- and cross-price derivatives of demand for inside products[
Jp
∗
s
]
0
. In other words, one must show that one can choose δ∗, α∗ and µ∗ so that
s∗ = σ (δ∗;µ∗) , (33)
and [
Jps ∗
]
0
=
[
Jpσ (δ∗;µ∗)
]
0
, (34)
where σ is defined by its inverse in Equations (10) to (13).
Regarding the market shares, Equation (33) is invertible, with inverse given
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by
δ∗j = σ
−1
j (s
∗;µ∗) = lnGj (s∗;µ∗) + c,
where lnGj is given by Equation (11), and
δ∗0 = ln(s∗0) + c.
Setting δ∗0 = 0, one obtains c = − ln
(
s∗0
)
, so that, to match the vector of market
shares s∗, one can set
δ∗j = lnGj (s
∗;µ∗)− ln(s∗0) ,
that is
δ∗j = ln
( s∗j
s∗0
)
−
∑
i,j
µ∗ij ln
 s∗js∗i + s∗j
 .
Regarding the price derivatives, Equation (34) given by[
Jp
∗
s
]
0
= −α∗ [JlnG (s∗)]−10
(
IJ − 1Js∗−0ᵀ
)
,
with s∗ = σ (δ∗;µ∗), can be inverted to give
[JlnG (s
∗;µ∗)]0 = −α∗
(
IJ − 1Js∗ᵀ
) [
Jp
∗
s−0
]−1
0
≡ α∗Γ ∗ (s∗) ,
that is, for entry ij,
∂ lnGi (s∗)
∂sj
=
µ∗ij
s∗i + s
∗
j
= α∗Γ ∗ij (s
∗) ,
where Γ ∗ij is the entry ij of the matrix Γ
∗. This implies that, to match the oﬀ-
diagonal elements, one can set
µ∗ij = α
∗ (s∗i + s∗j)Γ ∗ij (s∗) .
Once the oﬀ-diagonal elements are matched, the diagonal elements are auto-
matically, since, the FIL model satisfies the Euler-type equation
∑
k∈J
∂ lnGj (s∗)
∂sk
s∗k = 1, j ∈ J .
Lastly, the parameter α∗ can be chosen so that µj > 0 for all j ∈ J0.
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C Projection into Product Characteristics Space
Additive RandomUtilityModels (ARUM) Since McFadden (1974), the ARUM
has been employed in many fields of economics (see Table 1 in Berry and Haile,
2016). In particular, since at least Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995), it has been
the workhorse model in the structural demand estimation literature. The ARUM
relies on the single-unit purchase assumption that each consumer chooses one
unit of the product that maximizes her utility given by the sum of a deterministic
and a random utility terms.
Consider a linear-in-characteristics ARUMwhere the conditional indirect util-
ity of consumer n choosing a product j ∈ J0 is given by
unj = δj +
K2∑
k=1
σkvnkx
(2)
jk + εnj ,
where δj is given by Equation (2), σk, for k = 1, . . . ,K2, are K2 random coeﬃcients,
vnk is a standardized random variable, x
(2)
jk are K2 exogenous characteristics, and
εnj is a remaining consumer-specific valuation for product j.
Gandhi and Houde (2017) show that such a model yields inverse demands of
the form
σ−1j
(
s,x(2);σ1, . . . ,σK2
)
= f
(
sj , {sk ,∆(2)j,k}j,k;σ1, . . . ,σK2
)
+ c, j ∈ J0, (35)
where c ∈ R is a market-specific constant and f is a symmetric function, with
∆
(2)
j,k = x
(2)
j −x(2)k the vector of nonlinear characteristic diﬀerences between products
j and k. They also show that inverse demands (35) exhibit symmetry, anonymity,
and translation invariance in x(2).
Economic Restrictions of the FIL Model Recall that inverse demands of the
FIL model are given by σ−1j (s;µ) = lnGj (s;µ) + c, where
lnGj (s;µ) ≡ µj ln
(
sj
)
+
∑
i,j
µij ln
(
si + sj
)
, j ∈ J0.
Then, using Assumption (i),
lnGj (s;µ) = ln
(
sj
)
−
∑
i,j
µij ln
(
sj
si + sj
)
, j ∈ J0.
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Setting µij = µ
(
d(2)ij
(
x(2)i ,x
(2)
j
))
, one obtains, for all j ∈ J0,
lnGj
(
s,x(2)
)
= lnGj
(
s,d(2)
(
x(2)
))
= ln
(
sj
)
−
∑
i,j
µ
(
d(2)ij
(
x(2)i ,x
(2)
j
))
ln
(
sj
si + sj
)
.
Then, lnGj is invariant to translation in x(2) since, for all c ∈ R,
lnGj
(
s,x(2) + c1J+1
)
= lnGj
(
s,d(2)
(
x(2) + c1J+1
))
= lnGj
(
s,d(2)
(
x(2)
))
= lnGj
(
s,x(2)
)
.
Now, rewrite lnGj
(
s;x(2)
)
as
lnGj
(
s,x(2)
)
= ln
(
sj
)
−
∑
i∈J0
µ
(
d(2)ij
(
x(2)i ,x
(2)
j
))
ln
(
sj
si + sj
)
+C, j ∈ J0,
where the sum is over j ∈ J0, including product j, and C = µjj (0) ln(1/2) ∈ R is
product-invariant. Then,
lnGj
(
s,x(2)
)
= lnG
(
(sj ,x
(2)
j ), (s−j ,x
(2)
−j )
)
.
D Additional Results fromMonte Carlo Simulations
The scatter plots in Figures 1 to 5 represent the accuracy of the estimation of the
FIL model when the true model is the RCL model. Each blue dot represents a
price elasticity; its vertical position is the mean estimated elasticity across 500
Monte Carlo datasets and its horizontal position is the true elasticity. All market-
level variables are fixed at their values in the first 20 markets of the first Monte
Carlo dataset of each configuration. The red line corresponds to the 45-degree
line. The scatter plots remove the outliers in terms of fit as measured by the
absolute value between the estimated elasticity and its corresponding true one
(to be precise, I remove the 2.5% best and the 2.5% worst fits).
Tables 4 to 6 show that the optimal instruments allow to better fit the own-
and cross-price elasticities of the RCL model.
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Figure 1: Results with Exogenous Prices: Own-Price Elasticities (Part 1)
(a) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 0.5
(b) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 0.5
(c) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 0.5
(d) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 0.5
(e) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 1
(f) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 1
(g) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 1
(h) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 1
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Figure 2: Results with Exogenous Prices: Own-Price Elasticities (Part 2)
(a) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 2
(b) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 2
(c) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 2
(d) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 2
(e) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 3
(f) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 3
(g) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 3
(h) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 3
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Figure 3: Results with Exogenous Prices: Cross-Price Elasticities (Part 1)
(a) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 0.5
(b) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 0.5
(c) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 0.5
(d) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 0.5
(e) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 1
(f) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 1
(g) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 1
(h) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 1
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Figure 4: Results with Exogenous Prices: Cross-Price Elasticities (Part 2)
(a) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 2
(b) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 2
(c) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 2
(d) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 2
(e) T = 20, J = 25, σx = 3
(f) T = 50, J = 25, σx = 3
(g) T = 20, J = 50, σx = 3
(h) T = 50, J = 50, σx = 3
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Figure 5: Results with Endogenous Prices
(a) Own-price elasticities, σx = 0.5
(b) Own-price elasticities, σx = 1
(c) Own-price elasticities, σx = 2
(d) Own-price elasticities, σx = 3
(e) Cross-price elasticities, σx = 0.5
(f) Cross-price elasticities, σx = 1
(g) Cross-price elasticities, σx = 2
(h) Cross-price elasticities, σx = 3
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Table 4: Simulation Results: Own-Price Elasticities with Exogenous Prices
T J σx Mean Percentiles Bias MSE
2.5th 97.5th 2.5th 97.5th
RCL FIL RCL FIL
20 25 0.5 -3.8338 -3.9197 -4.8205 -2.5582 -5.3656 -2.1735 -0.0859 0.1090
50 25 0.5 -3.8333 -3.9039 -4.8196 -2.5142 -5.3293 -2.2422 -0.0705 0.0935
20 50 0.5 -3.9021 -3.9488 -4.9011 -2.8028 -5.3510 -2.5435 -0.0467 0.0922
50 50 0.5 -3.9021 -3.9473 -4.8997 -2.7943 -5.3660 -2.5309 -0.0452 0.0847
20 25 1 -3.8314 -3.9453 -4.8191 -2.5578 -5.5691 -2.1300 -0.1139 0.1666
50 25 1 -3.8309 -3.9288 -4.8179 -2.5121 -5.4481 -2.1851 -0.0979 0.1466
20 50 1 -3.9009 -3.9628 -4.9014 -2.7982 -5.4669 -2.4962 -0.0619 0.1317
50 50 1 -3.9009 -3.9614 -4.9000 -2.7932 -5.4985 -2.4784 -0.0605 0.1241
20 25 2 -3.8201 -4.2224 -4.8144 -2.5156 -8.1138 -1.9190 -0.4023 1.4402
50 25 2 -3.8196 -4.1949 -4.8122 -2.5135 -7.3852 -1.8856 -0.3753 1.2991
20 50 2 -3.8948 -4.1436 -4.9015 -2.7790 -7.2497 -2.1976 -0.2488 0.9905
50 50 2 -3.8947 -4.1461 -4.8997 -2.7719 -7.1414 -2.1844 -0.2515 1.0192
20 25 3 -3.8018 -4.6097 -4.7905 -2.4682 -11.7957 -1.8773 -0.8079 8.5887
50 25 3 -3.8015 -4.6165 -4.8003 -2.5089 -11.7504 -1.8228 -0.8150 10.0277
20 50 3 -3.8839 -4.4182 -4.8957 -2.7562 -10.1795 -2.1065 -0.5343 5.5795
50 50 3 -3.8837 -4.4463 -4.8922 -2.7618 -9.4595 -2.0887 -0.5626 10.2463
Notes: Summary statistics across 500 Monte Carlo replications. The bias is measured by the
mean error. The mean square error (MSE) measures the accuracy.
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Table 5: Simulation Results: Cross-Price Elasticities with Exogenous Prices
T J σx Mean Percentiles Bias MSE
2.5th 97.5th 2.5th 97.5th
RCL FIL RCL FIL
20 25 0.5 0.1515 0.1565 0.0011 0.9628 0.0006 0.8702 0.0050 0.0012
50 25 0.5 0.1520 0.1562 0.0011 0.9060 0.0007 0.8658 0.0042 0.0010
20 50 0.5 0.0752 0.0770 0.0004 0.4714 0.0003 0.4364 0.0017 0.0004
50 50 0.5 0.0752 0.0769 0.0005 0.5038 0.0003 0.4724 0.0017 0.0003
20 25 1 0.1512 0.1576 0.0016 0.9224 0.0007 0.8304 0.0064 0.0017
50 25 1 0.1517 0.1573 0.0016 0.8845 0.0008 0.8206 0.0056 0.0015
20 50 1 0.0752 0.0773 0.0007 0.4548 0.0003 0.4157 0.0021 0.0005
50 50 1 0.0752 0.0772 0.0007 0.4820 0.0003 0.4526 0.0021 0.0005
20 25 2 0.1496 0.1692 0.0037 0.8192 0.0010 0.6623 0.0196 0.0089
50 25 2 0.1501 0.1684 0.0038 0.7880 0.0011 0.6316 0.0183 0.0081
20 50 2 0.0748 0.0812 0.0017 0.4083 0.0004 0.3321 0.0065 0.0020
50 50 2 0.0748 0.0812 0.0017 0.4216 0.0005 0.3529 0.0065 0.0020
20 25 3 0.1459 0.1840 0.0062 0.7109 0.0015 0.6350 0.0381 0.0307
50 25 3 0.1463 0.1845 0.0062 0.6927 0.0015 0.6035 0.0382 0.0362
20 50 3 0.0736 0.0862 0.0029 0.3514 0.0007 0.3228 0.0126 0.0051
50 50 3 0.0736 0.0867 0.0030 0.3696 0.0009 0.3266 0.0130 0.0089
Notes: Summary statistics across 500 Monte Carlo replications. The bias is measured
by the mean error. The mean square error (MSE) measures the accuracy.
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Table 6: Simulation Results with Endogenous Prices
T J σx Mean Percentiles Bias MSE
2.5th 97.5th 2.5th 97.5th
RCL FIL RCL FIL
Own-Price Elasticities
50 25 0.5 -4.1208 -4.1352 -5.4317 -2.6397 -5.9828 -2.6511 -0.0145 0.2240
50 25 1 -4.1178 -4.1960 -5.4325 -2.6380 -6.6359 -2.5784 -0.0783 0.5488
50 25 2 -4.1060 -4.7652 -5.4303 -2.6084 -12.9322 -2.2572 -0.6592 14.0420
50 25 3 -4.0887 -4.7236 -5.4167 -2.5384 -14.4515 -2.1151 -0.6348 15.1808
Cross-Price Elasticities
50 25 0.5 0.1855 0.1881 0.0038 0.8959 0.0020 0.8246 0.0026 0.0018
50 25 1 0.1843 0.1892 0.0050 0.8627 0.0020 0.7429 0.0049 0.0038
50 25 2 0.1792 0.2072 0.0087 0.7678 0.0019 0.6499 0.0281 0.0433
50 25 3 0.1720 0.2035 0.0110 0.7035 0.0028 0.6214 0.0315 0.0452
Notes: Summary statistics across 500 Monte Carlo replications. The bias is measured by the
mean error. The mean square error (MSE) measures the accuracy.
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E The Post-Nabisco Merger
The FIL model possesses the main features that make it appealing for merger
evaluation according to Pinkse and Slade (2004): it imposes no specific restric-
tions on price elasticities; it is easily and fastly estimated by linear IV regression
using standard computer softwares; and it can handle very large choice sets.
This appendix shows the use of the FIL model for merger simulation purposes
through the study of the Post’s acquisition of the Nabisco cereal line in the ready-
to-eat (RTE) cereals industry that occurred in January 1993. This merger has been
extensively studied in the empirical literature (see Rubinfeld (2000), Nevo (2000)
and Michel and Weiergraeber (2019)).37 Using both pre- and post-merger data, I
directly estimate these price eﬀects. Then, using pre-merger data, I estimate a FIL
model and, assuming a static oligopolistic price competition model, I simulate
the merging firm’s price eﬀects. Lastly, I compare the results.
E.1 Data
Datasets and Variables I use data from the Dominick’s Database made avail-
able by the James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Busi-
ness. This is a weekly store-level scanner data, comprising information on 30
categories of packaged products at the Universal Product Code (UPC) level for
all Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF) chain stores in the Chicago metropolitan area
over the period 1989-1997. The data are supplemented by store-specific infor-
mation, including average household size and store traﬃc.
For the application, I focus on the RTE cereals and use data from 60 DFF
stores during the period 1992–1993, i.e., one year before and one year after the
merger. I use the whole sample, i.e., both pre- and post-merger data, for the
reduced form analysis, and only pre-merger data for the structural approach.
Following the prevailing literature, I aggregate UPCs into brands, where a
brand is a cereal (e.g., Special K) associated to its manufacturer (e.g., Kellogg’s),
so that diﬀerent size boxes are considered one brand. I select 45 brands from
6 national manufacturers (General Mills, Kellogg’s, Nabisco, Post, Quaker and
Ralston), so that they represent around 75% of each manufacturer total sales on
the period. The 45 brands taken together account for around 60% of the national
market (see Corts, 1996; Shum, 2004, for information on national market shares).
37For an industry overview, see also Corts (1996), Nevo (2001) and Backus et al. (2018).
104
CHAPTER 2. THE FLEXIBLE INVERSE LOGIT MODEL
Lastly, I group cereals into three market segments, namely Adults, Kids and Fam-
ily, according to the classification provided by the website www.cerealfacts.org.
I define a product as a brand and a market as a month-store pair. I compute
the market shares of the 45 brands in volume as follows. First, I select all package
sizes between 10 and 32 ounces. Then, I compute the total volume sold by a brand
in a market, which I divide by the potential market size to obtain the market
shares. The market share of the outside option is then obtained as the diﬀerence
between one and the sum of the 45 brands’ market shares.
I compute the potential market size as follows. According to the USDA’s Eco-
nomic Research Service, per capita US consumption of RTE cereals was equal to
13.9 pounds in 1992 and 14.6 pounds in 1993. I use this information to compute
the monthly per capita consumption. Then, assuming that people visit stores
twice a week, I compute the total number of persons in a market as the number
of households times average household size. The potential market size is thus
given by the total number of persons in a market multiplied by the monthly per
capita consumption of RTE cereals.
At no loss of generality, I define a serving weight as 1 ounce (i.e., 28.35g).
Prices in the analysis are weighted deflated retail prices calculated as the volume-
weighted average price per ounce of the UPCs that form the brand and where the
deflator is the monthly Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U)
in the Chicago-Naperville-Elgin area from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.38
I supplement the data with the fiber and sugar contents of one serve of cere-
als using release SR16 of the USDA Nutrient Database for Standard Reference.39
I use information regarding the presence or not of rice, wheat, corn and oats
using manufacturers’ websites and diﬀerent websites collecting nutritional infor-
mation. I also use monthly prices for rice, wheat, sugar and corn from the web-
site www.indexmundi.com, and for oats from the website www.macrotrends.net,
which will be used to construct cost-based instruments.
Evolution of Retail Prices Before turning to the econometric analysis, observe
in Figure 6 how the weighted average prices of the merging firms’ and the non-
38The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a measure of the average change over time in the prices
paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services. Indexes are avail-
able for the U.S. and various geographic areas. Average price data for select utility, automotive
fuel, and food items are also available.
39This dataset is made available by the United States Department of Agriculture and provides
the nutrient content of more than 8,500 diﬀerent foods including RTE cereals.
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merging firms’ separately evolved before and after the merger. It appears that
bothmerging and non-merging firm’s exhibit a slightly increasing trend in prices.
In addition, before the merger, the merging firms’ prices are lower than the non-
merging firms’ prices, while they are similar after merger.
This suggests that merging firms took advantage of the merger to increase
their prices relatively to non-merging firms. However, the increasing trend can
also be explained by changes in economic factors other than the merger, such that
increases in price inputs. The econometric analysis of the next subsection aims
at estimating the merging firms’ price eﬀect, everything else being equal.
Figure 6: Prices Evolution by Merging Status
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E.2 Reduced-Form Analysis
I first estimate the price eﬀects of the Post-Nabisco merger using both pre- and
post-merger data. Based on Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016), I estimate the
following regression
ln(pjsm) = αi + βiPostMergeri + ξj + ξs + ξm +∆ξjsm,
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where subscript i denotes a product group, and where pjsm is the price of brand
j = 1, . . . ,45, sold in store s = 1, . . . ,60 during monthm = 1, . . . ,24. I define product
groups i at two levels: (i) merging status: i ∈ {merging,non-merging}; (ii) at the
firm level: i ∈ {General Mills,Kellogg’s,Nabisco,Post,Quaker,Ralston}.
The following table presents the results.
Table 7: Price Effect
Coeﬃcient SE Percent change CI
Regression at the level of merging vs. non-merging firms
MergingFirms × PostMerger 0.0477*** (0.00274) 4.77% [4.23% ; 5.31%]
(1-MergingFirms) × PostMerger 0.0220*** (0.00282) 2.20% [1.65% ; 2.76%]
(lower bound) Price eﬀect 0.0257*** (0.00128) 2.66% [2.40% ; 2.92%]
MergingFirms fixed eﬀects Yes
Observations 64654
R2 0.998
Regression at the level of the firm
General Mills × PostMerger 0.0112*** (0.00307) 1.13% [0.52% ; 1.74%]
Kellogg’s × PostMerger 0.0283*** (0.00300) 2.87% [2.26% ; 3.47%]
Nabisco × PostMerger 0.0556*** (0.00399) 5.72% [4.89% ; 6.55%]
Post × PostMerger 0.0459*** (0.00275) 4.70% [4.14% ; 5.27%]
Quaker × PostMerger 0.0117*** (0.00340) 1.18% [0.51% ; 1.86%]
Ralston × PostMerger 0.0386*** (0.00338) 3.94% [3.25% ; 4.63%]
Firms fixed eﬀects Yes
Observations 64654
R2 0.998
Notes: Regressions include fixed eﬀects for brands, stores, and months. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The percentage price eﬀects are obtained
from exp(βi)− 1 and the corresponding standard errors using the delta method.
The structural approach of the next subsection assumes that costs did not
change after the merger. To make the results consistent with the structural ap-
proach, based on Weinberg and Hosken (2013), I also estimate the following re-
gression which controls for cost changes
ln(pjsm) = αi + βiPostMergeri + ci
(
ωjm
)
+ ξj + ξs + ξm +∆ξjsm,
where ci
(
ωjm
)
is a cost function depending on price inputs which is merging
status-specific. I replace ci
(
ωjm
)
by a polynomial in ωjm (of orders 2 and 3, re-
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spectively). I distinguish between merging status to allow price inputs to enter
the production function of diﬀerently according to the merging status. Price in-
puts are prices for corn, oats, rice, wheat and sugar multiplied by the content of
one serving weight (in grammes for sugar and a dummy for the others).
If it is assumed that the merger has no eﬀect on non-merging firm’s prices,
then the diﬀerence βmerging − βnon-merging measures the merging firms’ price ef-
fects. Otherwise, the diﬀerence must be viewed as a lower bound.
Table 8: Price Effect, by merging status and holding cost constant
Coeﬃcient SE Percent change CI
Regression with a second-order polynomial cost function
MergingFirms × PostMerger 0.0726*** (0.00355) 7.53% [6.78% ; 8.28%]
(1-MergingFirms) × PostMerger 0.0580*** (0.00357) 5.98% [5.23% ; 6.72%]
(lower bound) Price eﬀect 0.0145*** (0.00150) 1.55% [1.24% ; 1.87%]
Observations 64654
R2 0.998
Regression with a third-order polynomial cost function
MergingFirms × PostMerger 0.0444*** (0.00409) 4.54% [3.71% ; 5.38%]
(1-MergingFirms) × PostMerger 0.0245*** (0.00408) 2.48% [1.66% ; 3.30%]
(lower bound) Price eﬀect 0.0199*** (0.00178) 2.06% [1.70% ; 2.42%]
Observations 64654
R2 0.998
Notes: Regressions include fixed eﬀects for brands, stores, and months. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The percentage price eﬀects are obtained
from exp(βi)− 1 and the corresponding standard errors using the delta method.
E.3 Structural Approach using the FIL Model
The structural approach uses the structural model of demand and supply pre-
sented in subsection 5.1.
Demand Estimation I estimate the FIL model given by Equation (19) where
x(1) includes a constant as well as dummies for brands, stores and months, and
where x(2) includes the fiber and sugar contents of the cereals – product charac-
teristics x(1) and x(2) are invariant across markets, this is the reason for which I
omit notation for markets t.
I estimate the model following the two-step procedure described in Subsec-
tion 5.3. In the first step, I estimate the FIL model using a first-order Bernstein
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polynomial (with 2× 2 parameters), where instruments are given by
IVjt =
xj , pˆjt,
∑
i,j
bk1,1bk2,2pˆit

k1={0,1};k2={0,1}
 ,
where pˆjt is the predicted value of the linear regression of prices pjt on x
(1)
j ,
(
x(1)j
)2
,∑
i,j
(
x(2)i − x(2)j
)
and ωjt. Cost shifters are input prices (for sugar, corn, oats, rice
and wheat) multiplied by their content in one serving weight (in grammes for
sugar and a dummy for the others).40
In the second step, I use a second-order Bernstein polynomial (with 3× 3 pa-
rameters), with the optimal instruments of Chamberlain (1987). The Sanderson
andWindmeijer (2016)’s F-statistics of the 10 first-stage regressions are far higher
than 10, indicating that instruments are not weak.
The estimated median own-price elasticities are in line with the literature.
They range from −6.181 to −1.461 with an average of −3.362. Regarding the
cross-price elasticities, they range from −0.692 to 0.669, with an average of 0.038.
30% of the pairs of products are complements (see Iaria and Wang, 2019, who
find a large amount of complementarity in the RTE cereals industry). Note, how-
ever, that confidence intervals should be computed to determine whether or not
the small values for some of the cross-price elasticities are well significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
Merger Simulation Consider a static oligopolistic price competition model be-
tween the six manufacturers. Assuming that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
exists and using the associated first-order conditions, I compute marginal costs
and margins. The model predicts negative marginal costs only for less than
0.130% of the observations. Note that I use retail prices to simulate a merger
between manufacturers, while ignoring the retailers (DFF) – I abstract from the
vertical relationship between retailers and manufacturers. The median marginal
cost implied by the model is 0.13 dollars per serving, which, in line with Michel
and Weiergraeber (2019), implies median margin equal to 33 cents.
Given the demand estimates and the predicted marginal costs, I simulate the
merger by only changing the merging firms’ product ownership. I compute the
40Bernstein polynomials used in this application have lower orders than those used in the sim-
ulations. This is because with higher orders, instruments become weak. A future version of this
paper will consider Bernstein polynomials with higher orders.
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post-merger prices using the approximate solution of the first-order conditions
(see Hausman et al., 1994; Nevo, 1997), and then I compute the merging firms’
price eﬀect as ∑
j∈M
60∑
s=1
12∑
m=1
wjsm
p
post
jsm − pjsm
pjsm
,
with
∑
j,s,mwjsm = 1, where M is the set of brands sold by the merging firms,
where wjsm are premerger volume shares, and where p
post
jsm are the simulated post-
merger prices.
E.4 Comparison
Assuming that themerger has no eﬀect on non-merging firm’s prices, the reduced-
form approach leads to an estimate of the merging firm’s price eﬀect of 1.55%
when the cost function is approximated by a second-order polynomial in input
prices and of 2.06% when it is approximated by a third-order polynomial. These
results must be taken with caution, especially because there are cost factors that
are not considered in the analysis, such as cost of packaging, distribution, adver-
tising, etc.
The structural approach when the demand model is the FIL model and the
supply model is a static price competition model leads to an estimate of the
merging firm’s price eﬀect of 2.03%, thereby indicating that the FIL model pre-
dicts a merger eﬀect on retail prices in line with that found in the reduced-form
approach. However, several specifications and robustness checks should be run
before getting a reliable conclusion.
110
Bibliography
Allen, R. and J. Rehbeck (2019): “Identification With Additively Separable Het-
erogeneity,” Econometrica, 87, 1021–1054.
Anderson, S. P., A. De Palma, and J. F. Thisse (1992): Discrete choice theory of
product diﬀerentiation, Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Andrews, I., J. Stock, and L. Sun (2018): “Weak instruments in IV regression:
Theory and practice,”Working paper.
Armstrong, T. B. (2016): “Large market asymptotics for diﬀerentiated product
demand estimators with economic models of supply,” Econometrica, 84, 1961–
1980.
Backus, M., C. Conlon, and M. Sinkinson (2018): “Common ownership and
competition in the ready-to-eat cereal industry,”Working paper.
Barnett, W. A. (1983): “Definitions of "second order approximation" and of "flex-
ible functional form",” Economics Letters, 12, 31–35.
——— (1985): “The minflex-Laurent translog flexible functional form,” Journal
of Econometrics, 30, 33–44.
Berry, S., A. Eizenberg, and J. Waldfogel (2016): “Optimal product variety in
radio markets,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 47, 463–497.
Berry, S., A. Gandhi, and P. Haile (2013): “Connected substitutes and invertibil-
ity of demand,” Econometrica, 81, 2087–2111.
Berry, S. and P. Haile (2016): “Identification in diﬀerentiated products markets,”
Annual review of Economics, 8, 27–52.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995): “Automobile prices in market equi-
librium,” Econometrica, 63, 841–890.
111
BIBLIOGRAPHY
——— (1999): “Voluntary export restraints on automobiles: Evaluating a trade
policy,” American Economic Review, 89, 400–430.
Berry, S. and A. Pakes (2001): “Additional information for:Comments on Al-
ternative models of demand for automobiles by Charlotte Wojcik,” Economics
Letters, 74, 43–51.
Berry, S. T. (1994): “Estimating discrete-choice models of product diﬀerentia-
tion,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 242–262.
Berry, S. T. and P. A. Haile (2014): “Identification in diﬀerentiated products
markets using market level data,” Econometrica, 82, 1749–1797.
Björnerstedt, J. and F. Verboven (2016): “Does merger simulation work? Ev-
idence from the Swedish analgesics market,” American Economic Journal: Ap-
plied Economics, 8, 125–64.
Brenkers, R. and F. Verboven (2006): “Liberalizing a distribution system: the
European car market,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 4, 216–
251.
Bresnahan, T. F., S. Stern, and M. Trajtenberg (1997): “Market Segmentation
and the Sources of Rents from Innovation: Personal Computers in the Late
1980s,” RAND Journal of Economics, S17–S44.
Bulow, J. I. and P. Pfleiderer (1983): “A note on the eﬀect of cost changes on
prices,” Journal of political Economy, 91, 182–185.
Chak, P. M., N. Madras, and B. Smith (2005): “Semi-nonparametric estimation
with Bernstein polynomials,” Economics Letters, 89, 153–156.
Chamberlain, G. (1987): “Asymptotic eﬃciency in estimation with conditional
moment restrictions,” Journal of Econometrics, 34, 305–334.
Chu, C. (1989): “A Paired Combinational Logit Model for Travel Demand Anal-
ysis,” in Transport Policy, Management and Technology Towards 2001: Selected
Proceedings of the Fifth World Conference on Transport Research, Vol. 4, Western
Periodicals, Ventura, CA, 295–309.
Compiani, G. (2019): “Market Counterfactuals and the Specification of Multi-
Product Demand: A Nonparametric Approach,” Unpublished.
112
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Conlon, C. and J. Gortmaker (2018): “Best practices for diﬀerentiated products
demand estimation with pyblp,”Working paper.
Corts, K. (1996): “The Ready-to-eat Breakfast Cereal Industry in 1994 (A),” Har-
vard Business School.
Cournot, A.-A. (1838): Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des
richesses par Augustin Cournot, chez L. Hachette.
Davis, P. and P. Schiraldi (2014): “The flexible coeﬃcient multinomial logit (FC-
MNL) model of demand for diﬀerentiated products,” The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 45, 32–63.
Davis, P. J. (1975): Interpolation and approximation, Courier Corporation.
Diewert, W. (1974): “Application of Duality Theory,” Frontiers of Quantitative
Economics, 2.
Doraszelski, U. and A. Pakes (2007): “A framework for applied dynamic analysis
in IO,” Handbook of industrial organization, 3, 1887–1966.
Dubé, J.-P., J. T. Fox, and C.-L. Su (2012): “Improving the numerical performance
of static and dynamic aggregate discrete choice random coeﬃcients demand
estimation,” Econometrica, 80, 2231–2267.
Ershov, D., J.-W. Laliberté, and S. Orr (2018): “Mergers in a Model with Com-
plementarity,” Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295232.
Fosgerau, M., J. Monardo, and A. de Palma (2019): “The Inverse Product Diﬀer-
entiation Logit Model,” Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141041.
Gandhi, A. and J.-F. Houde (2017): “Measuring substitution patterns in diﬀeren-
tiated products industries,” Unpublished.
Gentzkow, M. (2007): “Valuing new goods in a model with complementarity:
Online newspapers,” The American Economic Review, 97, 713–744.
Goldberg, P. K. (1995): “Product diﬀerentiation and oligopoly in international
markets: The case of the US automobile industry,” Econometrica, 891–951.
Griffith, R., M. O’Connell, and K. Smith (2019): “Tax design in the alcohol
market,” Journal of Public Economics, 172, 20–35.
113
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Grigolon, L. (2018): “Blurred boundaries: a flexible approach for segmentation
applied to the car market,”Working paper.
Hanemann, W. M. (1984): “Discrete/continuous models of consumer demand,”
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 541–561.
Hausman, J., G. Leonard, and J. D. Zona (1994): “Competitive analysis with
diﬀerenciated products,” Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 159–180.
Hurwicz, L. (1966): “On the structural form of interdependent systems,” in Stud-
ies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Elsevier, vol. 44, 232–239.
Iaria, A. and A. Wang (2019): “Identification and Estimation of Demand for
Bundles: The Case of the RTE Cereal Industry,” Unpublished.
Knittel, C. R. and K. Metaxoglou (2014): “Estimation of Random-Coeﬃcient
DemandModels: Two Empiricists’ Perspective,” Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 96, 34–59.
Koppelman, F. S. and C.-H. Wen (2000): “The paired combinatorial logit
model: properties, estimation and application,” Transportation Research Part
B: Methodological, 34, 75–89.
Lee, J. and K. Seo (2015): “A computationally fast estimator for random coeﬃ-
cients logit demand models using aggregate data,” The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 46, 86–102.
McFadden, D. (1974): “Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior,”
Frontiers in Econometrics, 105–142.
McFadden, D. and K. Train (2000): “Mixed MNL models for discrete response,”
Journal of applied Econometrics, 15, 447–470.
Michel, C. and S. Weiergraeber (2019): “Estimating Industry Conduct in Dif-
ferentiated Products Markets,”Working paper.
Miller, N. H., M. Remer, C. Ryan, and G. Sheu (2016): “Pass-Through and the
Prediction ofMerger Price Eﬀects,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 64, 683–
709.
Monardo, J. (2019): “Shape Restrictions for Structural Demand Estimation: Be-
yond the ARUM,” Unpublished.
114
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mrázová, M. and J. P. Neary (2017): “Not so demanding: Demand structure and
firm behavior,” American Economic Review, 107, 3835–74.
Nevo, A. (1997): “Mergers with Diﬀerentiated Products: The Case of Ready-to-
Eat Cereal,” .
——— (2000): “Mergers with Diﬀerentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-
Eat Cereal Industry,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 395–421.
——— (2001): “Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry,”
Econometrica, 69, 307–342.
Newey, W. K. (1990): “Eﬃcient instrumental variables estimation of nonlinear
models,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 58, 809–837.
Newman, P. (2008): “Substitutes and complements,” The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics: Volume 1–8, 6434–6438.
Ogaki, M. (1990): “The indirect and direct substitution eﬀects,” The American
Economic Review, 80, 1271–1275.
Petrin, A. (2002): “Quantifying the benefits of new products: The case of the
minivan,” Journal of political Economy, 110, 705–729.
Pinkse, J. and M. E. Slade (1998): “Contracting in space: An application of spa-
tial statistics to discrete-choice models,” Journal of Econometrics, 85, 125–154.
——— (2004): “Mergers, brand competition, and the price of a pint,” European
Economic Review, 48, 617–643.
Pinkse, J., M. E. Slade, and C. Brett (2002): “Spatial price competition: a semi-
parametric approach,” Econometrica, 70, 1111–1153.
Reiss, P. C. (2016): “Just How Sensitive are Instrumental Variable Estimates?”
Foundations and Trends in Accounting, 10, 204–237.
Reynaert, M. and F. Verboven (2014): “Improving the performance of random
coeﬃcients demandmodels: the role of optimal instruments,” Journal of Econo-
metrics, 179, 83–98.
Rojas, C. (2008): “Price competition in US brewing,” The Journal of Industrial
Economics, 56, 1–31.
115
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rubinfeld, D. L. (2000): “Market definition with diﬀerentiated products: the
Post/Nabisco cereal Merger,” Antitrust LJ, 68, 163.
Salanié, B. and F. A. Wolak (2019): “Fast," robust", and approximately correct:
estimating mixed demand systems,” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Samuelson, P. A. (1974): “Complementarity: An essay on the 40th anniversary
of the Hicks-Allen revolution in demand theory,” Journal of Economic literature,
12, 1255–1289.
Sanderson, E. and F. Windmeijer (2016): “A weak instrument F-test in linear
IV models with multiple endogenous variables,” Journal of Econometrics, 190,
212–221.
Shum, M. (2004): “Does advertising overcome brand loyalty? Evidence from
the breakfast-cereals market,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 13,
241–272.
Skrainka, B. S. and K. L. Judd (2011): “High performance quadrature rules: How
numerical integration aﬀects a popular model of product diﬀerentiation,” .
Slade, M. E. (2004): “Market power and joint dominance in UK brewing,” The
Journal of Industrial Economics, 52, 133–163.
Verboven, F. (1996): “International price discrimination in the European carmar-
ket,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 240–268.
Weinberg, M. C. and D. Hosken (2013): “Evidence on the accuracy of merger
simulations,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 1584–1600.
Weyl, E. G. and M. Fabinger (2013): “Pass-through as an economic tool: Prin-
ciples of incidence under imperfect competition,” Journal of Political Economy,
121, 528–583.
Wojcik, C. (2000): “Alternative models of demand for automobiles,” Economics
Letters, 68, 113–118.
116
Chapter 3
Shape Restrictions for Demand
Estimation
1 Introduction
Structural estimation of demandmodels for diﬀerentiated products allows to bet-
ter understand consumers’ behavior and to studymany economic questions of in-
terest (e.g., mergers, new products, trade policy, cost pass-through, etc.). Ideally,
one would like demand models to impose limited shape restrictions while be-
ing consistent with an underlying structural model of heterogeneous and utility-
maximizing consumers.
Most papers that structurally estimate demands assume an additive random
utility model (ARUM) from which the demand function is derived and then esti-
mated using the method developed by Berry (1994). The ARUM is ubiquitously
used due to its ability to model the behavior of heterogeneous consumers in the
presence of many diﬀerentiated products in a tractable and parsimonious way.1
Berry (1994)’s method is used to estimate demandmodels for diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts while handling endogeneity issues, due to the presence of structural error
terms that represent product characteristics that are unobserved by the modeller
but observed and valued by consumers and firms.
This paper is motivated by two observations. First, the ARUM imposes shape
1The ARUM relies on the single-unit purchase assumption that each consumer chooses one
unit of the product that maximizes her utility given by the sum of a deterministic and a random
utility terms. It has been widely applied in empirical industrial organization (see Berry, 1994;
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) and in other fields to answer many questions (see e.g., Table
1 in Berry and Haile, 2016).
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restrictions on its associated demand function, known as the Daly-Zachary con-
ditions due to Daly and Zachary (1979).2 In particular, they rule out comple-
mentarity as defined by a negative cross-price derivative of demand, which may
be undesirable in applications where complementarity is likely to occur and to
qualitatively aﬀect results (e.g, mergers, bundling, products’ entry).3 Second,
Berry (1994)’s method targets the inverse demand function, rather than the de-
mand function or the underlying utility function. This is because it starts from
the equation that equates the predicted to the observed market shares where the
structural errors enter nonlinearly, thereby preventing the use of standard instru-
mental variables (IV) methods to deal with endogeneity issues. The method thus
suggests to invert it to obtain inverse demand equations where the structural er-
rors enter linearly and to use them as a basis for estimation. However, since these
inverse demand equations have generally no closed form expression, estimation
requires numerical inversion and non-linear optimization, which can be painful
and time-consuming.4
Fosgerau et al. (2019b) contrasts with the standard practice by building novel
inverse demand models, called generalized inverse logit (GIL) models, which al-
low for complementarity and which are estimated by IV regression using Berry
(1994)’s method. Interestingly, Fosgerau et al. (2019b) show that any GIL model
can be derived from amodel of heterogeneous and utility-maximizing consumers,
called perturbed utility model (PUM) and studied by Allen and Rehbeck (2019a),
see arrow "Lemma 1" in Figure 1.5
The main goal of this paper is to show the converse, namely that, under mild
conditions, any PUM yields an inverse demand function that is a GIL model.
The proof of this result involves two intermediate results that are of independent
interest. First, any PUM yields a demand function satisfying a slight variant of
the Daly-Zachary conditions, referred to as the modified Daly-Zachary (MDZ)
2In this paper, I use interchangeably the terms "demands", "choice probabilities", and "market
shares".
3I use the standard definition of complementarity (substitutability), i.e. a negative (positive)
compensated cross-price derivative of demand. Since I rule out income eﬀect, complementarity
(substitutability) is the only source of the negative (positive) cross-price derivative of demand.
See Samuelson (1974) for a discussion on the diﬀerent ways of defining complementarity.
4To my knowledge, the logit and nested logit models are the only ARUM with a closed-form
inverse demand function.
5The PUM assumes that each consumer chooses a probability distribution over products so
as to maximize her utility given by the sum of an expected utility term and a non-linear, deter-
ministic function of probabilities. The PUM extends the ARUM to allow for richer substitution
patterns.
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conditions and allowing for complementarity, see arrow "Lemma 2" in Figure
1. Second, any demand function satisfying the MDZ conditions has an inverse
demand function that is a GIL model, see arrow "Lemma 3" in Figure 1. Overall,
by equivalence relations, PUM, GIL models and demands satisfying the MDZ
conditions are observationally equivalent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
setting used in the paper. Section 3 defines the PUM and the GIL model. Section
4 establishes the main result of the paper, namely that the shape restrictions
that the GIL model imposes on the inverse demand function are necessary and
suﬃcient for consistency with PUMmaximization, and sketches its proof. Section
5 provides the proofs of the results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
Figure 1: Relations between PUM, GIL Models and MDZ Conditions
PUM
GIL Model MDZ Conditions
Lemma 2
Lemma 3
Lemma 1
Conditions (PUM i) – (PUM iii)
Utility Model (8)
Conditions (MDZ i) – (MDZ iii)
Demand Model (3)
Conditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii)
Inverse Demand Model (7)
Notation I use italics for scalar variables and real-valued functions, boldface
for vectors, matrices and vector-valued functions, and calligraphic for sets. By
default, vectors are column vectors.
Let J = {0, . . . , J}. A vector s ∈ RJ+1 refers to s ≡
(
s0, . . . , sJ
)ᵀ ∈ RJ+1.
∆J denotes the J-dimensional unit simplex: ∆J ≡
{
s ∈ [0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1},
int
(
∆J
)
≡
{
s ∈ (0,∞)J+1 :∑j∈J sj = 1} is its interior, and bd(∆J ) ≡ ∆J\int(∆J) is its
boundary.
Let CS : RJ+1 → R be a function. Then, ∇δCS (δ), with entries j given by
∂CS(δ)
∂δj
, denotes its gradient with respect to the vector δ.
Let G =
(
G0, . . . ,GJ
)
: RJ+1 → RJ+1 be a vector function composed of functions
Gj : RJ+1 → R. The Jacobian matrix JsG (s) of G with respect to s at s has entries ij
given by ∂Gi(s)∂sj .
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A univariate function R→ R applied to a vector is a coordinate-wise applica-
tion of the function, e.g., ln(s) =
(
ln(s0) , . . . , ln
(
sJ
))
. 1J = (1, . . . ,1)
ᵀ ∈ RJ is a vector
consisting of ones.
|s| denotes the 1-norm of the vector s: |s| =∑j∈J |sj |. δ−j denotes the vector δ
after deleting its j-th entry: δ−j ≡ (δ0 . . .δj−1,δj+1 . . .δJ ).
2 Setting
Consider a population of consumers choosing from a choice set J = {0, . . . , J} of J+
1 diﬀerentiated products, where products j = 1, . . . , J are the inside products and
product j = 0 is the outside good. Let pj ∈ R be the price of product j and xj ∈ RK
be the vector of K observed characteristics of product j. Following the structural
demand estimation literature (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995), let ξj ∈ R be the
j-product unobserved characteristics term. The ξj ’s represent the structural error
terms of the demand model in the sense that they are assumed to be observed by
consumers and firms but not by the modeller.
Following Berry and Haile (2014), define for each product j ∈ J a linear index
δj = xjβ −αpj + ξj , j ∈ J , (1)
where β captures the consumers’ taste for characteristics
(
x0, . . . ,xJ
)
and α > 0
denotes the consumers’ marginal utility of income; and normalize the indexes of
each inside product relative to that of the outside good by setting δ0 = 0, so that
δ ∈ RJ+10 ≡ {δ ∈ RJ+1 : δ0 = 0}.6
Consider the demand system
σ =
(
σ0, . . . ,σJ
)
: RJ+10 → int
(
∆J
)
,
where the function σ gives the vector s of nonzero observed market shares as a
function of the vector of product indexes δ,
s = σ (δ;θ2) , (2)
known up to some parameters θ2 to be estimated. Demands (2) rule out income
eﬀect (since they are independent of income); the implicit assumption behind
6Alternatively, one can normalize δ such that RJ+10 = {δ ∈ RJ+1 :
∑
j∈J δj = 0}.
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being that preferences are quasi-linear and that income is suﬃciently high that
not all income is spent on the J + 1 diﬀerentiated products (see e.g., Nocke and
Schutz, 2017).
Demand estimation based on the system (2) that equates the predicted mar-
ket shares to the observed market shares is complicated by the fact that the error
terms ξ enter in a nonlinear way, thereby preventing the use of standard regres-
sion techniques. Berry (1994) suggests inverting system to obtain an inverse de-
mand system in which the error terms ξ enter linearly and to use it as a basis for
estimation. Indeed, if σ is invertible in δ, then there exists an inverse demand
σ−1 : int(∆J )→ RJ+10 given by
σ−1 (s;θ2) = δ,
in which the structural error terms ξj enter linearly as a function of the data (i.e.,
market shares, prices and product characteristics) and parameters α, β, and θ2
to be estimated,7
ξj = σ
−1
j (s;θ2)− xjβ +αpj , j ∈ J . (3)
Invertibility in δ of the system of market shares (2) is thus crucial for identifi-
cation and estimation. Berry et al. (2013) show that their "connected substitutes"
structure is suﬃcient for demand invertibility.8 Proposition 2 provides a result
of invertibility for demands that can accommodate some patterns of substitution
that are not allowed in Berry et al. (2013)’s setting, including complementarity as
defined by a negative cross-price derivative of demand.
Product characteristics are typically assumed to be exogenous (i.e., that they
are uncorrelated with the structural error terms). However, prices and mar-
ket shares in the right-hand side of Equation (3) are likely to be endogenous.
Then, provided that there exists appropriate instruments z for prices and market
shares, one can estimate demands (2) based on the following conditional moment
restrictions
E
[
ξj |z
]
= 0, j ∈ J ,
where ξj is given by Equation (3).
7To ease exposition, I hereafter omit notation for parameters θ2.
8The connected substitutes structure requires that (i) products be weak substitutes, i.e., every-
thing else equal, an increase in δi weakly decreases demand σj for all other products and (ii) the
“connected strict substitution” condition hold, i.e., there is suﬃcient strict substitution between
products to treat them in one demand system.
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3 Models
Most papers that structurally estimate demands assume an additive random util-
ity model (ARUM), derive the associated demand function, and invert it to obtain
the inverse demand equations (3). However, the ARUM rules out complementar-
ity by assumption and, in general, yields an inverse demand function that has no
closed-form expression, so that one needs to resort to numerical inversion and
non-linear optimization for estimation.
Fosgerau et al. (2019b)’s approach constrasts with this practice, obtaining
Equation (3) by directly developing novel (closed-form) inverse demand mod-
els, called generalized inverse logit (GIL), which allow for complementarity and
just require IV regression for estimation.9
Fosgerau et al. (2019b) shows that any GILmodel is consistent with amodel of
heterogeneous and utility-maximizing consumers, called perturbed utility model
(PUM) and studied by Allen and Rehbeck (2019a).10 The goal of this paper is to
show the converse, namely that the inverse demand function yield by any PUM is
a GIL model, to establish that the conditions that the GIL model imposes on the
inverse demand function are necessary and suﬃcient for consistency with PUM
maximization.
3.1 The Generalized Inverse Logit (GIL) Model
The GIL model is an inverse demand model of the form
σ−1j (s) = lnGj (s) + c = δj , j ∈ J , (4)
where δj is given by Equation (1), where c is equal, up to an additive constant, to
the consumer surplus and where the function lnG ≡ (lnG0, . . . , lnGJ ) satisfies the
following conditions.
Conditions GIL The function lnG satisfies the following conditions.
(GIL i) G : [0,∞)J+1 → (0,∞)J+1 is continuously diﬀerentiable and homoge-
neous of degree one on int
(
∆J
)
11
9Compiani (2019) adopts a similar approach. Using Berry and Haile (2014)’s setting, he pro-
poses to non-parametrically estimate inverse demand models.
10See also McFadden and Fosgerau (2012) and Fudenberg et al. (2015).
11The function G is homogeneous of degree one if, for all λ > 0, G (λs) = λG (s).
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(GIL ii) JslnG is positive definite and symmetric on int
(
∆J
)
12
(GIL iii) | lnG (s) | approaches infinity as s approaches bd(∆J ).
This form of inverse demand generalizes the inverse demand obtained from
the logit model through the presence of the functionG, and as shown by Fosgerau
et al. (2019b), allows for complementarity.
3.2 The Perturbed Utility Model (PUM)
The PUM is a utility model that admits a representative consumer choosing a
vector s ∈ ∆J of market shares of the diﬀerentiated products so as to maximize
her quasi-linear utility defined as the sum of an expected utility component and
a perturbation function (−Ω)
u (s) =
∑
j∈J
δjsj −Ω (s) , (5)
where δj is given by Equation (1) and where the perturbation function (−Ω) is a
deterministic function of s that satisfies the following conditions.
Conditions PUM The function Ω : [0,∞)J+1 → R∪ {+∞} satisfies the following
conditions.13
(PUM i) Ω is finite for s ∈ ∆J and infinite otherwise
(PUM ii) Ω is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly convex on int(∆J ).
(PUM iii) |∇sΩ(s)| approaches infinity as s approaches bd(∆J ).
Conditions (PUM i) – (PUM iii) imply that the argmax of the utility maxi-
mization program is unique and that this maximizer is interior, i.e., σ ∈ int(∆J ).
Demands are then given by
σ (δ) = argmax
s∈∆J
{u (s)} , (6)
12JslnG is positive definite on int
(
∆J
)
if sᵀJslnGs > 0, for all s ∈ int
(
∆J
)
.
13Conditions (PUM i) to (PUM iii) imply that (int(∆J ),Ω) is a convex function of Legendre type.
See Appendix A.1. See, amongst others, Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), Galichon and Salanié
(2015), Matějka and McKay (2015), Chiong et al. (2016), Allen and Rehbeck (2019a), Fosgerau
et al. (2019a) for economics papers that use convex analysis.
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where u is given by Equation (5).
As shown by Allen and Rehbeck (2019a), this form of utility can be derived,
after an aggregation across consumers, from amodel of heterogeneous and utility-
maximizing consumers called perturbed utility model (PUM). Indeed, in a PUM,
the utility that each consumer derives from choosing a vector s ∈ ∆J is the sum of
an expected utility
∑
j∈J δjsj term and a disturbance function (−Ω˜),
u (s;ε) =
∑
j∈J
δjsj − Ω˜ (s,ε) ,
where ε capture consumer heterogeneity, so that the utility (5) can be obtained
after integrating out the distribution of ε.14 15
The PUM is consistent with deliberate stochastic choice at the consumer level
(Fudenberg et al., 2015; Allen and Rehbeck, 2019b), with stochastic choice due
to rational inattention (Matějka and McKay, 2015; Fosgerau et al., 2019a) or due
to costly optimization (Mattsson and Weibull, 2002), and with taste for variety.16
As noted by Allen and Rehbeck (2019a), the ARUM is a special case of the
PUM, where Ω˜ (s,ε) = −∑j∈J sjεj , meaning that the class of PUM is strictly larger
than the class of ARUM (see also Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Fosgerau et al.,
2019a,b).
The PUM allows for complementarity (Allen and Rehbeck, 2018), which is
ruled out by the ARUM. Complementarity in a PUM can be due to a variety
of consumer behavior, including taste for variety and one-stop shopping, and
can also be the manifestation of the attraction eﬀect or the compromise eﬀect
(Rieskamp et al., 2006).
14See Theorem 1 in Allen and Rehbeck (2019a) for the conditions under which this aggregation
holds and for the relationships between the functions Ω˜ andΩ and the distribution of ε. See also
Allen and Rehbeck (2019b).
15This specification assumes that the only source of consumer heterogeneity in preferences is
due to the vector of random utility terms ε whose distribution is parametrized by the vector θ2.
This assumption rules out observed heterogeneity in preferences related to observed individual
characteristics as well as unobserved heterogeneity in preferences through random coeﬃcients on
price and product characteristics. This implies that the probability that each consumer chooses
product j ∈ J coincides with the market share of that product. For this reason, I omit notation
for consumers.
16See alsoMachina (1985), Clark (1990), Agranov andOrtoleva (2017) and Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2019).
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4 Conditions for Consistency with PUM Maximiza-
tion
This section establishes the main result of the paper. It also sketches its proof,
which is illustrated in Figure 1. The findings of this section are illustrated through
the logit example in Appendix C. For the purpose of this paper, the modified
Daly-Zachary (MDZ) conditions are introduced. They are demand shape restric-
tions extending the Daly-Zachary conditions due to Daly and Zachary (1979).
The following proposition states that the conditions that the GIL models im-
pose on the inverse demand function are necessary and suﬃcient for consistency
with PUM maximization.
Proposition 1. Any GIL model is consistent with a PUM, i.e., it can be derived
from the maximization of a utility function of the form of Equation (5). Con-
versely, any PUM yields an inverse demand function that is a GIL model.
The proof of this proposition uses three lemmas, stated in this section and
formally proved in the next section, which link the PUM, the GIL model and the
MDZ conditions.
The first lemma, shown in Fosgerau et al. (2019b), establishes that any GIL
model is consistent with a PUM. Specifically, the GIL model (4) is consistent with
a consumer choosing a vector s ∈ ∆J of market shares of the diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts so as to maximize her quasi-linear utility
u (s) =
∑
j∈J
δjsj −
∑
j∈J
sj lnGj (s) , (7)
which is a PUM where the perturbation −Ω given by
Ω (s) =

∑
j∈J sj lnGj (s) if s ∈ ∆J ,
+∞ otherwise,
satisfies Conditions (PUM i) – (PUM iii). This result is summarized as follows.
Lemma 1. The GIL model (4) is consistent is the PUM (7).
The second lemma shows that any PUM yields a demand function satisfying
the modified Daly-Zachary (MDZ) conditions given as follows.
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Conditions MDZ The demand function σ satisfies, for all δ ∈ RJ+1 and for all
j ∈ J ,
(MDZ i) σj (δ) > 0 and
∑
k∈J σk (δ) = 1 (positive unit demand)
(MDZ ii) σj (δ) = σj (δ+ c1) for all c ∈ R (translation invariance)
(MDZ iii) lim
δj→∞
σj (δ) = 1 and lim
δj→∞
σi (δ) = 0 with δi < ∞, i , j (boundary
conditions)
(MDZ iv) Jδσ is positive definite on R
J+1
0 (Slutsky positive definiteness)
(MDZ v) Jδσ is symmetric (Slutsky symmetry).
The MDZ conditions represent a slight variant of the Daly-Zachary condi-
tions, due to Daly and Zachary (1979), which are necessary and suﬃcient for
consistency with ARUM maximization (see Appendix B). As discussed below,
they are weaker than the Daly-Zachary conditions. The following lemma thus
helps understanding how the PUM extends the ARUM.
Lemma 2. The demand function (6) yield by the PUM (5) satisfies Conditions
(MDZ i) – (MDZ v).
The third lemma shows that any demand function satisfying the MDZ con-
ditions has an inverse function that is a GIL model. For this purpose, let, for all
j ∈ J ,
σj (δ) ≡ σ˜j
(
eδ
)
= sj ,
which, by translation invariance, is equivalent to
σj (δ+ c1) = σ˜j
(
eδ
)
= sj . (8)
By the inverse function theorem, Slutsky positive definiteness implies that σ
is one-to-one on RJ+10 , so that one can invert Equation (8) to obtain
σ−1j (s) = lnGj (s) + c = δj , (9)
where ln σ˜−1j (s) ≡ lnGj (s), which is of the form of Equation (4).
Using tools from convex analysis, one can further show (see Section 5) that
c is equal, up to an additive constant, to the consumer surplus and that lnG =
(lnG0, . . . , lnGJ ) satisfies Conditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii).
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The following lemma shows how the MDZ conditions imposed on a demand
function translate to its inverse.17
Lemma 3. Assume that the demand function σ satisfies Conditions (MDZ i) –
(MDZ v). Then, its inverse σ−1 is a GIL model.
Lemma 3 shows that any demand function satisfying the MDZ conditions
has an inverse demand that is a GIL model, thereby establishing that the GIL
structure is suﬃcient to recover all demand functions satisfying the MDZ condi-
tions. Since the MDZ conditions are weaker than the Daly-Zachary conditions,
this also implies that the class of GIL models is strictly larger than the class of
ARUM choice probabilities defined in Appendix B. This has already been shown
by Fosgerau et al. (2019b) but using a diﬀerent line of proof.
Discussion on the MDZ Conditions The MDZ conditions are written in terms
of product indexes. However, since these latter are linear in prices (see Equation
(1)), they can easily be re-written in terms of prices.18 Except otherwise stated, in
this paper, Slutsky matrix refers to the matrix of demand derivatives with respect
to product indexes Jδσ (and not with respect to prices J
p
σ ).
The MDZ conditions have an economic content. Condition (MDZ i) states
that all products are chosen with non-null probability and that demands sum
to one. Condition (MDZ ii) states that demands are invariant to translation in
product indexes δ, which implies that only diﬀerences in product indexes de-
termine demands, not their absolute values. Since product indexes are linear in
prices, this also implies that demands depend on price diﬀerences. As a conse-
quence, demand models satisfying this condition require a normalization on δ
for identification, i.e., for there to be a unique vector δ that rationalizes the vec-
tor of observed market shares s (see Proposition 2 below). This also implies that
one can restrict σ to the set RJ+10 without loss of generality. Condition (MDZ iii)
means that all consumers choose product j ∈ J with certainty when that prod-
uct becomes infinitely attractive (i.e., when δj goes to infinity), with the others
remaining finitely attractive (i.e., with δi finite for all i , j). Conditions (MDZ iv)
17Compiani (2019) discusses shape restrictions on inverse demands satisfying the “connected
substitutes” structure (see his Appendix D). In particular, he shows that it implies that the Slutsky
matrix Jpσ is anM-matrix and satisfies weak column diagonal dominance, so that its inverse is an
inverseM-matrix and is weakly diagonally dominant of its row entries.
18For example, Slutsky symmetry
∂σj (δ)
∂δi
= ∂σi (δ)∂δj is equivalent to
∂σj (δ)
∂pi
= ∂σi (δ)∂pj . Likewise, Slutsky
negative definiteness zᵀJpσz < 0 for all z ∈ RJ+1 is equivalent to zᵀJδσz > 0 for all z ∈ RJ+1.
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and (MDZ v) are key for rationalizability of demands, i.e., for them to be consis-
tent with utility maximization.
TheMDZ conditions relax the Daly-Zachary by replacing positivity with Slut-
sky positive definiteness. Positivity is a technical condition that has no economic
content and that is generally hard to verify in practice. It is required for the im-
plied distribution of the random utility components to have a positive density.
On top of that, it rules out complementarity, as defined by a negative cross-price
derivatives. By contrast, Slutsky positive definiteness accommodates substitu-
tion patterns that go beyond those obtained from ARUM. In particular, it allows
to obtain demands that combine substitutes and complements.
Slutsky symmetry and positive definiteness are well known conditions. Slut-
sky symmetry is already part of the Daly-Zachary conditions. In addition, as
shown by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), any demand function satisfying Con-
ditions (MDZ i) and (MDZ v) and only allowing for substitutes admits a Slut-
sky matrix that is positive definite on RJ+10 . Then, in ARUM, Slutsky positive
definiteness is not restrictive with respect to Slutsky positive semi-definiteness.
These conditions are also well known conditions in continuous-choice models
(see e.g., Hurwicz, 1971; Lewbel, 2001; Nocke and Schutz, 2017). As shown
by Nocke and Schutz (2017), continuously diﬀerentiable demands are consistent
with quasi-linear utility maximization if and only if Jpσ is symmetric and negative
semi-definite, i.e., if and only if Jδσ is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
Invertibility of Demand As a by-product, the following proposition, which is
of independent interest, shows invertibility of GIL models.
Proposition 2. Assume that lnG satisfies Conditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii).
(i) It follows that lnG is invertible on int(∆J ).
(ii) Consider any vector of market shares s ∈ int
(
∆J
)
. Then, there exists a unique
δ ∈ RJ+10 such that
δj = σ
−1
j (s) = lnGj(s) + c, j ∈ J , (10)
or equivalently,
sj = σj (δ) =
Hj
(
eδ
)∑
k∈J Hk (eδ)
, j ∈ J , (11)
where Hj ≡ G−1j .
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Part (i) of Proposition 2 uses convex analysis to show the invertibility of any
function lnG satisfying Conditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii).
Equation (10) describes an inverse demand, i.e., a mapping frommarket shares
to product indexes, up to a normalizing additive constant due to Condition (MDZ
ii). Part (ii) of Proposition 2 establishes existence and uniqueness of its inverse
mapping (11) from product indexes to market shares (i.e., the demand function).
This proposition thus states that the vector of product indexes δ is identified up
to an additive constant c from the vector of observed nonzero market shares s by
the relation (10), where c is fixed by normalizing δ0 to zero.
Proposition 2 supplements, and in some cases extends, other results on de-
mand invertibility. Demands satisfying the MDZ Conditions allow for comple-
mentarity. This implies that Proposition 2 extends Berry (1994)’s invertibility
result, which assumes substitutability. It also supplements Berry et al. (2013) to
allow for complementarity. Their result holds for demands satisfying the “con-
nected substitutes” structure, which rules out complementarity as defined by a
negative cross-price derivative of demand but, by contrast to Proposition 2, does
not require demand diﬀerentiability. Complementarity violates the first condi-
tion of the connected substitutes structure, which, however, accommodates some
form of complementarity (see Example 1 in Berry et al. (2013) and Section 4.3.
in Compiani (2019)). A related invertibility result can be found in Fosgerau et al.
(2019b) (see Proposition 1), who use a diﬀerent line of proof.
Using Equation (10), diﬀerent inverse demand models can be obtained from
diﬀerent specifications of the function G =
(
G0, . . . ,GJ
)
. Equation (10) can thus
serve as general-purpose specification tool: by specifying a function G, the mod-
eller determines the way products interact in utility (7) or in demand (11), and
thus the type of relationship between them. In other words, Equation (10) gives
a general method for parametrizing the cross-price elasticities of demands.
Combining Equations (10) for product 0 and product j, with the normaliza-
tion δ0 = 0, one obtains the following inverse demand equations to be estimated
ξj = − ln
(
Gj (s)
G0 (s)
)
+ xjβ −αpj , j = 1, . . . , J. (12)
Then, after parametrizing G with parameters θ2, Equations (12) can be esti-
mated using standard IV regression techniques. In addition, if lnG is linear in
parameters θ2, then one just requires linear IV regression for estimation; this is
the case of the logit and nested logit models (Berry, 1994; Verboven, 1996), of
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the inverse product diﬀerentiation logit model (Fosgerau et al., 2019b) and of the
flexible inverse logit model (Monardo, 2019). Alternatively, Equation (12) could
be estimated non-parametrically, imposing shape restrictions onG given by Con-
ditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii).
5 Proofs
This section provides the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 and of Proposition 2.
5.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Condition (MDZ i) By definition, σ satisfies
∑
j∈J σj(δ) = 1 with σj(δ) ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ J .
In the PUM, the representative consumer solves
max
s∈∆J

∑
j∈J
δjsj −Ω(s)
 . (13)
The corresponding Lagrangian is given by
L(s,λ,λ0, . . . ,λJ ) =
∑
j∈J
δjsj −Ω(s) +λ
1−∑
j∈J
sj
+∑
j∈J
λjsj ,
where λ ≥ 0 and λj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J .
This utility maximization program leads to
∑
j∈J sj = 1 and the following first-
order conditions
δj − ∂Ω (s)∂sj −λ+λj = 0, j ∈ J .
Note that the objective function of the utility maximization program (13) is
continuous on the compact set ∆J . Then, by the Weierstrass theorem, the utility
maximizing program has a solution, either in the interior or on the boundary of
∆J .
Condition (GIL iii) ensures that this solution is interior. To see this, note
that for s ∈ bd(∆J ), |∇sΩ(s)| = +∞. This implies that s ∈ bd(∆J ) cannot solve
the first-order conditions, and, in turn, that the solution is interior, i.e., satisfies∑
j∈J σj(δ) = 1 with σj(δ) > 0 for all j ∈ J .
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Lastly, the strict concavity of Ω, which implies the strict concavity of the ob-
jective function, ensures that the solution is unique.
Condition (MDZ ii) is implied by the quasi-linearity of the utility function as
follows
argmax
s∈∆J

∑
j∈J
(
δj + c
)
sj −Ω(s)
 = argmaxs∈∆J

∑
j∈J
δjsj −Ω(s) + c
 ,
= argmax
s∈∆J

∑
j∈J
δjsj −Ω(s)
 .
(see also Allen and Rehbeck, 2019a, p.1031). This implies that the vector δ is
identified up to an additive constant, which, in turn, requires a normalization. In
the remainder of this proof, I consider, without loss of generality, that δ belongs
to RJ+10 ≡ {δ ∈ RJ+1 : δ0 = 0}.
Condition (MDZ iii) Assume that δj tends towards infinity, while the other δi ,
i , j, remain finite. Then, since Ω (s) is finite on ∆J , this implies that sj tends
towards its upper bound, i.e., one, and, then, that the other si , i , j, tend towards
zero (since s ∈ int(∆J )).
Condition (MDZ iv) One can use Lemma 1 of Allen and Rehbeck (2019a), since
the PUM considered in the present paper satisfies their Assumption 2. Then, the
PUM satisfies Roy’s identity, i.e., ∇δCS (δ) = σ (δ). In addition, as shown in the
proof of Proposition 2, (int(∆J ),Ω) is a convex function of Legendre type. Then,
by Proposition 4, (RJ+10 ,CS) is also a convex function of Legendre type, which
implies that CS is strictly convex on RJ+10 , and thus has a Hessian that is positive
definite. Overall, this implies that Condition (MDZ iv) is satisfied.
Condition (MDZ v) is implied by Lemma 2 of Allen and Rehbeck (2019a), since
the PUM considered in the present paper satisfies their Assumption 2.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Note first, by Condition (MDZ ii), that one can consider without loss of general-
ity the restriction of σ and CS to RJ+10 . Then, by the inverse function theorem,
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Condition (MDZ iv) implies that σ is one-to-one on RJ+10 . Set
σj (δ) = σ j (δ) = sj , j ∈ J . (14)
By Condition (MDZ ii), this is equivalent to
σj (δ+ c1) = σ j (δ) = sj , j ∈ J ,
which, after inverting, gives
σ−1j (s) = σ
−1
j (s) + c = δj , j ∈ J .
Now, set σ j (δ) = σ˜j
(
eδ
)
, for all j ∈ J . Inverting gives σ−1j (s) = ln σ˜−1j (s) ≡
lnGj (s), so that one obtains the requested result
σ−1j (s) = lnGj (s) + c = δj , j ∈ J . (15)
Condition (MDZ v) implies that σ admits a function C˜S : RJ+10 → R such that
∇δC˜S = σ . By Roy’s identity, this function is, up to an additive constant, the
consumer surplus, C˜S = CS. In addition, Condition (MDZ iv) implies that CS is
diﬀerentiable and convex on RJ+10 . Then, by Proposition 3, ∇δCS(δ) = σ (δ) = s
implies that ∑
j∈J
δjsj =Ω(s) +CS(δ), (16)
whereΩ : int(∆J )→ R is the convex conjugate of CS.
Now, note that c is in utility terms, that is, c = c (δ). Then, multiplying Equa-
tions (15) by sj and summing over j ∈ J yields∑
j∈J
δjsj =
∑
j∈J
sj lnGj (s) + c(δ). (17)
Comparing the Equations (16) and (17) leads to c(δ) = CS (δ).
Condition (GIL i) Using Equation (14), Conditions (MDZ iv) and (MDZ v) imply
that Jδσ is positive definite and symmetric on R
J+1
0 .
Recall that σ ≡ σ˜ ◦ exp is one-to-one; then set s = σ˜ ◦ exp(δ), so that δ =
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ln σ˜−1(s) ≡ lnG(s). Using the inverse function theorem, one obtains
Jδσ (δ) = J
δ
σ˜◦exp(δ) =
[
Js(σ˜◦exp)−1(σ˜ ◦ exp(δ))
]−1
=
[
Jsln σ˜−1(s)
]−1
=
[
JslnG(s)
]−1
,
i.e., JslnG(s) =
[
Jδσ (δ)
]−1
, which implies that JslnG is symmetric and positive definite
on int(∆J ).
Condition (GIL ii) Using Equation (17), Proposition 3 implies that s ∈ int(∆J )
maximizes ∑
j∈J
δjsj −
∑
j∈J
sj lnGj (s) ,
which yields the first-order conditions
∑
j∈J sj = 1 together with
δj = lnGj (s) +
∑
k∈J
sk
∂ lnGk (s)
∂sj
+λ, j ∈ J .
By symmetry of JslnG, this yields
δj = lnGj (s) +
∑
k∈J
sk
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
+λ, j ∈ J .
However, recall from Equation (15),
δj = lnGj(s) + c,
where c is common across products. This means that the quantity
∑
k∈J
sk
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
is independent of s and common across products. This also implies that it can be
set, e.g., equal to K ∈ R, so that
∑
k∈J
sk
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
= K,
which, by Lemma 4, means that G is homogeneous of degree K . Then,
δj = lnGj(s) +K +λ, j ∈ J ,
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which, after inverting, yields
sj =Hj
(
eδ−(K+λ)
)
= e−(K+λ)/KHj
(
eδ
)
,
where the second equality uses that H is homogeneous of degree 1/K , its inverse
G being homogeneous of degree K .
Using that demands sum to one yields sj =
Hj(eδ)∑
k∈J Hk(eδ)
and ln
(∑
k∈J Hk
(
eδ
))
=
(K + λ)/K , which implies that CS(δ) = K ln
(∑
k∈J Hk
(
eδ
))
. However, demands
must satisfy Roy’s identity, i.e., σj(δ) =
∂CS(δ)
∂δj
, which implies that K = 1.
Condition (GIL iii) By Proposition 4, (∇sΩ)−1(δ) = ∇δCS(δ) = σ (δ) = s. When s
approaches bd(∆J ), |∇sΩ(s)| = | lnG(s)+1| approaches infinity, which implies that
| lnG(s)| approaches infinity as well.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof makes uses of Proposition 4 as applied to the function Ω : RJ+1 →
R∪ {+∞} defined by
Ω (s) =

∑
j∈J sj lnGj (s) if s ∈ ∆J ,
+∞ otherwise,
where lnG satisfies Conditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii).
I first show that (int(∆J ),Ω) is a convex function of Legendre type. Ω is strictly
convex on int(∆J ), since its Hessian is equal to JslnG(s) for any s ∈ int(∆J ) (see
Lemma 4 in Fosgerau et al., 2019b). Ω is essentially smooth, since it is diﬀeren-
tiable through the open convex set int(∆J ) with limi→∞ |∇siΩ (si) | = +∞whenever
s1,s2, . . . is a sequence in int(∆J ) converging to a point s ∈ bd(∆J ). The latter fea-
ture is shown by first noting that ∇sΩ(s) = lnG(s) + 1 for s ∈ int(∆J ) and then
using that lims→bd(∆J ) | lnG(s)| = +∞.
Then, using Proposition 4, ∇sΩ = lnG+1, and thus lnG, is a bijection between
int(∆J ) and RJ+1 with a continuous inverse mapping.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationships between the class of GIL models developed
by Fosgerau et al. (2019b) and the class of PUM studied by Allen and Rehbeck
(2019a). It establishes that the conditions that the GIL models impose on the
inverse demand function are necessary and suﬃcient for consistency with PUM
maximization.
The GILmodel can be used in diﬀerent contexts. They can be used for demand
estimation purposes and to study economic questions, such as mergers, products’
entry, changes in regulations (e.g., taxes). In particular, Fosgerau et al. (2019b)
build the IPDLmodel and show its use by estimating the demand for ready-to-eat
cereals in Chicago in 1991-1992. Moreover, recalling that the inverse function is
the target of estimation in structural demand estimation, one could use the shape
restrictions imposed on GIL models for non-parametric estimation; alternatively,
these conditions could be tested after estimation.
Lastly, the GIL model could also be used to model consumer’s dynamic be-
havior in the spirit of De Groote and Verboven (2019) and matching in the spirit
of Galichon and Salanié (2015).
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A Preliminaries
A.1 Elements of Convex Analysis
This subsection provides the elements of convex analysis used in the paper. See
Rockafellar (1970) and Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) for a comprehensive treat-
ment of the topic.
Consider a convex function f that takes values in the extended real number
line and whose domain of definition is a subset X of RJ+1: f : X → R∪ {±∞}. Its
eﬀective domain domf is defined by domf = {x ∈ X |f (x) < +∞} and is a convex set
in RJ+1. The convexity of f is equivalent to that of the restriction of f to domf .
A proper convex function f is a convex function that takes values in the ex-
tended real number line such that f (x) < +∞ for at least one x and f (x) > −∞
for every x. Then, f is proper if and only if its eﬀective domain domf is non-
empty and the restriction of f to domf is finite. In other words, a proper convex
function on RJ+1 is a function obtained by taking a finite convex function f on
a non-empty convex set domf and then extending it to all of RJ+1 by setting
f (x) = +∞ for x < domf .
Let f : RJ+1 → R∪{+∞}. The convex conjugate of the function f is the function
f ∗ : RJ+1 → R∪ {+∞} defined as
f ∗ (x∗) = sup
x∈domf
{x∗ᵀx− f (x)}.
Note that f ∗ is a convex function, regardless of whether f is convex. In addition,
when f is convex, the subscript x ∈ domf is not necessary since, by definition,
x∗ᵀx−f (x) = −∞ for x < domf . The conjugate of a diﬀerentiable function f is also
called the Legendre transform of f .
A proper convex function f is essentially smooth if (i) int(domf ) is non-empty;
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(ii) f is diﬀerentiable throughout int(domf ), (iii) limi→∞ |∇xi f (xi)| = +∞ when-
ever x1,x2, . . . is a sequence in int(domf ) converging to a point x ∈ bd(domf ).
A pair (int(domf ) , f ) is a convex function of Legendre type if int(domf ) is an
open convex set and f is a strictly convex function on int(domf ) that is essen-
tially smooth.
The results of this paper make use of the following two propositions.
Proposition 3 (Theorems 23.5 and 26.1 in Rockafellar (1970)). Let f : RJ+1 →
R∪{+∞} be a proper convex function. Assume that f is continuous and essentially
smooth.The following five conditions are equivalent
1. x∗ = ∇f (x), x ∈ int (domf );
2. x = ∇f ∗(x∗), x∗ ∈ int (domf ∗);
3. x = supz{x∗ᵀz− f (z)};
4. x∗ = supz∗{z∗ᵀx− f ∗(z∗)};
5. f (x) + f ∗(x∗) = x∗ᵀx.
Proposition 4 (Theorem 26.5 in Rockafellar (1970) ). Let f : RJ+1 → R∪ {+∞} be
a continuous convex function. Assume that (int(domf ), f ) is a convex function of
Legendre type. Then (int(domf ∗), f ∗) is also a convex function of Legendre type.
Furthermore, the gradient mapping ∇xf is a continuous bijection between
int(domf ) and int(domf ∗), with a continuous inverse mapping (∇xf )−1 = ∇x∗f ∗,
i.e., (∇xf )−1(x∗) = ∇x∗f ∗(x∗) for x∗ ∈ int(domf ∗).
A.2 An Euler-Type Equation
The following lemma, presented in a slightly diﬀerent version in Fosgerau et al.
(2019b), establishes that the logarithm of a homogeneous function (which is a
homothetic function) satisfies a modification of the generalized Euler equation
for homothetic functions (McElroy, 1969).
Lemma 4. Consider a function G : [0,∞)J+1 → [0,∞)J+1. Assume that JslnG is
symmetric on int(∆J ). G is homogeneous of degree K if and only if it satisfies the
Euler-type equation
∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
= K, s ∈ int(∆J ). (18)
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Proof.
⇒ is shown by Fosgerau et al. (2019b) for the case of K = 1, but the proof can be
easily extended to any K as follows
∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGj (s)
∂sk
=
∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGk (s)
∂sj
=
∑
j∈J sj
∂Gk(s)
∂sj
Gk (s)
=
KGk (s)
Gk (s)
= K,
where the first equality uses the symmetry of JslnG and the third equality uses
uses the Euler equation for the homogeneous function G.
⇐ Assume that G satisfies the Euler-type Equation (18). Then, by symmetry of
JslnG ∑
j∈J
sj
∂ lnGk (s)
∂sj
= K,
that is ∑
j∈J
sj
∂Gk (s)
∂sj
1
Gk (s)
= K,
and ∑
j∈J
sj
∂Gk (s)
∂sj
= KGk (s) ,
which implies that G is homogeneous of degree K .
B On the Additive Random Utility Model (ARUM)
The ARUM was popularized by McFadden (1973). Due to its ability to model
the behavior of heterogeneous consumers in the presence of many diﬀerentiated
products in a tractable and parsimonious way, it has been ubiquitously used in
the literature on structural estimation of demand models for diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts since Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995).
The ARUM In the ARUM, the utility uj that each consumer derives from choos-
ing product j ∈ J is the sum of a deterministic utility term δj and a randomutility
term εj
uj = δj + εj , j ∈ J ,
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where δj is given by Equation (1).19 This specification assumes, as it is the case
for the PUM, that the only source of consumer heterogeneity in preferences is
due to the vector of random utility terms ε whose distribution is parametrized by
the vector θ2.
As it is standard in the discrete choice literature, I further assume that the
random vector ε follows a joint distribution with finite means that is absolutely
continuous, independent of δ, and fully supported on RJ+1. This implies that
utility ties ui = uj , i , j, occur with probability 0, meaning that the argmax set
of the ARUM is almost surely a singleton; that the choice probabilities are all
almost everywhere positive; and that demands depend on prices and product
characteristics only through product indexes δ.
In an ARUM, each consumer chooses the product that provides her the high-
est utility, so that demands are given by
σj (δ) = Pr
(
uj ≥ ui , ∀i , j
)
, j ∈ J . (19)
The Daly-Zachary Conditions Daly and Zachary (1979) provide the shape re-
strictions that any ARUM impose on their demands. These conditions, known as
the Daly-Zachary conditions, are given as follows.
Conditions DZ The demand function σ satisfies, for all δ ∈ RJ+1 and for all
j ∈ J ,
(DZ i) σj (δ) > 0 and
∑
k∈J σk (δ) = 1 (positive unit demand)
(DZ ii) σj (δ) = σj (δ+ c1) for all c ∈ R (translation invariance)
(DZ iii) lim
δj→∞
σj (δ) = 1 and lim
δj→∞
σi (δ) = 0 with δi <∞, i , j (boundary con-
ditions)
(DZ iv) The partial derivatives of σj with respect to any set of distinct product
indexes other than δj exist, are independent of the order of diﬀerentia-
tion, and satisfy
(−1)k∂
kσj (δ)
∂δk−j
> 0, k = 1, . . . , J, (20)
with δk−j any k-subvector of δ−j (positivity)
19This is equivalent to let the residual income (y − pj ) enter linearly with a coeﬃcient α, which
implies unit demand and absence of income eﬀect.
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(DZ v) Jδσ is symmetric (Slutsky symmetry)
Note that, with respect to the original Daly-Zachary conditions, Conditions
(DZ i) and (DZ iv) hold with strict inequality (i.e., the original Daly-Zachary con-
ditions allow zero demands and zero partial derivatives). This is a consequence
of the assumption that ε is fully supported on RJ+1, which, e.g., is satisfied by the
logit and nested logit models.
The following proposition, due to Daly and Zachary (1979) and restated by
Anderson et al. (1992) in their Theorem 3.1, states that Conditions (DZ i) – (DZ
v) are necessary and suﬃcient for consistency with ARUM maximization.20
Proposition 5. The ARUM choice probabilities (19) satisfy Conditions (DZ i) –
(DZ v). Conversely, any demand satisfying Conditions (DZ i) – (DZ v) can be
derived as ARUM choice probabilities (19).
Proof. See Proofs of Theorem 3.1. in Anderson et al. (1992) or of Theorem 3 in
Koning and Ridder (2003).
Comparisonwith theMDZConditions As highlighted by Hofbauer and Sand-
holm (2002), ARUM satisfies Slutsky symmetry and positive definiteness, plus
the additional positivity condition. This implies, as already noted by Koning and
Ridder (2003), that Slutsky symmetry and positive definiteness is weaker than
Slutsky symmetry and positivity.
Koning and Ridder (2003) show that Slutsky Jpσ symmetry and negative semi-
definiteness is weaker than Slutsky symmetry and non-negativity (i.e., Equation
(20) holds with weak inequality). As an illustration, they consider the simple
J +1 = 2 case (see their Appendix C). Their illustration can be easily extended to
show that Slutsky Jδσ symmetry and positive definiteness is weaker than Slutsky
symmetry and positivity.
20The Daly-Zachary conditions are also known as the Daly-Zachary-McFadden conditions, due
to McFadden (1981). They were re-stated by Anderson et al. (1992) in their Theorem 3.1 and
further studied by Koning and Ridder (2003). Other papers have investigated the restrictions on
demands that make them consistent with a random utility maximization (see e.g., Armstrong and
Vickers (2015), Jaﬀe and Weyl (2010), Jaﬀe and Kominers (2012), Bhattacharya (2019)).
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Slutsky Jδσ positive definiteness requires that the Slutsky matrix
∂σ0 (δ)
∂δ0
∂σ0 (δ)
∂δ1
∂σ1 (δ)
∂δ0
∂σ1 (δ)
∂δ1

be positive definite, which implies that the diagonal elements must be positive.
Positivity requires that
∂σ0 (δ)
∂δ1
< 0 and
∂σ1 (δ)
∂δ0
< 0.
Since Condition (i) holds, Slutsky symmetry implies
∂σ0 (δ)
∂δ0
= −∂σ0 (δ)
∂δ1
= −∂σ1 (δ)
∂δ0
=
∂σ1 (δ)
∂δ1
.
Assume that Condition (i) holds. Then, no-negativity and Slutsky Jδσ sym-
metry imply that the Slutsky matrix is positive definite and symmetric, with the
additional requirement that its oﬀ-diagonal elements negative. They are thus
stronger than Slutsky Jδσ symmetry and positive definiteness.
C The Logit Example
The standard logit model satisfies the properties of the ARUM defined in Ap-
pendix B. It rules out income eﬀect and the only source of consumer heterogene-
ity in preferences is due to the vector of random utility terms ϵ where εj are i.i.d.
type I extreme value, so that ϵ follows a joint distributes with finite means that
is absolutely continuous, independent of δ, and fully supported on RJ+1. This
Appendix illustrates the findings of Section 4 through the logit example.
The Modified Daly-Zachary Conditions The logit model has demands given
by
σj (δ) =
eδj∑
k∈J eδk
=
1
1+
∑
k∈J \{j} eδk−δj
, (21)
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which satisfies the modified Daly-Zachary conditions. Indeed, demands (21) are
positive and sum to one. They are invariant to translation in δ since
σj (δ+ c1) =
1
1+
∑
k∈J \{j} e(δk+c)−(δj+c)
= σj (δ) ,
and, with δk < ∞, k , j, lim
δj→∞
σj (δ) = 1 and lim
δj→∞
σk (δ) = 0, k , j. Its Slutsky
matrix given by
Jδσ =

s0 (1− s0) −s0s1 · · · −s0sJ
−s0s1 . . . . . . ...
...
. . . . . . −s0sJ−1
−s0sJ · · · −s0sJ−1 sJ
(
1− sJ
)

,
with s = σ (δ), is positive definite on RJ+10 , since
zᵀJδσz =
∑
i∈J
∑
i<j
sisj
(
zi − zj
)2
> 0, for all z ∈ RJ+10 ,
and symmetric.
Shape Restrictions on the Inverse Demand The logit model has inverse de-
mands given by
σ−1j (s) = lnGj (s) + c, j ∈ J ,
with
lnGj (s) ≡ ln
(
sj
)
, j ∈ J .
where c is the consumer surplus, which is given by the log-sum-exp function
CS (δ) = ln
∑
j∈J
eδj
 ,
up to an additive constant (see Berry, 1994). Then, lnG(s) ≡
(
ln(s0), . . . , ln(sJ )
)
sat-
isfies Conditions (GIL i) – (GIL iii): G is continuously diﬀerentiable and homoge-
nous of degree one on int(∆J ), since for λ > 0,G(λs) =G(λs); JslnG = IJ+1 is positive
definite and symmetric on int(∆J ); and | lnG(s)| =∑j∈J | ln(sj)| approaches infinity
as s approaches bd(∆J ).
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The Logit Model as a Perturbed Utility Model As shown by Anderson et al.
(1988), the logit demands can also be obtained from a model of the form of Equa-
tion (6), whereΩ is given by the Shannon entropy21
Ω (s) =

∑
j∈J sj ln(sj) if s ∈ ∆J ,
+∞ otherwise.
More precisely, Anderson et al. (1988) consider a representative consumer
choosing a vector of market shares, trading oﬀ variety against quality, so as to
maximize her utility composed of two terms: the first term,
∑
j∈J δjsj , captures
the net utility that she derives from consuming s in absence of interaction among
products and the second term, −Ω(s), expresses her taste for variety. Indeed,
if her utility were only composed of the first term, then she would only choose
the product j with the highest net utility δj . Likewise, if her utility were only
composed of the second term, then she would choose all the products with equal
shares (and she would minimize her utility by choosing only one product). This
last feature justifies why −Ω(s) expresses taste for variety and is a manifestation
of the IIA property of the logit model.
The logit model satisfies Conditions (PUM i) – (PUM iii). Indeed, the Shannon
entropy Ω is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly convex since its Hessian,
equal to IJ+1, is positive definite; |∇sΩ(s)| =∑j∈J | ln(sj)+1| approaches infinity as
s ∈ bd(∆J ).
21Note that it is known, from the convex analysis literature, that CS is the convex conjugate of
the Shannon entropy (see Example 3.25 (p. 93) of Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
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Re´sume´ :
L’estimation structurelle des mode`les de demande sur des
marche´s de produits diffe´rencie´s joue un roˆle important en
e´conomie. Elle permet de mieux comprendre les choix des
consommateurs et, entre autres, de mesurer les effets d’une
fusion d’entreprise, de l’introduction d’un nouveau produit
sur le marche´ ou d’une nouvelle re´gulation. L’approche tra-
ditionnelle consiste a` spe´cifier un mode`le d’utilite´, typique-
ment un mode`le d’utilite´ ale´atoire additif, a` en calculer ses
demandes et a` inverser ces dernie`res pour obtenir des
e´quations de demande inverse qui serviront de base pour
l’estimation. Toutefois, en ge´ne´ral, ces demandes inverses
n’ont pas de forme analytique. L’estimation exige donc une
inversion nume´rique et l’emploi de proce´dures d’estimation
non-line´aire, qui peuvent eˆtre difficiles a` mettre en oeuvre et
chronophages.
Cette the`se adopte une approche diffe´rente, en de´veloppant
de nouveaux mode`les de demande inverse qui sont
cohe´rents avec un mode`le d’utilite´ de consommateurs
he´te´roge`nes. Cette approche permet de capter de fac¸on
plus flexible les substitutions entre les produits, graˆce a` de
simples re´gressions line´aires base´es sur des donne´es in-
cluant les parts de marche´, les prix et les caracte´ristiques
des produits.
Le premier chapitre de cette the`se de´veloppe le mode`le in-
verse product differentiation logit (IPDL), qui ge´ne´ralise les
mode`les logit emboıˆte´s, permettant ainsi de capter de fac¸on
flexible les substitutions entre les produits, y compris de la
comple´mentarite´. Il montre que le mode`le IPDL appartient a`
une classe de mode`les de demande inverse, nomme´e gene-
ralized inverse logit (GIL), laquelle inclut une grande majorite´
de mode`les d’utilite´ ale´atoire additifs qui ont e´te´ utilise´s a` des
fins d’estimation de la demande.
Le second chapitre de´veloppe le mode`le flexible inverse logit
(FIL), un mode`le GIL qui utilise une structure de nids flexible
avec un nid pour chaque pair de produits. Il montre que le
mode`le FIL, projete´ dans l’espace des caracte´ristiques des
produits, permet d’obtenir des e´lasticite´s-prix qui de´pendent
directement des caracte´ristiques des produits et, en utili-
sant des simulations de Monte-Carlo, qu’il est capable de
reproduire celles du ”flexible” mode`le logit a` coefficients
ale´atoires.
Le troisie`me chapitre e´tudie la micro-fondation du mode`le
GIL. Il montre que les restrictions que le mode`le GIL im-
pose sur la fonction de demande inverse sont des conditions
ne´cessaires et suffisantes de cohe´rence avec un mode`le de
consommateurs he´te´roge`nes maximisant leur fonction d’uti-
lite´, connu sous le nom de perturbed utility model (PUM). Il
montre e´galement que tout mode`le GIL ge´ne`re une fonction
de demande qui satisfait une le´ge`re variante des conditions
de Daly-Zachary, laquelle permet de combiner substituabilite´
et comple´mentarite´ en demande.
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Abstract : Estimation of structural demand models in dif-
ferentiated product markets plays an important role in eco-
nomics. It allows to better understand consumers’ choices
and, amongst other, to assess the effects of mergers, new
products, and changes in regulation. The standard approach
consists in specifying a utility model, typically an additive
random utility model, computing its demands, and inverting
them to obtain inverse demand equations, which will serve
as a basis for estimation. However, since these inverse de-
mands have generally no closed form, estimation requires
numerical inversion and non-linear optimization, which can
be painful and time-consuming.
This dissertation adopts a different approach, developing no-
vel inverse demand models, which are consistent with a uti-
lity model of heterogeneous consumers. This approach al-
lows to accommodate rich substitution patterns thanks to
simple linear regressions with data on market shares, prices
and product characteristics.
The first chapter of this dissertation develops the inverse pro-
duct differentiation logit (IPDL) model, which generalizes the
nested logit models to allow for richer substitution patterns,
including complementarity. It also shows that the IPDL mo-
del belongs to the class of generalized inverse logit (GIL)
models, which includes a vast majority of additive random
utility models that have been used for demand estimation
purposes.
The second chapter develops the flexible inverse logit (FIL)
model, a GIL model that uses a flexible nesting structure with
a nest for each pair of products. It shows that the FIL model,
projected into product characteristics space, makes the price
elasticities depending on product characteristics directly and,
using Monte Carlo simulations, that it is able to mimic those
from the ”flexible” random coefficient logit model.
The third chapter studies the micro-foundation of the GIL mo-
del. It shows that the restrictions that the GIL model imposes
on the inverse demand function are necessary and sufficient
for consistency with a model of heterogeneous and utility-
maximizing consumers, called perturbed utility model. It also
shows that any GIL model yields a demand function that sa-
tisfies a slight variant of the Daly-Zachary conditions, which
allows to combine substitutability and complementarity in de-
mand.
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